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ABSTRACT 
Anti Virus (AV) software generally employs signature matching and 
heuristics to detect the presence of malicious software (malware). The 
generation of signatures and determination of heuristics is dependent upon 
an AV analyst having successfully determined the nature of the malware, 
not only for recognition purposes, but also for the determination of infected 
files and startup mechanisms that need to be removed as part of the 
disinfection process. If a specimen of malware has not been previously 
extensively analyzed, it is unlikely to be detected by AV software. In 
addition, malware is becoming increasingly profit driven and more likely to 
incorporate stealth and deception techniques to avoid detection and analysis 
to remain on infected systems for a myriad of nefarious purposes.  
 
Malware extends beyond the commonly thought of virus or worm, to 
customized malware that has been developed for specific and targeted 
miscreant purposes. Such customized malware is highly unlikely to be 
detected by AV software because it will not have been previously analyzed 
and a signature will not exist. Analysis in such a case will have to be 
conducted by a digital forensics analyst to determine the functionality of the 
malware.  
 
Malware can employ a plethora of techniques to hinder the analysis process 
conducted by AV and digital forensics analysts.  The purpose of this 
research has been to answer three research questions directly related to the 
employment of these techniques as: 
1. What techniques can malware use to avoid being analyzed? 
2. How can the use of these techniques be detected? 
3. How can the use of these techniques be mitigated? 
 
These questions were effectively answered by validating anti-analysis 
techniques, showing how the techniques can be effectively detected and 
mitigated as well as by analyzing malware collected from the internet. This 
research contributes to the knowledge of malware analysis and digital 
forensics by: 
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• Demonstrating that anti-analysis techniques can be very effective at 
hindering analysis by the tools typically used by analysts. 
• Showing that the use of anti-analysis techniques can be effectively 
detected and mitigated by the use of appropriate analysis techniques, 
scripts and plugins. 
• Support of claims virus signature based detection by anti-virus 
software can be far less than ideal. 
• Showing that extensive use of packers and protectors are employed 
by network based malware collected from the internet to obstruct 
signature based detection and to hinder analysis. 
• Support of an alternate paradigm of malware detection that could use 
detection of deception and anti-analysis techniques to detect 
malicious software instead of using virus signatures and heuristics. 
• Identification of a Malware Analysis Body of Knowledge (MABOK) that 
incorporates anti-analysis techniques as a core component. 
• Identification of deficiencies in analysis tools given the extent of 
available anti-analysis techniques. 
• Determination of an appropriate analysis methodology tailored for 
dealing with anti-analysis techniques. 
• Development of a taxonomy of analysis avoidance techniques. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1. OVERVIEW 
This thesis analyses techniques malicious software (malware) incorporates 
into its code to prevent and/or hinder the malware forensic analyst from 
conducting an analysis of the malware. The effectiveness of these 
techniques was validated in this research. A variety of procedures were 
developed and examined to determine if these anti-analysis techniques 
could be detected and mitigated. Malware collected from the internet was 
also analyzed to partially corroborate these techniques. This research found 
that a plethora of techniques are available to hinder the malware analyst 
and all of the techniques that were implemented in the course of this 
research were found to be effective at hindering analysis. Equally, detection 
and mitigation techniques were uncovered and also found to be effective at 
detecting and mitigating the anti-analysis techniques. Malware and forensic 
analysts and researchers will be the primary users of this research.  
 
Aycock (2006, pp. 1-12) defines malware as “software whose intent is 
malicious, or whose effect is malicious”. Analysis of malicious software is 
essential for computer security management and is emerging as an 
important field of research. This is because malware is often targeted at 
organizations and is increasingly using anti-analysis techniques to prevent 
detection and analysis (Masood, 2004).  
 
Anti-Forensics is described by Rogers (2006) as “attempts to negatively 
affect the existence, amount, and/or quality of evidence from a crime scene, 
or make the examination of evidence difficult or impossible to extract”. 
Kessler (2007) extends this definition in a practical sense by saying “anti-
forensics, then, is that set of tools, methods, and processes that hinder 
such analysis”. The movement towards the employment of anti-forensic 
techniques in malware could be attributed to the substantial illicit financial 
gain that can now be achieved from employing malware nefariously 
(Larsson, 2007; Newman, 2006; Sukhai, 2004; Team Cymru, 2006). 
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Commercial Anti-Virus (AV) software is often limited in its ability to detect 
and remove malware (Chouchane, Walenstein, & Lakhotia, 2007; Mila Dalla, 
Mihai, Somesh, & Saumya, 2008; Xuxian, Xinyuan, & Dongyan, 2007; Yin, 
Song, Egele, Kruegel, & Kirda, 2007; Zhang, Reeves, Ning, & 
Purushothaman Iyer, 2007; Zhou & Meador Inge, 2008). This is essentially 
because AV software relies on an analyst having already analyzed collected 
malware, extracted a signature and made computer virus signature files 
available to the users of the AV software through very regular updates. 
Hence, AV software is highly unlikely to detect new malware that is 
unleashed on the internet, corporate intranet or that has been customized 
to target specific networks  because it has not been previously analyzed and 
had a signature extracted (Masood, 2004).   
 
1.2. A STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
There is a positive feedback loop between malware developers and malware 
researchers. As soon as a strategy is developed by one side, the other side 
implements a counter measure. Security professionals in the field need to 
know how to determine if they are the target of an attack, what the 
functionality of malware infections is and how to eradicate infections from 
their systems. This is especially true if a signature does not exist and the 
forensic analyst is required to analyse the instance of malware. The analysis 
process can be assisted if the analyst has up to date methodologies and skill 
sets at their disposal.  
 
Virus Total provides a web-based, free and independent service that uses 
multiple anti-virus engines to analyze suspicious files that have been 
uploaded to their site. Virus Total (2007), on their website, state that 
“Currently, there is not any solution that offers a 100% effectiveness rate 
for detecting viruses and malware”. In support of this statement, Figure 1-1 
shows the results that were captured from submitting a potentially harmful 
web robot (bot) that was collected from the ECU Nepenthes sensor 
network, to the Virus Total service.  
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Figure 1-1 Screen shot from Virus Total showing low detection rate 
of submitted bot after examination by thirty one different AV 
engines. 
 
Out of the thirty-one antivirus programs that had the bot submitted to them, 
only six detected the bot, whilst one detected that there was a low threat 
present. This is not a particularly unusual result, evidenced from this 
research and supported by other researchers (Bilar, 2005; Masood, 2004; 
Mohandas, n.d.; Skoudis & Zeltser, 2004; Szewczyk & Brand, 2008; 
Wysopal, 2009). An analysis of the Win32.Qucan.a worm, by Mohandas 
(n.d., p. 20), found that only 50% of the antivirus detection engines were 
able to detect the worm that he submitted. This finding is well supported by 
the researchers with indication that the situation is deteriorating. Masood 
(2004) claims that the percentage of malware that avoids automated 
detection is growing every day and “manages to wreak havoc on networks”. 
Skoudis and Zeltser (2004, p. 108) emphasize that with new and fast 
spreading malware, most computer users would not be able to download a 
virus definition fast enough to stop them. Rubenking (2007) says that a 
solution needs to be found where malware can be recognized and cleaned 
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up whilst not interfering with legitimate programs or interfere with the 
normal operation of the computer. 
 
Part of the problem is that AV software relies on detecting signatures of 
malware that has already been analyzed by AV researchers and that the 
user has already downloaded the latest AV signatures to protect their 
computers. If newly released and unanalyzed malware is loaded onto a 
computer, it is highly unlikely that the malware will be detected because a 
signature will not exist. This undoubtedly can be classified as an incident. 
“An incident can be thought of as a violation or imminent threat of violation
 
of computer security policies, acceptable use policies, or standard security 
practices” (NIST, 2004, pp. 2-1). An appropriate strategy and priority must 
be assigned for the incident. NIST (2004, pp. 3-17) lists a number of 
criteria for the determination of a suitable strategy, which include 
consideration of: 
• Potential damage to, and theft of resources. 
• Need for evidence preservation. 
 
This information is important if the incident is reportable to the appropriate 
authorities and to assist in risk mitigation. However, the difficulty of 
obtaining this information must be taken into account. Malware uses a 
variety of techniques to avoid analysis. This is because there is an 
increasing profit motive for malware authors whose intention is to keep 
their malware undetected on computers (Dunham, 2006; Holt, 2007; 
Schiller et al., 2007; Sukhai, 2004; Team Cymru, 2006).  
 
A significant body of knowledge is required to obtain this information from 
manual analysis, to either develop an AV signature or to determine the 
functionality of the malware (Valli & Brand, 2008). A short, non-exhaustive, 
requisite skills list for Windows-based malware analysis indicated by Valli & 
Brand could include: 
• Assembly language programming. 
• Program debugging skills. 
• Static analysis techniques. 
• Dynamic analysis techniques. 
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• Windows Applications Programming Interface (API) programming. 
• Windows Operating System. 
• Computer networking skills. 
• Malware techniques. 
• Reverse engineering skills. 
 
Automated and semi-automated tools exist to assist in this analysis, but 
malware can detect these tools and alter its behaviour to hide its presence 
and/or modify its behaviour to not show its true intentions. This is 
exemplified by the research of Lau and Svajcer (2008). These researchers 
found that families of malware will adapt its behaviour if it detects it is 
running in a virtual machine by stopping execution or will run an alternate 
payload to deceive the forensic analyst. This is because forensic analysis of 
malware is often performed from within virtual machines. The advantage of 
using virtual machines for analysis is that they can be reverted to a known 
state very quickly. This is especially useful for analyzing malware that 
employs deception. If a deceptive path is executed that adds no value to 
the analysis but corrupts the host that is running the malware, the host can 
be reverted back to a known state and analysis continued down an alternate 
path of execution.   
 
There is evidence that malware writers are targeting specific organizations 
such as banks. Larsson (2007) claims to have interviewed the creator of the 
Haxdoor Trojan, which was purportedly used to steal eight million Swedish 
Kronor from the Nordea bank. The significant issue raised in the article is 
that the creator of the virus is offering to create and sell customized 
versions of his malware so that users can steal money from accounts from 
the bank of their choice. He also offers support to achieve this, such as 
provision of servers for saving the stolen account information, in a non-
traceable way. This sort of supported, targeted attack is not unprecedented. 
Dunham (2006, p. 11) reports that, in May 2005, an Israeli programmer 
was arrested for customizing and selling a Trojan horse, called Hotworld, 
to steal proprietary data from specified targets. At least eighty companies 
were implicated, including private investigation firms. This is significant 
because it is highly unlikely that such customized malware will be detected 
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by AV software and in addition, that companies are prepared to pay for 
stolen information.  
 
1.3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The objective of this research has been to find answers to the following 
research questions: 
1. What techniques can malware use to avoid being analyzed? 
2. How can the use of these techniques be detected? 
3. How can the use of these techniques be mitigated? 
 
Research question one seeks to find out what techniques malware can use 
to hinder the forensic analyst from fully analyzing it. The objective of the 
malware is to prevent full discovery of its malicious intent by using 
deception and obfuscation. 
 
Research question two seeks to determine how the use of these techniques 
by malware can be detected by an analyst. This information is of value to 
the forensic analyst so that an appropriate strategy or methodology can be 
employed to counter the use of the technique. This information could also 
be of value to the forensic analyst to find evidence of intent to deceive or 
hide malicious intent. 
 
Research question three seeks to ascertain how the use of these techniques 
can be mitigated so that analysis can proceed beyond the engagement of 
the analysis avoidance technique in the code so that discovery of the true 
intent of the malicious program can be determined. 
 
1.4. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
This research contributes to the body of knowledge for malware forensic 
analysis with particular emphasis given to the advancement of the analysis 
of the anti-analysis capability of malware.  
 
The conduct of this research shows that there is a very large variety of anti-
analysis techniques malware can incorporate to hinder analysis and avoid 
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detection. This was determined primarily from a search of the literature and 
from validating the techniques in small, standalone programs and observing 
the effect on common analysis tools such as debuggers using quasi-
experimentation. A taxonomy of anti-analysis techniques was developed 
during the course of this research that amalgamates the classification of 
techniques from key papers.  
 
The detection of anti-analysis techniques feature far less in the literature 
than does the discussion of the incorporation of anti-analysis techniques. 
Detection of anti-analysis techniques in code would not only assist the 
analyst in investigation of malicious intent and the attempt at deception, it 
also appears that detection of anti-analysis techniques may be a very good 
indicator that the code has a malicious intent. This research supports other 
researcher’s claims that existing AV software, that uses signatures and 
heuristics, is less than ideal at detecting malware, especially malware that 
has not been analyzed before. Analysis of network based malware collected 
from the internet for the purposes of this research is shown to nearly all 
contain a measure of anti-analysis techniques.  Hence this research 
supports a new paradigm for AV software to rely less on signature detection 
and to be focused more on the detection of anti-analysis techniques as a 
good indicator that program under investigation is malicious.   
 
Plugins exist for popular debuggers to hide its presence from discovery by 
malware that can incorporate anti-analysis techniques. These plugins focus 
primarily on hiding the presence of the debugger and ordinarily do not log 
or notify the analyst of the presence of anti-analysis techniques in the code 
that is being analyzed. This is a significant omission if malicious intent is 
being investigated, because it will simply not be logged. This research 
shows that the coverage of mitigation techniques of plugins is much less 
than the number of anti-analysis techniques that are available. This is 
significant because a false sense of security from using the plugins may lead 
to the analyst not conducting a thorough analysis of the malware and being 
the subject of deception. This suggests a deficiency in existing tools.  
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A variety of scripting languages and Application Programming Interfaces 
(API) exist to extend popular debuggers. This research shows how they can 
be incorporated to successfully detect and mitigate the use of anti-analysis 
techniques. Given the claim by this research that existing plugins have 
severe limitations due to their lack of coverage of anti-analysis techniques 
and lack of logging functionality, scripting of debuggers is an essential skill 
required for analyzing malicious software. In addition, this research shows 
that the extent of knowledge required to analyze malware is extensive. A 
proposed Malware Analysis Body of Knowledge was initiated by the conduct 
of this research where the treatment of anti-analysis techniques is a key 
and vital component. 
 
This research examines some of the more well known methodologies for 
analyzing malware. A suitable methodology that detects the presence of 
anti-forensic techniques during the analysis process and then mitigates the 
technique has been identified through the conduct of this research.  
 
This research could also prove to be of benefit to software engineering 
where requirements dictate that the Intellectual Property (IP) of the 
software has to be protected from reverse engineering. An understanding of 
the anti-analysis techniques discussed in this thesis that can be used to 
hinder the reverse engineering of code could assist in validating such a 
requirement through Test and Evaluation (T&E). 
 
1.5. STRUCTURE OF THIS THESIS 
Chapter 1 of this thesis presents an overview of this thesis, a statement of 
the problem, the research questions this thesis addresses and highlights the 
significance of this research for the digital forensic investigator. Malware 
invariably incorporates anti-forensic techniques and AV software cannot be 
relied upon to detect the presence of malicious code. This necessitates the 
development of an appropriate methodology to reveal the true intent of 
malware. 
 
Chapter 2 provides a review of the literature. It establishes the foundation 
for this research by defining key terminology, models, classifications, anti-
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forensic techniques, previous studies and models to reveal and support lines 
of enquiry not discussed in the literature. 
 
Chapter 3 justifies the selection of the most appropriate research method, 
the conceptual framework and research design to address the research 
questions. The selected research method to address the research questions 
is positivist, empirical and quasi-experimental. Two lines of experimentation 
were identified. The first was to implement a number of anti-forensic 
techniques in small, standalone programs to determine their effectiveness 
against the software tools likely to be employed by a digital forensic analyst. 
The second line was to analyze network based malware using anti-virus 
software. 
 
Chapter 4 presents the results from conducting experiments with anti-
forensic techniques. All of the techniques were found to be effective, and 
that the use of these techniques can be detected and mitigated. 
 
Chapter 5 presents the results of having analyzed network based malware. 
The results support claims that anti-virus software is much less than ideal at 
detecting malicious software. 
 
Chapter 6 provides discussion of the results and why the results are 
significant to the digital forensic analyst. Claims of contribution to 
knowledge are discussed together with an appropriate methodology that 
can be employed by analysts when anti-forensic techniques are encountered 
during their investigations and highlights the limitations of existing tools 
and anti-virus software. Further lines onf investigation are also identified. 
 
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis by linking the claims of contribution to 
knowledge to the implications of this research. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Code that protects itself from being analyzed is a significant hindrance, not 
only to automated malware detection tools such as AV software, but also to 
the manual analysis performed by malware analysts. The purpose of this 
literature review is to examine the literature related to:  
• Characterization of network based malware 
• Existing malware analysis methodologies. 
• Anti forensic techniques used by malware to avoid analysis. 
• Malware detection techniques. 
• Packers and protectors. 
• New paradigms for malware detection. 
These lines of enquiry trace directly to the research questions. 
2.1. CHARACTERISATION OF NETWORK BASED MALWARE 
Malware presents itself as a significant threat to computer users. Various 
attack vectors exist as well as the number of malicious payloads that they 
can contain. Network based malware, such as worms, propogate 
autonomously via networks and do not propogate in the same fashion as 
viruses do. Network based malware was collected for the basis of this 
research, as discussed in the Conceptual Framework section of this thesis, 
subsection 3.6.2. For this reason, viruses are not included directly in the 
following discussion.  Hence, this subsection introduces worms and how 
they propogate. It also discusses the various payloads of worms that can 
include, but not limited to, Trojans, Rootkits, Backdoors and Bots. It is 
important to note that the payload of worms, such as Bots, have evolved to 
incorporate anti-forensic techniques. The anatomy of a worm is presented 
to provide a greater insight into how they function, and how their payloads 
have evolved to include multiple threats and have become more stealthy to 
avoid detection. Current detection methods are also discussed.  
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2.1.1. Worms 
Network worms can propagate to victim computers using a variety of 
methods. A summarized description of the propagation categories listed by 
Kaspersky Labs (2007b) is presented in Table 2-1. 
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Table 2-1 Summary of the propagation methods of worms. 
Worm Propagation Method 
Email Worms The worm could be an attachment to an email, and the 
worm is activated when the attachment is opened, or the 
email contains a link to an infected site. These worms 
spread though: 
• Windows Mail API (MAPI) functions 
• Microsoft Outlook Services 
• Directly to SMTP servers using code in the worm. 
 
Instant 
Messaging 
(ICQ and 
MSN) Worms 
 
Propagate using instant messaging applications to send 
links to entries in the contact list to infected sites.  
 
Internet 
Worms 
Spread by: 
• Copying to network resources 
• Exploitation of Operating System vulnerabilities 
• Penetration of services such as FTP and Web 
servers.  
• Take advantage of malware already installed to 
install the worm 
 
IRC Worms Utilizes contacts from the infected user to use Internet 
Relay Chat (IRC) channels to send links to infected 
websites or send infected files. 
 
File-sharing 
Networks or 
P2P Worms 
Uses the P2P network to download and execute infected 
files. 
 
 
2.1.2. Trojans 
A summarized description of the categories listed by Kaspersky Labs 
(2007a) is listed in Table 2-2. 
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Table 2-2 Summary of the malicious functionality of trojans. 
Trojan Functionality 
PSW Trojan Steal passwords and confidential information and send this 
information to a remote computer. 
 
Trojan 
Clickers 
Redirect infected machines to web sites to : 
• Increment the hit count of a site for the purposes 
advertising. 
• For organizing a Denial of Service (DoS) attack. 
• To redirect the victim to an infected site where the 
victims machine will be attacked by other malware. 
 
Trojan 
Downloaders 
Downloads and installs malware on the victim machine and 
most likely registers it to auto run without the consent or 
knowledge of the user. 
 
Trojan 
Droppers 
Consist of multiple payload components to install other 
malware onto the victim machine so that the installation of 
the additional components is hidden from the user, and 
perhaps to trick anti virus software which may not analyse 
the other components. 
 
Trojan 
Proxies 
Uses the infected machine to give the attacker anonymous 
access to the intenet. These machines can also be used by 
an attacker for mass mailing of spam. 
 
Trojan Spies Spy on user activity through the use of spy programs such 
as key loggers and forward the collected information to the 
attacker. Can be used to steal banking details and financial 
information for the purposes of fraud. 
 
Trojan 
Notifiers 
Notify the attacker that the machine has been infected via 
email, ICQ, or IRC.  
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2.1.3. Rootkits 
Rootkits are used by an attacker to evade detection by replacing system 
files. Hoglund and Butler (2005, p. 4) say “a rootkit is a set of programs 
and code that allow permanent or consistent, undetectable presence on a 
computer”. 
 
2.1.4. Backdoors 
Contain a remote administration capability so that infected machines can be 
controlled remotely via a network connection, and may not be visible in the 
list of currently active programs (VirusList.com, 2009). Activities may 
include all the functionality listed above and may also 
• Send and/or receive files 
• Launch and/or delete files 
 
2.1.5. Bots 
The original intention of a robot (bot) was to perform some useful action on 
an IRC channel whilst the operator or user were engaged in some other task 
(Schiller et al., 2007, p.7). Bots are capable of taking action on a client 
machine without a hacker having to have logged onto the infected machine. 
A collection of Bots is known as a botnet. The botnet is typically under the 
command of a botherder who can dictate the actions of the botnet through 
a bot server. The botnet can be divided into divisions which can each be 
performing different actions, or if the communication channel to one 
division is lost, the other divisions can continue the mission. Bot clients are 
modular and adaptive and can be updated with new software, or 
commanded to perform a malicious action such as a DDoS against a target.  
The attacker may be distanced from the infected machine by many layers 
within the hierarchy. The attacker can send commands to an IRC channel 
through an obfuscating proxy and through multiple hops (Schiller et al., 
2007, p.30).  
 
A bot typically consists of a module to exploit a vulnerability to gain access 
to a target, another module to stop AV software and firewalls, a module to 
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scan for other vulnerable systems, a module to exploit the system it is 
installed on, such as collecting passwords or keylogging and a module that 
communicates with a Command and Control Center (C&C). Not only is it 
important to remove the bot from an infected system, it is important to 
work out how the bot got onto the system in the first place so the 
vulnerability can be rectified.  
 
Schiller et al. (2007, p. 24) describes botnet technology as the “next killer 
Web application” because organized crime have used it as a force multiplier 
to attack the non-computer literate, including the young and the elderly to 
derive money. Their discussion continues to say that these criminal 
organizations have grown large enough to become a “threat to major 
corporations and even nations”. 
 
The evolution of botnets is important to understand. It shows how they 
have become more modularized and stealthy as time has progressed. 
Stealth is a critical component of anti-analysis techniques. The following sub 
sections discuss this evolution. 
 
2.1.5.1. Evolution of Bots 
PrettyPark (Anonymous, 1999) was the first bot client that made use of 
the IRC bot for the purpose of remote control over the internet, and 
emerged in June 1999 (Canavan, 2005, p. 6). It allowed the attacker to 
retrieve information from the compromised system and had a basic 
mechanism for updating itself by downloading and executing new files from 
IRC. Features of PrettyPark are still evident in IRC bots seen today. 
Features discussed by Canavan (2005, p. 6) include: 
• The capability to determine system information such as the version of 
the operating system as well as the user and computer name. 
• The ability to retrieve email addresses and login names to 
applications such as ICQ. 
• The ability to retrieve network settings, user names and passwords. 
• The capability of being able to download updates to increase its 
functionality. 
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Global Threat (GT) bots began to appear in late 2000 and made use of a 
Windows shareware IRC client called mIRC (Mardam-Bey, 1995) that include 
scripting capabilities that allowed hackers to put together their own scripts 
to connect to remote servers and await commands. GT bots also made use 
of tools such as HideWindow (Anonymous, n.d.-f) to conceal its presence on 
infected machines and used PsExec (Microsoft, 2008c) to spread itself over 
the local network. They also used FireDaemon (FireDaemon Technologies 
Ltd, 2009) to install and run as a service and IrOffer (iroffer.org, n.d.) to 
perform as a fileserver. These bots were launched as a service by altering 
the system startup files (Canavan, 2005, p.7). GT bot also had the 
capability to conduct a DDoS attack by flooding. It could spread itself also 
by using social engineering ploys including sending an email that claimed to 
be from a security vendor and if the user clicked on an embedded link they 
downloaded the bot client from a malicious website. GT bots were not 
modular, they were all contained within a single package (Schiller et al., 
2007, p. 9). 
 
SDBot (sd, 2002) appeared in 2002 and added the feature of a remote 
control backdoor (Schiller et al., 2007). The source code was made 
available by the author, as well as a Web page and contact information 
through email and ICQ. This made it easy for hackers to modify and 
maintain. Variants of SDBot can exploit the backdoors of other malware 
such as SubSeven (Sub7Crew, n.d.), Mydoom (Anonymous, n.d.-k), 
Bagle (Anonymous, n.d.-b), Kuang (Anonymous, n.d.-h) and many others. 
When these backdoors are found SDBot downloads itself onto the client and 
infects it. 
 
Agobot (Gembe, 2002) made use of modular design and appeared in 2002. 
It uses IRC for C&C, but is spread using P2P file sharing applications 
(Schiller et al., 2007, p. 11). It has three modules which retrieves the next 
module once the primary task of the module has completed. The sequence 
of events is as follows: 
1. Delivers the IRC bot client and installs a remote access back door. 
2. Attacks and shuts down AV processes. 
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3. Prevents the user from accessing Web sites including AV vendor sites.  
 
Capabilities of Agobot discussed by (Schiller et al., 2007) include: 
• Able to scan other computers for vulnerabilities. 
• Capable of being able to launch DDoS attacks. 
• Ability to scan for CD keys for games and software. 
• Can terminate AV software and security monitoring processes. 
• Can modify the host file so that updates will not be downloaded from 
AV software sites. 
• Can install a rootkit to hide itself. 
• Incorporates anti reverse engineering techniques to make analysis 
difficult. 
 
Related bots include Phatbot (Gembe, 2002) which uses public key 
cryptography for communication with the C&C over P2P, Polybot 
(Anonymous, 2004), XtremBot (Anonymous, n.d.-d) and Forbot 
(Anonymous, n.d.-e). It is also worth noting that this is when the family 
lines of bots began to blur and variants appeared which took the best 
components of other bots and incorporated those features. It became 
harder to determine from which family a particular bot had evolved from 
(Canavan, 2005, p. 14). There are reports that AV vendors are becoming 
less concerned about identifying the particular bot because of the number of 
variants which have different capabilities (Schiller et al., 2007, p. 12). 
Instead they are looking at the malicious components of the bot as the 
source of identification. 
 
Spybot (Anonymous, 2003) is a derivative of SDBot and appeared in 2003 
as open source. It adds Spyware capabilities and collects email addresses, 
lists of visited web sites and logs of activities. Variants can also capture 
screen shots of the screen, send spam, install a rootkit, control webcams, 
kill security processes and other malicious acts. It spreads via file sharing 
applications, exploitation of known vulnerabilities and backdoors left by 
other malware. 
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RBot (Anonymous, n.d.-l) appeared in 2003 and is a backdoor Trojan which 
uses IRC to communicate with the C&C. It introduced the use of packers 
and protectors to compress and/or protect the malware. It can scan for 
shares on networks with Windows machines and attempts enumerate users 
and attempts to guess weak passwords. 
 
Polybot is derived from the source code of Agobot and appeared in March 
2004. It uses polymorphism to change its appearance of the packed and or 
protected binary for each infection by using a different key each time.  
 
The MyTob (Diabl0, 2005) bot appeared in February 2005 and is a hybrid 
that uses its own SMTP engine for sending mass e-email to addresses in the 
Address Book of the infected computer and has capabilities similar to 
Spybot. 
 
(Schiller et al., 2007, p. 15) lists a number of new features appearing as 
components for bots. These are summarised as follows: 
GpCoder (Anonymous, 2005) – Encrypts a user’s files and then offers to 
sell the user a decoder. 
Serv-U – An FTP server that enables botherders to store stolen software, 
games, movies and illegal material on the botnets under their control. The 
data is stored in hidden directories, and the FTP server appears as Windows 
Explorer in Task Manager. 
SPIM – Spam for Instant Messaging. Can be used for phishing attacks 
which provide links to Web sites that download malicious code to victim 
machines. An example SPIM message presented by Schiller et.al. (2007, p. 
16) is reproduced in Figure 2-1. 
ATTENTION...Windows.has.found.55.Critical.System.Errors... 
To fix the errors please do the following:.. 
1 Download Registry Update from: www.regfixit.com. 
2 Install Registry Update 
3 Run Registry Update. 
4 Reboot your computer 
FAILURE TO ACT NOW MAY LEAD TO SYSTEM FAILURE! 
Figure 2-1 Example Spam for Instant Messaging (SPIM) message to 
trick the user into downloading malware. 
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2.1.6. Blended Threats 
It is very important to realize that modern malware combines numerous 
attack vectors and malicious payloads, such that simple classification of 
malware to an individual type or family is becoming more difficult. Such a 
combination of threats in an individual instantiation of a malware specimen 
is known as a blended threat. Virus Bulletin (2008) describes a blended 
threat as “a sophisticated attack using multiple malware types and vectors 
to carry out penetration and control of a system”. An example of a blended 
threat discussed by Virus Bulletin could be initiated be the receipt of a 
spammed email that contains a link to a hijacked web site that uses 
iframes running malicious javascript. The malicious javascript exploits 
vulnerabilities in the browser of the user which can then execute code on 
the users computer to disable security software and download additional 
malware. Functionality of the downloaded malware could be to run a spam 
e-mail server or to launch attacks against new victims.  
 
2.1.7. Anatomy of a Worm 
Skoudis and Zeltser (2004) describe the anatomy of a worm with an 
analogy to a rocket with the following components: 
 
Warhead – Contains exploit(s) to take advantage of vulnerabilities in 
software to penetrate a target. 
Propagation Engine – Mechanism(s) to propagate itself to other 
vulnerable machines. 
Target Selection Algorithm – An algorithm to select or search for 
vulnerable machines. 
Scanning Engine – An algorithm and code that searches for machines that 
run software that is known to be exploitable, using the code available in the 
warhead. 
Payload – Contains the individual malicious packages that are installed on 
the target machine such as a keylogger, web server, backdoor, firewall and 
AV disabler and so on. 
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Figure 2-2 is adapted from Skoudis et al. (2004). and depicts the 
components of the BugBear.B worm. 
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Figure 2-2 Anatomy of BugBear.B showing modular nature of the 
worm. 
 
The representation of the BugBear.B worm emphasizes the modular nature 
of modern malware. Different components and sub components can be 
plugged in or out depending upon the requirements and intention of the 
attacker.  Trend Micro Incorporated, a major AV software vendor, 
recognizes that blended threats are increasingly being seen on the internet 
and predicts that malware will increasingly use tricks to avoid detection 
(Trend Micro Incorporated, 2007).   
 
2.1.8. Defence Methods 
Defence methods against malware are typically based on some combination 
of the following methods (Farwell, 2004):  
Signatures - recognition of signatures of known and previously analyzed 
malware. 
Heuristics – flagging of anything outside the normal operating parameters 
of the system. 
Integrity – detection of changes to the integrity of known files. 
 
The typical computer user runs a signature based virus checker that should 
download new signature files every day to help protect them from 
compromise. However, this is far from a complete solution as it relies on the 
signature of the malware being present in the updated signature file. If the 
malware that is attacking a computer system is new to the internet, or 
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custom written to attack identified targets, it is highly likely that the 
updated signature file will not protect the target (Masood, 2004).  
 
Before a signature is extracted and uploaded to the client machines and 
added to the virus signature database, the malware must be analyzed by a 
malware analyst to determine what the functionality of the malware is, what 
changes it will make to system files and how it will change the normal 
behaviour of the machine. The extent of infection must be determined to 
ensure that infected files are removed or repaired. If the malware has 
detected it is being analyzed and has not shown its true intent by not 
unpacking and installing all of the files it was going to install, then the full 
extent of the infection will not be determined to the detriment of the end 
user who requires protection. The first step in this analysis process is 
referred to as profiling. 
 
2.2. PROFILING 
Initial examination of collected malware is called profiling (Aquilina, Casey, 
& Malin, 2008, p. 286). Profiling of malware is conducted from a high level 
of perspective to determine the purpose and functionality of the malware. 
This assists in making an informed decision on how to proceed with a more 
detailed analysis. There are two general types of file profiling that can be 
conducted, namely static analysis and dynamic analysis.  
 
2.2.1. Static Analysis 
Static analysis extracts information about the binary code without actually 
running the code. It can include examination of disassembly listings, 
extraction of strings, obtaining a virus signature, determination of the 
target architecture and compiler used, as well as many other characteristics 
 
Static analysis of disassembly listings of binary code can be technically 
difficult. A disassembly of binary code is a textual file that represents the 
assembly language code of a program. A program is a series of instructions 
and data that a computer executes to perform some series of functions. The 
series of instructions and structures of data can be analysed without 
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executing the program. This gives the analyst the ability to explore various 
possible paths of execution that can take place when a program runs. These 
different paths of execution are referred to as control flow graphs and 
consist of nodes and edges, where nodes consist of basic blocks of code and 
edges interconnect the nodes as potential control flow paths. Control flow 
can be dictated by constructs including conditional blocks, switch blocks and 
loops. Dataflow analysis examines the way data is moved and changed 
throughout the execution of a program (Chess & West, 2007). 
2.2.2. Dynamic Analysis 
Dynamic analysis extracts information about the code by observing what it 
does whilst it is running. This can include network communications, file and 
registry access and modification, interaction with services and other 
behavioral activities. Dynamic analysis gives consideration to the services to 
provide or emulate for the network based malware to interact with so that 
its dynamic behaviour can be observed. The malware that arrives on the 
system may simply be the first stage in a process that attempts to 
download the real payload in a second stage. This is known as a dropper. 
Arnold, Chess, Morar, Segal, & Swimmer (2000) recommend that the 
following services may need to be provided through emulation, or via a real 
service, to give the network based malware the opportunity to behave in 
the environment it would expect on a real network. 
 
HTTP – Malware may try to transfer files from HTTP, through javascript, or 
some other scripting language. Typically this is port 80. 
FTP – Malware may try to transfer files. Typically this is port 21. 
IRC – Bots, in the past, typically used IRC for communications. P2P is 
becoming more popular for communications. Typically, IRC uses ports in the 
ranges of 6660-6669, but malware can use any unused port. 
DNS – Malware may seek to look up an address in DNS. Typically this is 
port 53. 
Drive sharing – Malware may look for shared drives. Typically this could 
include ports 135, 137 and 445. 
Email – Malware may look for mail services, typically on port 25. 
Packet routing – Malware may try to route packets through various 
network devices. 
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Skoudis (2004, p. 595) outlines a model where analysis tools are distributed 
on a local victim machine and on an external machine, to capture behavioral 
aspects of the malware on the local machine and its interaction with 
external services over a network. External services as outlined by Arnold et 
al. (2000) can be setup on the external monitoring segment. A possible 
model for malware monitoring is shown in Figure 2-3. It shows that the 
malware is installed on a local machine together with local file, registry and 
process monitoring tools, debugger and local network monitoring. Externally 
provided tools include a port scanner and vulnerability scanner to see if the 
malware has opened up ports, or exposes a particular vulnerability that may 
only be visible from an external computer. This is because malware can hide 
the presence of open ports on the victim machine and they can only be 
seen externally. A sniffer is a useful addition to the external network to 
detect the types of network communications that are initiated by the 
malware, including attempts to resolve names from a DNS server, attempts 
to establish connections to an IRC server, scans for computers that are 
sharing drives, or mail servers. 
 
 
Figure 2-3 Possible model for deployment of analysis tools for 
monitoring malware on victim machine and via external monitoring. 
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A summarized list of the analysis tools recommended by Skoudis (2004, 
p.568) as well as their purpose and analysis type, is shown in Table 2-3. 
Table 2-3 Summary of malware analysis tools showing analysis type, 
purpose and name of commonly used tool name. 
Analysis Type Purpose Tools 
Static analysis 
 
Use as many antivirus detection 
engines as possible to assist 
classification. 
 
VirusTotal (Virus Total, 
2008) 
Static analysis Search the body of the malware 
for strings. 
 
Strings (Microsoft, 2008c) 
Dynamic analysis File integrity check to record 
baseline configuration. 
 
Winalysis (Winalysis.com, 
2008) 
Dynamic analysis File monitoring. Find which tools 
are opening, reading and writing 
files. 
 
Filemon (Microsoft, 2008c) 
Dynamic analysis Process monitoring. Determine 
resources that are being used 
such as DLL’s and registry keys. 
 
Process explorer 
(Microsoft, 2008c)  
Dynamic analysis Network monitoring. Uncover 
which ports are open, collect 
network traffic and find 
vulnerabilities. 
 
Fport (Foundstone, 2008), 
tcpview (Microsoft, 2008c), 
nessus (Tenable Network 
Security, 2008), nmap 
(Insecure.org, 2008), 
wireshark (Combs, 2008), 
and snort (Sourcefire, 
2008). 
 
Dynamic analysis 
 
Registry monitoring. Monitor 
registry activities as they occur. 
 
 
Regmon (Microsoft, 2008c)  
Code analysis Disassembly, debugging IDA Pro (Hex-Rays, 2008) , 
OllyDbg (Yuschuk, 2008) . 
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2.3. OVERVIEW OF COMMON MANUAL ANALYSIS 
METHODOLOGIES 
A manual, step by step, analysis process suggested by Skoudis (2004, 
p.573) for analysis of malware that incorporates static and dynamic analysis 
techniques has been reproduced in the following list: 
 
• Load specimen onto victim machine. 
• Run antivirus program. 
• Research antivirus results and filenames. 
• Conduct strings analysis. 
• Look for scripts. 
• Conduct binary analysis. 
• Disassemble code. 
• Reverse compile code. 
• Monitor files changes. 
• Monitor files integrity. 
• Monitor process integrity. 
• Monitor local network activity. 
• Scan for open ports remotely. 
• Scan for vulnerabilities remotely. 
• Sniff network activity. 
• Check promiscuous mode remotely. 
• Monitor registry activity. 
• Run code with debugger. 
 
The methodology of Skoudis (2004) is fairly linear in nature, after one step 
is completed, the next step is entered. It does not explicitly seek to mitigate 
the use of anti forensic techniques the malware may be using to hide its 
presence, alter the program flow, or detect the presence of analysis tools. 
 
A generalized approach to profiling listed by Aquilina, Casey and Malin 
(2008, p.286) is listed and summarized as follows as a series of steps that 
may be conducted in a particular order: 
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Detail – Document the system details from which the suspect file was 
obtained. 
Hash – Determine the cryptographic hash of the suspect file. 
Compare – Conduct a similarity test against known samples. 
Classify – Identify the target platform, high level language of the specimen 
and the compiler used. 
Scan – Identify the language used to author the code as well as the 
compiler used, the type of file and target architecture. 
Examine – Use executable file analysis tools to try to determine if the 
suspect file has malicious intent. 
Extract and Analyze – Extract strings, file metadata and symbolic 
information. 
Reveal – Identify armoring techniques that will protect the suspect file from 
examination.  
Correlate – Determine if the file is statically or dynamically linked. 
Research – Determine if the file has already been analyzed by conducting 
online research. 
 
This list explicitly has a step to reveal armoring techniques that malware 
can use to hinder analysis which is not listed by Skoudis. The work by 
Skoudis (2004) precedes the list by Aquilina et al. (2008) by approximately 
four years and may indicate that the use of anti-analysis techniques 
employed by malware has become more prevalent during this time and that 
these techniques have to be mitigated before analysis can proceed. 
 
A significant work by Zeltser (2007) is very much, a comprehensive, manual 
analysis treatise. It is in the form of a training course conducted by the 
SANS organization and is appropriately titled “Reverse-Engineering 
Malware: Tools and Techniques – Hands On”. Zeltser begins by setting up a 
safe, laboratory environment, using freely available software tools. The 
general methodology presented by Zeltser (2007, pp. 1-12) is listed as 
follows: 
1. Run the malware in an isolated laboratory 
2. Monitor the interactions between the system and the network from a 
behavioral sense. 
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3. Understand the program’s code 
4. Repeat the process until enough information is gathered.  
 
What becomes evident throughout Letzer’s (2007) notes and the practical 
exercises, is the iterative and recursive nature of this methodology. This is 
in contrast to the linear methodology of Skoudis (2004). Starting points, or 
clues, are extracted from the malware from static and dynamic analysis and 
these are used to focus on the aspects of the code that have malicious 
functionality. This approach is often referred to as “hit listing” in reversing 
and analysis literature because it is often infeasible to fully analyze a 
malware specimen from the perspective of time that can be expended to 
this endeavor. In fact, it is to the malware writers’ advantage to make the 
code as difficult and time consuming to analyse as possible. The analyst 
may not be able to spend as much time analyzing the code as they would 
like. This could lead to missing the opportunity to analyse important and 
relevant sections of code.  
 
As this information is extracted, the investigative environment is adapted, 
such as adding entries to the hosts file, addition of an IRC client or server, 
mail server or whatever else the malware expects to connect to. Then the 
behavioral analysis can begin again, with the new information, to delve 
deeper into the malware to reveal its intentions and how it works. The 
iterative and recursive nature also lends itself to dealing with anti-analysis 
techniques as they arise and could be a superior methodology to adopt to 
detect and mitigate anti-analysis techniques, especially in the case where 
detection of the use of anti forensic techniques is an objective. 
2.4. OVERVIEW OF ANTI FORENSIC TECHNIQUES 
“Digital forensics includes preserving, collecting, confirming, identifying, 
analyzing, recording and presenting crime scene information” (Kleiman, 
2007, p. 9). Malware is increasingly being used to commit cyber crime 
(Trend Micro Incorporated, 2007) and digital forensics are applied by 
investigators to achieve this objective. However, techniques to thwart the 
digital forensic analyst are employed by maware developers. 
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Today as computer intruders become more cognizant of digital 
forensic techniques, malicious code is increasingly designed to 
obstruct meaningful analysis. By employing techniques that 
thwart reverse engineering, encode and conceal network traffic, 
and minimize the traces left on file system, malicious code 
developers are making both discovery and forensic analysis more 
difficult. This trend started with kernel loadable rootkits on UNIX 
and has evolved into similar concealment methods on Windows 
systems. Today, various forms of malware are proliferating, 
automatically spreading (worm behaviour), providing remote 
control access (Trojan horse/backdoor behaviour), and sometimes 
concealing their activities on the compromised host (rootkit 
behaviour). Furthermore, malware has evolved to undermine 
security measures, disabling AntiVirus tools and bypassing 
firewalls by connecting within the network to external command 
and control servers. (Aquilina et al., 2008, p. xxxv)   
 
An important consideration in the analysis of malware is that anti forensic 
techniques are increasingly being employed by developers of malware to 
avoid detection and analysis of their code (Brand, 2007; Falliere, 2006, 
2007; Ferrie, 2008; Grugq, n.d.; Harbour, 2007; Smith & Quist, 2006). It 
was reported in an online article that a speaker at the Australian IT Security 
in Government Conference claimed that 65% of new malware “uses some 
type of stealth or anti-forensic technology in an attempt to remain 
undetected before, during and after an attack” (Kotadia, 2006).  
 
Malware employs anti forensic techniques to prevent the forensic analysis of 
its behaviour and its underlying code. This is achieved by detecting the use 
of popular analysis tools and debuggers. Once detected, the malware can 
modify its behaviour so that it does not perform its malicious action from a 
dynamic analysis point of view. From a static analysis point of view, it can 
use numerous techniques to make the static analysis difficult and hide its 
true nature. 
 
An example presented by Yason (2007, p. 12) has been adapted and 
modified by the researcher in Figure 2-4 with comments. It uses the 
FindWindow() function from the user32 Dynamic Link Library (DLL) to 
identify if the popular debuggers, WinDbg (Microsoft, 2008b) or OllyDbg are 
running. If malware detects the presence of a debugger, it can amend its 
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behaviour so that it does not perform malicious activities, remove itself 
from the system, or, with appropriate privileges, damage the system.  
; set up the call to FindWindow to find OllyDbg 
push  NULL 
push  .szWindowClassOllyDbg 
call  [FindWindowA] 
 
; check the result of the call 
test eax,eax 
 
; if the result is non zero, the debugger was found,  
; so jump to the section of code to display a message box 
; note that this is not in this snippet of code 
jnz  .debugger_found 
 
; set up the call to FindWindow to find WinDbg 
push  NULL 
push .szWindowClassWinDbg 
call [FindWindowA] 
 
; check the result of the call 
test eax,eax 
 
; if the result is non zero, the debugger was found,  
; so jump to the section of code to display a message box 
; note that this is not in this snippet of code 
jnz .debugger_found 
 
; data 
.szWindowClassOllyDbg db “OLLYDBG”, 0 
.szWindowClassWinDbg db “WinDbgFrameClass”, 0 
Figure 2-4 Partial implementation of FindWindowA function to find 
popular debuggers (Yason, 2007, p. 12) 
 
Another example by Yason (2007, p. 14), reproduced in Figure 2-5 checks 
for the presence of breakpoints by scanning for the byte 0xCC (which 
represents a breakpoint) in a region of protected code as defined by the 
region: 
Protected_Code_End – Protected_Code_Start 
 
The protected code could be within a region of packed code that is 
unpacked by a runtime packer. A packer compresses and/or encrypts an 
executable program (which may or may not be malware) and creates a new 
executable binary file. The packed program includes a runtime unpacking 
stub which unpacks the original program into its original state and transfers 
control to the original program. Packers may use software protection 
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mechanisms such as anti debugging, anti virtual machine, exception 
handling and control flow handling to hinder analysis (Sun, Ebringer, & 
Boztas, 2008). 
 
cld 
mov  edi,Protected_Code_Start 
mov  ecx,Protected_Code_End – Protected_Code_Start 
mov  al,0xCC 
repne  scasb 
jz  .breakpoint_found 
Figure 2-5 Partial implementation of code to detect breakpoints 
(Yason, 2007, p.14) 
 
Most of the literature that discusses anti-analysis techniques only provides 
code snippets to accompany explanatory text. These snippets can be 
incorporated into working code for validation purposes to assess the 
effectiveness of the technique. Work on validation of a subset of these 
techniques has been conducted by the researcher and the results are 
documented in Chapter 4 of this thesis. A very general, overarching 
taxonomy of anti-analysis techniques, revealed through a search of the 
literature (Aquilina et al., 2008; Brand, 2007; Grugq, n.d.; Skoudis & 
Zeltser, 2004; Zeltser, 2007), includes the following: 
• Anti virtual machine 
• Anti online analysis engines 
• Anti unpacking 
• Process injection techniques 
• Code execution from memory 
• Checksum checks 
• Process camouflage 
• Structured exception handling 
• Import Address Table 
• Rootkits 
• Packers and Protectors 
These techniques are discussed in the following sections. 
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2.5. ANTI VIRTUAL MACHINE 
Analysis of malware is recommended by Zeltser (2007, pp. 1-20) to be 
performed on Virtual Machines such as VMWare (VMware, 2008) or Virtual 
PC (Microsoft, 2007). This allows multiple virtual machines to be run on the 
one physical machine, all of which can be networked and can each be 
running a different operating system. These virtual machines can also be 
backed up and restored very quickly and easily. This makes an ideal 
environment for the analysis of malware where a known state or checkpoint 
can be returned to, and the analysis restarted if required.  
 
However, malware can use techniques to determine if it is running in a 
virtual machine as demonstrated by the logic of the following pseudo code 
reproduced from a presentation by Smith and Quist (2006) as Figure 2-6. 
 
IF detect_vmware 
  THEN do nothing, destroy self, destroy system 
ELSE 
  Continue with malware payload  
Figure 2-6 VMWare detection pseudo code showing that if VMWare 
is detected, the machine could be damaged (Smith & Quist, 2006). 
 
Eagle (n.d.) reports that VMware uses a registry key for the installation 
location of Vmware as: 
HKLM\Software\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools\InstallPath 
 
Malware can look for the presence of this key to indicate that it could be 
running in a virtual machine. Another technique Eagle points out, is to use 
the Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to iterate though the 
network interfaces to see if any of the MAC addresses used belongs to 
VMware. Eagle suggests the following to mitigate this technique: 
• Uninstall VMware tools. 
• Change the MAC address of the virtual adapter in the guest OS. 
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Innes and Valli (2006) point out that VMWare, in its default configuration, is 
very easy to detect through a listing of the hardware and its reported type. 
The types listed by Innes et al. are reproduced in Table 2-4. 
 
Table 2-4 Default Hardware Configurations used to find presence of 
VMWare (Innes & Valli, 2006) 
Hardware Reported Type 
Video Card VMWare Inc [VMWare SVGA II 
Network Interface Card Advanced Micro Devices [AMD] 79c970 [PCnet 32 
LANCE] (rev 10) 
Hard Disk VMWare Virtual IDE Hard Drive 
CD Drive NECVMWar VMWare IDE CDR10 
SCSI Controller VMWare SCSI Controller 
 
Innes et al. (2006) also lists the three MAC addresses assigned to the 
virtual network cards as one of the following three values and this can be 
detected by running either ipconfig /all or by running the command arp 
–a and scanning the result. 
 
00-05-69-xx-xx-xx 
00-0C-29-xx-xx-xx 
00-50-56-xx-xx-xx 
 
Innes et al. (2006) also point out that VMWare developers left a backdoor 
open for the configuration of the virtual machine during runtime with the 
following lines of assembly code that have been reproduced from their 
paper as follows in Figure 2-7. 
 
mov eax, VMWARE_MAGIC ; 0x564D5868 
mov ebx, b ; <parameter of command> 
mov ecx, c ; <number of command> 
mov edx, VMWARE_PORT ; 0x5658 
in eax, dx 
Figure 2-7 Code snippet used to detect the presence of VMWare 
(Innes & Valli, 2006) 
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A sample of the commands listed by Innes et al. are reproduced in Figure 
2-8. 
 
04h Get current mouse cursor position. 
05h Set current mouse cursor position 
06h Get data length in host's clipboard. 
07h Read data from host’s clipboard 
08h Set data length to send to host's clipboard. 
09h Send data to host’s clipboard 
0Ah Get VMware version 
0Bh Get device information 
Figure 2-8 Commands that can be used to detect the presence of 
VMWare (Innes & Valli, 2006) 
 
Innes et al. (2006) point out that a VMWare machine could be detected if 
running this code was successful and a result was returned from the 
function call. Smith et.al. (2006) provide additional techniques to detect 
Vmware and Virtual PC. 
 
Porras, Saidi & Yegneswaran (2007, p.7) note that recent versions of Storm 
appear to have stopped checking to see if it is running inside a virtual 
machine and is instead focusing on hiding themselves from monitoring 
software. The significance of this comment is that the developers of Storm 
have evolved their malware beyond detecting the presence of a virtual 
environment. Possibly, this could be because of the trend for organizations 
to use virtualization to host their servers. If the simple approach of the 
malware is to not install itself on a virtual machine, an opportunity may be 
lost to it if it tries to install itself on a virtual machine that is not an analysis 
environment, but a real, business orientated, virtual machine. By loading 
their own drivers (sys files), they can be notified when a program or driver 
in an undesired list is launched. This takes the malware to a lower layer, 
underneath the radar, beneath where the virtual machine runs. This is done 
via a call to the Windows API function PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutine(). 
The list of executables disabled by Storm is quite extensive and listed in the 
Appendix of the paper by Porras et. al. (2007). The list includes spyware 
detection programs, virus scanners and anti spyware programs. This is a 
problem because it provides a vector to detect and mitigate the tools of a 
forensic analyst as well.  
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2.6. ANTI ONLINE ANALYSIS ENGINES 
Anubis (International Secure Systems Lab, Vienna University of Technology, 
Eurecom France, & UC Santa Barbara, 2008) is an online malware 
behavioral analysis service. Online analysis engines automate the dynamic 
analysis process as discussed above. Malware can be uploaded to the site, 
and a report is generated that includes extensive information on: 
General information such as the MD5 hash and file size 
• Load time DLLs 
• Run time DLLs 
• Packer signature 
• Virus signature 
• Registry activities 
• File activities 
• Process activities 
This information provides a high level over view of the actions malware can 
conduct on a system and assists in determination of any possible threats. A 
post by Xc (2007) to a forum, reported that all of the analyzed files on 
Anubis were being executed from the directory C:\InsideTM. This makes it 
easy for the malware to check if it is being run from this directory. An 
Anubis detection routine was written by OG (2007). 
 
Sandboxie (Sandboxie, 2008) is an application where suspicious programs 
can be run in an environment that uses a transient storage area, known as 
a sand box, so that data is not written to the hard drive. This allows the 
analyst to observe what an unknown program is going to do. However, 
Sandboxie can be defeated by “a DLL (SbieDLL.dll) being injected into the 
process run under SandBoxie” (Thrasher, 2007). Anti sandbox code was 
written by OG (2007). 
 
Norman Sandbox (Norman, 2008) also provides an online service to analyze 
malware, but this also can be detected. Krack (2006) notes that the 
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presence of the sandbox can be detected by “reading it’s memory, and 
comparing it to that of a standard computer”. Then, upon detection of the 
sandbox, the malware can halt its execution, resulting in nothing being 
logged and detected. 
 
A sample program was written by Stargazer (2006) that can detect the 
Norman Sandbox. This is a problem because analysts can submit suspicious 
files to online analysis engines such as Norman Sandbox. If the suspicious 
file detects that it is running on such an engine, it can alter its behaviour so 
that it appears to be benign and the report generated from the online 
engine does not reflect its real potential. The analyst could then allow the 
suspicious file to run on real systems, unaware of its real, malicious purpose. 
 
Analysts need to be aware of the limitations of their tools and the 
limitations of virtual environments, online analysis engines and sandboxes 
as outlined in the discussion above in this section. This, in general, 
highlights a weakness in dynamic analysis techniques where the analyst 
may not be aware that malware has detected the environment it is in, and 
is using deception to mask its true capability. In contrast to detailed static 
analysis of code, dynamic analysis is faster and much easier to perform, but 
is arguably, easier to deceive. The following section addresses the 
techniques malware can use to hinder static analysis techniques. 
2.7. ANTI REVERSING TECHNIQUES 
Eilam (2005, pp. 327-356) devotes a chapter in his book, on anti-reversing 
techniques. Eilam’s discussion of techniques is ordered into the following 
headings, and discussed in the following sections:   
• Eliminating symbolic information 
• Code encryption 
• Active anti-debugger techniques 
• Confusing disassemblers 
• Code obfuscation 
• Control flow transformations 
• Data flow transformations 
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2.7.1. Eliminating symbolic information 
Release builds that use C or C++ typically remove all symbolic information, 
but byte code languages such as Java and C# contain information that is 
useful to the analyst. This is because byte code languages utilize names 
instead of addresses for cross referencing. These meaningful names can be 
replaced by meaningless strings by byte code obfuscators. DLL imports can 
also use ordinals instead of names (Eilam, 2005, pp. 328-330). Ordinals are 
simply numbers and may appear far less meaningful than a function that is 
appropriately named according to its purpose. This can make it harder for 
the analyst because a list of the names of function calls can make it easier 
to assess the overall functionality of the malware. This could include 
identifying calls to modify the registry, startup programs or communicate 
over the internet to other computers. 
2.7.2. Code encryption 
Eilam (2005, p. 330) explains that this technique is commonly used to 
prevent static analysis and is performed after the program is compiled. It 
contains a decryption section in the code and the program is decrypted at 
run time. This means that the analyst will most likely have to run the 
program to let it decrypt itself. This gives the malware control and the 
opportunity to use deception to hide its true intent from the analyst. 
2.7.3. Active anti-debugger techniques 
Eilam (2005, pp. 331-336, p.331-336) discusses a few active techniques 
that are better described in other papers (Ferrie, 2008; Falliere, 2007; 
Yason, 2007). However, one technique worth discussion is the use of code 
checksums. This technique calculates a checksum for particular functions 
and then checks at runtime if the function has been modified by code 
patching, or by the setting of software breakpoints. This helps the malware 
determine if it is being analyzed if the code has been patched or a software 
breakpoint set in the region of code of interest. 
2.7.4. Confusing disassemblers 
Two methods used by disassemblers are linear sweep and recursive 
traversal. Linear sweep is used by the disassemblers/debuggers SoftIce 
(Compuware, 2008) and WinDbg (Microsoft, 2008b), which conducts a 
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disassembly in a sequential manner. Recursive traversal (used by OllyDbg 
and IDA Pro) follows the flow of each branch and is the more reliable 
technique and tolerant to anti-disassembly tricks. Linear sweeps can be 
easily confused with junk bytes, but the recursive sweep technique can also 
be fooled with opaque predicates (Eilam, 2005, pp. 336-344). Opaque 
predicates are simply code that appears to make a decision that could alter 
program flow, but in reality, only one branch of execution is possible to 
follow. 
2.7.5. Code obfuscation 
Eilam (2005, p. 344) says “code obfuscation involves transforming the code 
in such a way that makes it significantly less human-readable, while still 
retaining its functionality”. Transformation characteristics include potency, 
which is the level of complexity added to the code and can be measured by 
complexity metrics including the depth of nesting in a particular sequence 
and the number of predicates the code contains. Another characteristic is 
that the transformation must be resilient. A highly resilient transformation is 
hard to undo. Deobfuscators can conduct data-flow analysis to reverse the 
transformation. There is also a cost characteristic of the obfuscation 
transformation in terms of increased size of the resultant code and slower 
execution time (Eilam, 2005, pp. 344-345, p.344-345).  
2.7.6. Control flow transformations 
Control flow transformations are another way of reducing human readability 
of code by altering the order and flow of a program (Eilam, 2005, p. 346). 
Control flow transformations are categorized as computation 
transformations, aggregation transformations and ordering transformations 
(Collberg, Thomborson, & Low, 1998) 
2.7.7. Data transformations 
Eilam (2005, pp. 355-356) explains that data transformations obfuscate the 
data of a program rather than the structure of the code by encoding some, 
or all, of a program’s variables and/or by restructuring the arrays of the 
program. 
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2.8. ANTI UNPACKING 
The 2nd International Caro Workshop was held in the Netherlands in May 
2008 that focused on the problems and technical aspects of packers, 
decryptors and obfuscators as the major theme of the conference. Ferrie, 
(2008) a Senior AV Researcher at Microsoft, presented a paper at the 
conference that (at the time of writing this thesis) extensively lists what he 
refers to as the most common anti-unpacking tricks, together with some 
countermeasures. Ferrie’s taxonomy for these techniques is as follows: 
 
• Anti unpacking by anti dumping  
• Anti unpacking by anti debugging 
• Anti unpacking by anti emulating 
• Anti unpacking by anti intercepting 
• Miscellaneous  
 
The techniques Ferrie discusses in his paper are summarized in the 
following sections under the same headings as the taxonomy listed above. 
It should be noted that these techniques need not only be used during the 
unpacking process. They can be used within the body of the malware itself. 
2.8.1. Anti Unpacking by Anti Dumping 
Packed malware can be run until the OEP is reached, which generally means 
that the original code is now unpacked in memory. The analyst can then 
dump the code from memory and then analyze it. These tricks are used to 
prevent an accurate facsimile of the code being dumped (Ferrie, 2008, p. 1). 
2.8.1.1. Size of Image 
The SizeOfImage value in the Process Environment Block (PEB) can be 
changed so that process access is impeded, as well as stopping a debugger 
from attaching to the process. Ferrie (2008, p. 1) says that it breaks 
popular dumping tools such as LordPE (yoda, 2005a) in default mode, and 
continues by saying that this technique can be defeated by ignoring the 
SizeOfImage value in the PEB and call the VirtualQuery() function instead. 
This returns the number of sequential pages whose attributes are the same, 
and these pages can be enumerated. The first page begins with the 
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ImageBase page and sequential pages should return the MEM_IMAGE type. A 
page that did not come from the file is indicated by a page that is not of the 
MEM_IMAGE type.  
2.8.1.2. Erasing the Header 
Ferrie (2008, p. 1) reports that some dumpers such as ProcDump (G-RoM, 
Lorian, & Stone, 1999) rely on the section table in the PE header, and that 
altering or erasing the table can defeat such dumping tools. Ferrie (2008, p. 
2) advises using the VirtualQuery() function to recover the image size 
and to determine the permissions of the pages, but that it is not possible to 
recover the section table once it has been erased.  
2.8.1.3. Nanomites 
As a more advanced form of anti-dumping, this technique replaces branch 
instructions with software breakpoints (INT 3), called nanomites. This 
technique was introduced by the packing tool Armadillo (Silicon Realms, 
2008), now mostly known as SoftwarePassport. Tables in the unpacking 
code record details of the nanomite. Ferrie (2008, p. 2) relates that a 
process that is protected by nanomites uses self-debugging. This technique 
uses a copy of the process as a debugger which can then intercept the 
exceptions generated by the debuggee when the nanomite is reached. 
When this occurs and if the exception address is in an address table, the 
type information is retrieved from a type table. The branch is taken if the 
type matches the CPU flags and the destination address is retrieved from a 
destination table. Execution resumes from that address. If a match is not 
made, a size table is used to retrieve the size of the branch so that the 
instruction can be skipped.  
2.8.1.4. Stolen Bytes 
ASProtect (ASPack Software, 2008) introduced this technique. These are 
instructions taken from the original program and relocated into dynamically 
allocated memory. The original programs instructions are replaced with junk 
code except for a jump to the start of the relocated code (Ferrie, 2008, p. 
2).   
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2.8.1.5. Guard Pages 
The purpose of Guard Pages is to act as an alarm if they are accessed, by 
raising an EXCEPTION_GUARD_PAGE (0x80000001) exception. Then the 
exception can be intercepted and then checked to see if the page is within a 
particular range such as the process image space. Ferrie (2008, p. 2) 
reports that the packing tool called Shrinker (Blinkinc, 2003) uses this 
technique to perform on-demand compression. It uses this technique to 
reduce the committed memory requirements because pages that are not 
required do not need to be loaded into physical memory. It does this by 
hooking the ntdll KiUserExceptionDispatcher() function and looking for 
the EXCEPTION_GUARD_PAGE exception.  
Armadillo uses a variation of this technique to perform on-demand 
decryption but requires the use of self-debugging. It loads the entire 
program into memory at once, in contrast to the way Shrinker loads pages 
only as required. The debugger intercepts the exceptions raised by the 
debuggee and if the exception is within the process image space, the 
individual page that is being accessed is decrypted and execution resumes. 
Ferrie (2008, p. 3) suggests a way of mitigating Armadillo’s 
implementation by touching all the pages in the image which should make 
Armadillo decrypt all pages which can then be dumped from memory. 
2.8.1.6. Imports 
Because the list of imported functions of a binary give a good idea of the 
overall functionality of a program, most packers alter the Import Table after 
the imports have been resolved by erasing it and replacing it with a 
different access mechanism. This could be a private buffer that holds real 
function addresses that is not dumped by default (Ferrie, 2008, p. 3).  
2.8.1.7. Virtual Machines 
The executable code is never visible if a virtual machine is used to unpack 
the code. This technique is used by packers such as themida (Oreans 
Technologies, 2008), neoGuard (Seculab, 2008) and VMProtect (VMProtect, 
2008).  Seculab’s Russian web page extols the virtues of neoGuard to 
include a very high level of protection against disassembling and debugging 
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and that a custom disassembler and compiler would have to be written by 
the analyst to analyse the code that has been protected using neoGuard 
(Seculab, 2008). 
 
A simple technique to analyse packed malware is to let it unpack itself into 
memory, halt execution and then dump the code from memory and analyse 
it. Rolles (2007) reports that new protectors are applying transformations to 
the original code so that dumping and analyzing code is much more difficult. 
Rolles says this is done by “converting portions of the code into proprietary 
byte-code formats which are executed by an embedded interpreter (so-
called virtualization, virtual machines) and copying portions of the code 
elsewhere in the process' address space (so-called stolen bytes, stolen 
functions)”. This means that packers that use virtual machines run their 
unpacking routines from within a VM. The advantage to malware authors is 
that it negates the usefulness of existing, static analysis tools. Static 
analysis is broken because each different VM has a different instruction 
encoding format (and this can be polymorphic). Patching the VM program 
requires a familiarity with the instruction set that must be gained through 
analysis of the VM parser (Rolles, 2007). 
2.8.1.8. Anti Unpacking by Anti Debugging 
These techniques focus on preventing or hindering analysis when the 
malware is being run inside a debugger, or if a debugger tries to attach to a 
running process. 
2.8.1.9. NtGlobalFlag 
The NtGlobalFlag is a field in the PEB at offset 0x68 that is zero by default, 
but has a value stored in it when the process is running in a debugger. The 
value is comprised of a set of flags as follows: 
FLG_HEAP_ENABLE_TAIL_CHECK(0x10) 
FLG_HEAP_ENABLE_FREE_CHECK(0x10) 
FLG_HEAP_VALIDATE_PARAMETERS(0x40) 
 
Ferrie (2008, p. 3) emphasizes that other flags can be set in this value and 
it is a mistake to simply compare the value of this field with 0x70 to check 
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for the presence of a debugger. Although these three flags are usually set 
for a debugger, they are not set for a debugger that attaches to a running 
process. Ferrie also points out three more exceptions. Additional flags can 
be set for all processes with the value of GlobalFlag by the registry key: 
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\SessionManager 
 
The next exception is that all flags can be controlled on a per-process basis 
by the value of GlobalFlag by the registry key: 
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\WindowsNT\CurrentVersion\Image File 
Execution Options\<filename> 
Where <filename> is replaced by the name of the file being executed. 
 
The third exception is all of the flags can be controlled by the Load 
Configuration Structure on a per-process basis and was introduced to 
support Safe Exception Handling in Windows XP. It also contains two fields 
called GlobalFlagsClear and GlobalFlagsSet and can be used to set or 
clear any flags in the NtGlobalFlag field in the PEB. 
2.8.1.10. Heap Flags 
The default heap of the process can give away the presence of a debugger. 
The pointer to the base of the heap can be determined by using the 
kernel32 DLL GetProcessHeap() function, or alternatively by directly 
accessing the PEB. The handle to the process heap is at offset 0x18 in the 
PEB from which there are two fields of interest, Flags at offset 0x0c which 
shows the settings for the current heap block and ForceFlags at offset 
0x10c which shows the settings for how the heap will be manipulated. Ferrie 
(2008) says the presence of a debugger could be indicated by these values 
set in the Flag field as shown in Figure 2-9. 
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HEAP_GROWABLE(0x02) 
HEAP_TAIL_CHECKING_ENABLED(0x20) 
HEAP_FREE_CHECKING_ENABLED(0x40) 
HEAP_SKIP_VALIDATION_CHECKS(0x10000000) 
HEAP_VALIDATE_PARAMETERS_ENABLED(0x40000000) 
Figure 2-9 Heap Flags that can be read and used to detect the 
presence of a debugger. 
 
Ferrie (2008, p. 4) says that the presence of a debugger could be indicated 
by the setting of these flags in the ForceFlags field. 
 
HEAP_TAIL_CHECKING_ENABLED(0x20) 
HEAP_FREE_CHECKING_ENABLED(0x40) 
HEAP_VALIDATE_PARAMETERS_ENABLED(0x40000000) 
Figure 2-10 Force Flag fields that can be read and used to detect the 
presence of a debugger. 
 
2.8.1.11. The Heap 
Ferrie (2008, p. 5) reports that some artifacts can still be detected after the 
heap flags have been cleared, and that packers such as Themida® (Oreans 
Technologies, 2008) look for these. The following flag can cause the 
sequence 0xABABABAB to appear twice at the end of the allocated block. 
HEAP_TAIL_CHECKING_ENABLED 
 
Whilst the flag HEAP_FREE_CHECKING_ENABLED can cause the whole, or part 
sequence of 0xFEEEFEEE to appear if bytes are required to fill the slack 
space between blocks. 
  
2.8.1.12. Special API’s 
Various API’s can be used to detect the presence of a debugger. These are 
presented in the following subsections. 
2.8.1.12.1. IsDebugger Present 
A call to the kernel32 DLL IsDebuggerPresent() function returns TRUE if a 
debugger is found. Because it simply returns the value of the 
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BeingDebugged field of the PEB, the kernel32 call can be bypassed by 
directly looking at the PEB. This method can be defeated by setting the flag 
to FALSE (Yason, 2007).  
2.8.1.12.2. Check Remote Debugger Present 
This call has two parameters, a process handle, and a pointer to a BOOLEAN 
variable that will be set to TRUE if it is found that a debugger is attached to 
the process (Yason, 2007). The signature of this call is as follows: 
 
BOOL CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent ( 
 HANDLE  hProcess, 
 PBOOL  pbDebuggerPresent 
) 
Figure 2-11 Signature of the CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent 
function that can be used to detect the presence of a debugger. 
 
2.8.1.12.3. NtQueryInformationProcess 
The call chain for CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent is via ntdll 
NtQueryInformationProcess() which queries the DebugPort field of the 
EPROCESS kernel structure (Yason, 2007).  
2.8.1.12.4. Debug Objects 
Ferrie (2008, p. 6) explains that Windows XP introduced the idea of a 
“debug object” that is created when a debugging session commences. A 
handle is associated with this object and the ProcessDebugObjectHandle 
class can be used to query the value of the handle.  
2.8.1.12.5. NtQuery Object 
The number of debug objects can be obtained by using ntdll 
NtQueryObject() function call. This call returns a structure called 
OBJECT_ALL_INFORMATION which contains a field called 
NumberOfObjectsTypes which is a count of total object types. A mitigation 
strategy is to set a breakpoint when NtQueryObject returns and then patch 
the NumberOfObjectsTypes field to 0 (Ferrie, 2008, p. 7).  
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2.8.1.12.6. Thread Hiding 
The SetInformationThread() call can be used to hide a thread using an 
information class called HideThreadFromDebugger. The thread will continue 
to run when the function is called, but a debugger will no longer receive any 
events related to that thread (Ferrie, 2008, p. 7).  
2.8.1.12.7. Open Process 
When a process is loaded into a debugger, the SePrivilege privilege in the 
access token is enabled. It is not enabled when not loaded into a debugger. 
“Some packers indirectly use SeDebugPrivilege to identify if the process is 
being debugged by attempting to open the CSRSS.EXE process” (Yason, 
2007, p. 9). CSRSS.EXE (Client Server Runtime Server Subsystem) manages 
most of the graphical commands of Windows. The idea behind this is that 
the security descriptor of the CSRSS.EXE process only allows SYSTEM to 
access this process. A process that has the SeDebugPrivilege can access 
any process regardless of the security descriptor. Yason (2007, p. 10) says 
that this privilege is only granted to members of the Administrators group 
by default.  
 
Packers may try to obtain the PID of CSRSS.EXE via process enumeration. A 
possible solution to this technique is to set a breakpoint where ntdll 
NtOpenProcess() returns and to set the value of EAX to 0xC0000022 
(STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED) when the breakpoint is reached if the PID that is 
passed is that of CSRSS.EXE (Yason, 2007, p. 10) 
 
2.8.1.12.8. Close Handle 
The presence of a debugger can be detected by making use of the ZwClose 
system call. CloseHandle indirectly makes use of this call. Calling ZwClose 
with an invalid handle will generate a STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE exception. 
Falliere (2007, p. 6) says that “the only proper way to bypass the 
CloseHandle anti-debug is to either modify the syscall data from ring 0, 
before it is called, or set up a kernel hook.”  
2.8.1.12.9. Output Debug String 
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Falliere (2007, p. 7) says that if OutputDebugStringA is called with a valid 
ASCII string under the control of a debugger, the return value will the 
address of the string passed as a parameter. When not run in a debugger, 
the return value should be 1.  
2.8.1.12.10. Read File 
By reading file content into the code stream, the kernel32 ReadFile() 
function can be used as technique for self modification. It can also be used 
to remove the software breakpoints that a debugger may have placed. This 
technique can be defeated by using hardware breakpoints instead of 
software breakpoints (Ferrie, 2008, pp. 8-9).  
2.8.1.12.11. Write Process Memory 
The WriteProcessMemory() function of the kernel32 DLL can be used in a 
similar way to the ReadFile() function but requires that the data that is to 
be written is already in process memory space. Ferrie (2008, p. 9) says that 
the use of this technique can be defeated using hardware breakpoints.  
2.8.1.12.12. Unhandled Exception Filter 
Windows has a chained Structured Exception Handler (SEH) mechanism to 
pass exceptions to handlers instead of crashing the program if possible. 
Malware can take advantage of SEH to gain control of the malware to detect 
it is being debugged. The malware throws an exception deliberately, and if 
its own SEH does not handle the exception, it can deduce that it is being 
debugged (Yason, 2007, p. 25).  
2.8.1.12.13. Block Input 
Packers can use the user32 DLL BlockInput() function to prevent the 
analyst from using input devices such as the keyboard and mouse whilst the 
unpacking routine is being executed, and makes the system appear 
unresponsive during this time (Yason, 2007, p. 23).  
2.8.1.12.14. Suspend Thread 
User mode debuggers can be disabled by the use of the kernel32 
SuspendThread() function. Ferrie (2008, p. 9) reports that Yoda’s 
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Protector (yoda, 2005b) uses this technique which enumerates the 
process and then suspends the main thread of the parent process if it does 
not match Explorer.exe (Microsoft, 2008a) which is the parent process.  
2.8.1.12.15. Guard Pages 
This technique registers an exception handler, a page is dynamically 
allocated to it that is executable and writeable and the opcode RET is written 
to it. The page protection is changed to PAGE_GUARD and then an attempt is 
made to execute the RET instruction which will result in an 
EXCEPTION_GUARD_PAGE exception being raised. A debugger may intercept 
the exception and hence give away its presence. PC Guard (Sofpro, 2008) 
uses this technique (Ferrie, 2008, p. 10).  
2.8.1.12.16. Alternative Desktop 
An alternative desktop can be hidden by a technique described by Ferrie 
(2008, p. 10) and is used by the protector with its own VM, 
HyperUnpackMe2 (Anonymous, n.d.-g).  
2.8.2. Hardware Tricks 
Various hardware related tricks can be utilized to determine if the process is 
being debugged. These techniques are presented in the following 
subsections. 
2.8.2.1. Prefetch Queue 
Prior to the Pentium and later CPU’s, a variety of tricks were possible by 
exploiting some ways the prefetch queue for the CPU was mishandled by 
allowing the overwriting of the next instruction to execute after an 
exception occurred. Ferrie (2008, p. 10) says that the REP MOVS and REP 
STOS instructions can still be used to exploit this mishandling. These two 
instructions are cached by the CPU and will execute them even if the same 
instructions in memory have been overwritten.  
2.8.2.2. Hardware Breakpoints 
There are 8 debug registers (DR0 – DR7) that are used to set hardware 
breakpoints. Malware can detect that it is being debugged by setting them 
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to particular values and checking them later, or by simply resetting them. 
Ferrie (2008, p. 11) says that the packer called Telock (TGM, 2004) 
employs this technique to detect the use of a debugger as does ASProtect. 
Debug registers cannot be set directly in user mode, but other ways Falliere 
(2007, p. 11) lists include: 
• Throwing an exception and then modifying the thread context 
because it contains the contents of the CPU registers, and then 
resuming normal execution with the modified context. 
• Using the NtGetContextThread and NtSetContextThread system 
calls through the kernel32 DLL functions GetThreadContext and 
SetThreadContext. 
2.8.2.3. Instruction Counting 
This technique registers an exception handler and then sets some hardware 
breakpoints. When the addresses of the breakpoints are hit, an 
EXCEPTION_SINGLE_STEP exception is raised and passed to the exception 
handler which is then able to adjust the instruction pointer to point to a new 
instruction from which execution can resume. The kernel32 
GetThreadContext() function can be used to access the context structure 
of the thread. Some debuggers do not correctly handle hardware 
breakpoints not set by the debugger itself and this may result to 
instructions not being counted properly (Ferrie, 2008, p. 11).  
2.8.2.4. Execution Timing 
Packers and debug detection routines take advantage of the fact that code 
running in a debugger is going to take longer to execute than when not 
running in a debugger. The routines measure the time elapsed and 
compares the time differential with a normal run time value. If it took 
longer to run than expected, then it is probably running in a debugger. The 
RDTSC (Read Time Stamp Counter) instruction can be used before and after 
a routine to determine how much time elapsed. 
The kernel32 DLL has a function called GetTickCount that returns with the 
number of milliseconds elapsed since the system was started. A 
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SharedUserData data structure is always located at address 0x7FFE0000 
and contains the fields TickCountLow and TickCountMultiplier. 
A simple solution would be to identify where the timing checks are being 
performed in the code, and then set a breakpoint before the first time delta 
measurement and then perform a run instead of a step until the breakpoint 
is hit (Yason, 2007, p. 8). Alternatively the return result from a call to 
GetTickCount and modify the return value. Yason says that Olly Advanced 
(MaRKuS, 2006) installs a kernel mode driver that performs the following: 
Sets the Time Stamp Disable bit (TSD) in the CR4 control register which will 
trigger a General Protection (GP) exception if the RDTSC instruction is 
executed in a privilege level other than 0. 
The Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT) is setup so that the GP exception is 
hooked and the execution of the RDTSC is filtered.  
2.8.2.5. EIP via Exceptions 
Ferrie (2008, p. 12) says that it is a very common trick of unpackers such 
as PECompact (Bitsum Technologies, 2008) to use exceptions to alter the 
EIP and also to gain a measure of obfuscation if the trigger of the exception 
is not obvious.  
2.8.3. Process Tricks 
A number of process related techniques are available to determine if the 
process is being debugged and to hinder the analysis process. These 
techniques are discussed in the following subsections. 
2.8.3.1. Header Entry Point 
Since the PE header is read only by default, some unpackers, including MEW 
(Northfox, 2004), set the entry point of the program in it. This effectively 
blocks the debugger from setting a break point at the entry point, unless 
the kernel32 VIrtualProtectEx() function is called first (Ferrie, 2008, p. 
13).  
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2.8.3.2. Parent Process 
A process often has explorer.exe as its parent process, and a parent other 
than explorer.exe may have been spawned by a debugger. Yason (2007, p. 
10) says that this can be determined by the following process. 
1. Get the current process PID via the TEB (TEB.ClientID) or by calling 
GetCurrentProcessId(). 
2. Use Process32First/Next() and get explorer.exe’s PID from 
PROCESSENTRY32.szExeFile and get the PID of the parent process of the 
current process from PROCESSENTRY32.th32ParentProcessID. 
3. The target may be being debugged if the PID of the parent process is not 
the same as the PID of explorer.exe. 
A false positive may result if the process was launched using the command 
prompt or if the default shell is different. Yason says that this can be 
mitigated by setting Process32Next() to always fail when using Olly 
Advanced. Ferrie (2008, p. 13) reports that Yoda’s Protector is among 
the packers that use this technique.  
2.8.3.3. Self Execution 
A process can escape the control of a debugger by executing a copy of itself 
by utilizing a mutex. The initiating process creates the mutex and then 
executes a copy of the process which will not be debugged, even if the first 
process was being debugged and will know that it is a copy since the mutex 
will be found to already exist (Ferrie, 2008, p. 15).  
2.8.3.4. Process Name 
Some packers look for process names that match the names of debugging 
or malware analysis tools using the kernel32 
CreateToolhelp32Snapshot() function (Ferrie, 2008, p. 16).  
2.8.3.5. Threads 
Some packers such as PE-Crypt32 (random, killa, & acpizer, 1999) use 
threads to check for the presence of a debugger, or to check the integrity of 
the main code (Ferrie, 2008, p. 16).  
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2.8.3.6. Self Debugging 
Ferrie (2008, pp. 16-17) says that this technique used by Armadillo and 
other packers, runs a copy of a process and attaches to the copy as a 
debugger. This makes the process un-debuggable because only one 
debugger can attach to a process at any one point in time. This technique 
can be defeated by using kernel mode code to zero the EPROCESS-
>DebugPort field to allow another debugger to attach to the process. A DLL 
can also be injected into the process space by using the kernel32 
OpenProcess() function. On Windows XP and later, the kernel32 
DebugActiveProcessStop() function can be utilized to detach the debugger.   
2.8.3.7. Disassembly 
Breakpoints set within the first few instructions of an API can be bypassed if 
the packer uses API interception and copies the first few instructions of the 
function into a private buffer, and executes the instructions from there. The 
packer places a jump at the end of the last copied instruction so that 
execution of the original code resumes just after the point the last copied 
instruction was made. This also gives the packer the opportunity to search 
for breakpoints that have been set in the code which is an indication that 
the program is being debugged (Ferrie, 2008, p. 17). 
2.8.3.8. TLS Callback 
This technique is used to change the original entry point of a program to a 
different entry point so that an initial check can made to see if a debugger 
or other analysis tools are being run. It changes the PE loader so that the 
entry point of the program is referenced in Thread Local Storage (TLS), 
which is the 10th directory entry in the optional PE header (Falliere, 2007). 
TLS callbacks can be identified by examining the Data Directory of the PE 
header using a tool such as pedump (Pietrek, n.d.) because it will show if a 
TLS directory is in the executable (Yason, 2007, p. 28). 
2.8.3.9. Device Names 
Packers can use a device driver technique to detect debuggers such as 
OllyDbg and IDA Pro as well as monitors running at the system level such 
as the SysInternals tools Regmon and Filemon. This technique uses 
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kernel32 CreateFile against well known names. Yason (2007, p. 13) says 
that some versions of SoftICE append numbers to the device name which 
will cause this check to fail. However, a brute force approach can be used to 
find the name by appending numbers to the search routine in a loop.  
 
Ferrie (2008) provides examples of some device names used by popular 
analysis tools that are reproduced in Figure 2-12. 
 
SoftIce  
 \\.\SICE 
 \\.\SIWVID 
 \\.\NTICE 
Regmon 
 \\.\REGVXG 
 \\.\REGSYS 
 
FileMon 
 \\.\FILEVXG 
 \\.\FILEM 
Figure 2-12 Device names used by popular debugging tools that can 
be used by malware to detect their presence. 
2.8.3.10. SoftIce Specific 
SoftIce was a popular ring 3 and ring 0 debugger for the Windows platform. 
2.8.3.10.1. Driver Information 
SoftIce device drivers can be enumerated using the ntdll 
NtQuerySystemInformation() function. The version information of each file 
can then be determined using the VerQueryValue() function as well as 
strings that can be matched including SoftIce (Ferrie, 2008, p. 18). 
2.8.3.10.2. Interrupt 1 
Ferrie (2008, p. 18) explains that the int 1 instruction cannot be set from 
ring 3 and will raise an EXCEPTION_ACCESS_VIOLATION exception (General 
Protection Fault) if this interrupt is called directly. However, SoftIce hooks 
this interrupt and adjusts the Descriptor Privilege Level (DPL) to 3 from its 
normal DPL of 0 to enable SoftIce to single step user mode code. When 
the int 1 occurs, SoftIce does not check the cause was a software 
interrupt or the trap flag and it always calls the handler for interrupt 1 
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and an EXCEPTION_SINGLE_STEP exception is raised when an  
EXCEPTION_ACCESS_VIOLATION exception should have been raised resulting 
in the detection of the presence of SoftIce. 
2.8.3.11. OllyDbg Specific 
OllyDbg is a very popular ring 3 debugger. The techniques in the following 
subsections examine ways of detecting its presence. 
2.8.3.11.1. Malformed Files 
Ferrie (2008, p. 19) says that OllyDbg “will refuse to open a file whose data 
directories do not end exactly at the end of the Optional Header”. OllyDbg 
tries to allocate the amount of memory that the Export Directory Size, 
Base Relocation Directory Size, Export Address Table Entries and 
PE->SizeOfCode fields say, no matter how large the values are which can 
cause the system swap file to grow so large that it affects the performance 
of the system. 
2.8.3.11.2. Initial ESI Value 
Some packers try to detect OllyDbg by examining the initial value of the 
ESI register. Ferrie (2008, p. 19) reports that this value is 0xFFFFFFFF on 
Windows XP, but 0 in Windows 2000, and is just a coincidence. 
2.8.3.11.3. Output Debug String 
Falliere (2007, p. 7) reports if OutputDebugStringA is called with a valid 
ASCII string under the control of a debugger, the return value will the 
address of the string passed as a parameter. When not run in a debugger, 
the return value should be 1. Yason (2007, p. 26) says that this technique is 
specific to OllyDbg because it is vulnerable to a format string bug. 
2.8.3.11.4. Find Window 
The user32 function FindWindow() and FindWindowEx() can be used to 
find out if known applications are being run including OllyDbg (Yason, 2007, 
p. 22).  
2.8.3.11.5. Guard Pages 
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An attempt to execute instructions in a guarded page should result in an 
exception, but OllyDbg executes them (Ferrie, 2008, p. 19). 
2.8.3.12. Hide Debugger Specific 
OllyDbg has an enormous variety of plugins including ones to counter 
detection techniques. One of these is HideDebugger (Shub-Nigurrath, 2006) 
which hooked the kernel32 OpenProcess() function by setting a far jump 
to a new handler. The detection of this jump provides a good indication of 
the presence of the plugin (Ferrie, 2008, p. 19).  
2.8.3.13. Immunity Debugger Specific 
Ferrie (2008, p. 20) points out that the Immunity Debugger (Immunity, 
2008) is a customization of OllyDbg with a Python command-line interface 
and is vulnerable to all the same detection and vulnerabilities as OllyDbg. 
2.8.3.14. WinDbg Specific 
WinDbg is a Microsoft distributed, ring 3 and ring 0 debugger. The following 
techniques are WinDbg specific.  
2.8.3.14.1. Find Window 
Ferrie (2008, p. 20) says that the user32 FindWindow() function can be 
used to detect WinDbg by using the class name WinDbgFrameClass.  
2.8.3.15. Miscellaneous Tools 
The following sub section discusses various miscellaneous tools. 
2.8.3.15.1. Find Window 
Less common tools that malware searches for includes the window name 
string of Import REConstructor v1.6 FINAL © 2001-2003 MackT/uCF or 
class name of TESTDBG, kk1, Eew57 or Shadow (Ferrie, 2008, p. 20). 
2.8.4. Anti Unpacking by Anti Emulating 
This section discusses some of the techniques used to detect emulators and 
virtual machines. 
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2.8.4.1. Software Interrupts 
2.8.4.1.1. Interrupt 3 
An emulator can be detected if it does not behave the same way as 
Windows. The EIP has already been advanced to the next instruction when 
an EXCEPTION_BREAKPOINT occurs and Windows tries to set the EIP back to 
where it should be, but Windows assumes that the exception is caused by 
the short form of int 3 (CC). However, the EIP will point to the wrong 
place if the long form of int 3 (CD 03) caused the exception (Ferrie, 2008, 
p. 20).  
2.8.4.2. Time Locks 
Anti-emulation code can exploit the characteristic of emulators to limit the 
amount of time and/or the number of instructions that will be executed 
before exiting with no detection. The anti-emulation code can use a dummy 
loop to force the emulator to give up (Ferrie, 2008, p. 20). 
2.8.4.3. Invalid API Parameters 
For the purpose of simplicity, some emulators do not provide error checking 
for the return results of API calls. Some anti-emulator code can exploit this 
vulnerability to detect the presence of an emulator including that of the 
Tibs packer (Ferrie, 2008, p. 20). The Tibs (Anonymous, n.d.-m) packer 
is often used to pack the storm worm and has anti-emulation capability 
(Websense, 2008). 
2.8.4.4. Get Proc Address 
The address of a function exported by a DLL is obtained by using the 
kernel32 function GetProcAddress(), however, not all functions are 
provided by the virtual environment such as the kernel32 function 
GetTapeParameters(). Because some packers try to exploit this, some 
anti-malware emulators return a value for GetProcAddress() without due 
consideration to the parameters that were passed to it. The anti-emulator 
code can call a function with invalid parameters fully expecting not to 
receive a return value, and an emulator can be detected if a valid result is 
returned (Ferrie, 2008, p. 21). 
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2.8.4.5. Get Proc Address (Internal) 
Ferrie (2008, p. 21) says that “some anti-malware emulators export special 
APIs, which can be used to communicate with the host environment”. 
2.8.4.6. “Modern” CPU Instructions 
Ferrie (2008, p. 21) advises that for the purposes of simplicity, some anti-
malware emulators do not implement the entire CPU instruction set and 
leave out less common instructions such as CMPXCH8B and entire instruction 
classes such as Floating Point Unit (FPU), Multimedia Extensions (MMX) and 
Streaming Single Instruction Multiple Data Extensions (SSE). This can be 
used by the packer to detect the presence of the emulator, or the emulator 
may fail to determine what the malware is doing. 
2.8.4.7. Undocumented Instructions 
Am emulator may fail to detect the intention of the malware if a packer can 
use undocumented instructions that are not supported by the emulator 
(Ferrie, 2008, p. 22). 
2.8.4.8. Selector Verification 
Ferrie (2008, p. 22) says that packers such as MSLRH (Anonymous, n.d.-i) 
can use the kernel32 GetVersion() function to get the operating system 
version which can then be compared with the descriptor table layout. On a 
Windows NT-based system the CS selector should be 0x1B for ring 3 code, 
whilst on Windows 9x-based platforms the CS selector can exceed 0xFF 
(Ferrie, 2008, p. 22). 
2.8.4.9. Memory Layout 
Anti-malware emulators may not include the in-memory structures that a 
real system will have such as the RTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS which 
should appear at memory location 0x20000 (Ferrie, 2008, p. 22). 
2.8.4.10. File Format Tricks 
This section discusses a number of PE Header file format tricks used by 
malware that do not conform to the way the emulator expects to file to 
appear.  
Analysis Avoidance Techniques of Malicious Software 
 
 57 
 
2.8.4.10.1. Non Aligned Size of Image 
The PE->SizeOfImage field is stated in the file format documentation to be 
a multiple of the value in the PE->SectionAlignment field but is not a 
requirement and Windows can round up the value if required. Malware can 
take advantage of this to ensure that it will not run within a VM and hence 
hinder analysis (Ferrie, 2008, p. 22) 
. 
2.8.4.10.2. Overlapping Instructions 
Structures in the PE Header file can be made to overlap such as the MZ-
>lfanew field so that the PE header appears inside the MZ header. The PE-
>SizeOfOptionalHeader  field can be set so that it appears as if a section 
table is in the DataDirectory array. The Import Address Table and the 
Import Lookup Table virtual address values can “produce an import table 
which has fields inside the PE header” (Ferrie, 2008, p. 22). 
2.8.4.10.3. Non Standard Number of RVA and Sizes 
The location of the section table should be determined by using the PE-
>SizeOfOptionalHeader field. Ferrie (2008, p. 22) says a common mistake 
made by both SoftIce and OllyDbg is to “assume that the value in the PE-
>NumberOfRvaAndSizes field is set to the value that exactly fills the 
Optional Header, and that the section table follows immediately”.  
2.8.4.10.4. Non Aligned SizeOfRawData 
By recognizing that Windows automatically rounds up the SizeOfRawData 
field in the section table, a section table can be created whose entry point 
appears in pure virtual memory but there will not have physical data to 
execute because of the rounding (Ferrie, 2008, p. 23).  
2.8.4.10.5. Non Aligned PointerToRawData 
A section can be created where the entry point appears to point to data 
anywhere other than what should be executed because the 
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PointerToRawData field in the section table is subject to rounding down by 
Windows (Ferrie, 2008, p. 23). 
2.8.4.10.6. No Section Table 
If the value of the PE->SectionAlignment field is reduced to less than 4kb, 
the PE header is marked as both executable and writeable and the contents 
of the section table become optional. This means the entire section table 
can be zeroed out. The file is then mapped as if it were only one section 
where the size is that of the value set in the PE->SizeOfImage field (Ferrie, 
2008, p. 23). 
2.8.5. Anti Unpacking by Anti Intercepting 
2.8.5.1. Write->Exec 
Some unpacking tools try to determine when the unpacker has completed 
the unpacking process and transferred control to the host. It can do this by 
intercepting the execution of newly written pages by first writing and then 
executing a dummy instruction. This can cause the interceptor to exit early 
(Ferrie, 2008, p. 23). 
2.8.5.2. Write^Exec 
Ferrie (2008, p. 23) says that some unpacking tools can change the page 
attributes of memory from writeable-executable to writeable or executable 
but not both.  
2.8.6. Miscellaneous 
2.8.6.1. Fake Signatures 
Packers such as RLPack Professional (Reversing Labs, 2008) provide a 
false signature so that packer signature matching tools such as PEiD (Jibz, 
Qwerton, Snaker, & XineohP, 2006) incorrectly identify the packer (Ferrie, 
2008, p. 24). 
2.9. PROCESS INJECTION TECHNIQUES 
Harbour (2007, p. 21) explains that process injection is used to inject code 
into another running process. The target process executes the malicious 
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code. In so doing, it acts to conceal the source of the malicious behaviour. 
It can be used to bypass process specific security mechanisms and host 
base firewalls. The Windows Hooks mechanism can be used to achieve this 
by letting the process run specific code when a particular message is 
received. The Win32 API call SetWindowsHookEx() allows the target process 
to load a specified DLL into the memory space of the executable and select 
a function as a hook to handle a particular event. When the event is 
received, the target process executes the malicious code. An example 
provided in the paper by Harbour (2007, p. 25) is reproduced as follows in 
Figure 2-13 
 
HANDLE hLib, hProc, hHook; 
hLib = LoadLibrary(“evil.dll”); 
hProc = GetProcAddress(hLib, “EvilFunction”); 
hHook = SetWindowsHookEx(WH_CALLWNDPROC, hProc, hLib, 0); 
Figure 2-13 Code snippet showing SetWindowsHook function to load 
a malicious DLL. 
 
Another method is to use library injection. A new thread is created in the 
process which is used to load the malicious library. “When the library is 
loaded by the new thread, the DllMain() function is called, executing your 
malicious code in the target process” (Harbour, 2007, p. 29). An example 
provided by Harbour (2007, p. 30) is reproduced as follows in Figure 2-14. 
 
char libPath[] = “evil.dll”; 
char * remoteLib; 
HMODULE hKern32 = GetModuleHandle(“Kernel32”); 
void *loadLib = GetProcAddress(hKern32, “LoadLibraryA”); 
remoteLib = VirtualAllocEx(hProc, NULL, sizeof (liPath), 
MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_READWRITE); 
CreateRemoteThread(hProc, NULL, 0, loadLib, remoteLib, 0, 
NULL)); 
Figure 2-14 Code snippet showing library injection to load a 
malicious DLL. 
 
Yet another method pointed out by Harbour (2007) is to use Direct Injection. 
This is where the memory space of the process is populated with the 
malicious code, which could be a function or an entire DLL, which he says is 
much harder to do. API's required include VirtualAllocEx(), 
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WriteProcessMemory() and CreateRemoteThread() which is used to create 
a new thread in the process. 
 
2.10. CODE EXECUTION FROM MEMORY 
If the code is executed directly from memory and never resides on the hard 
drive, it may not be detected during a forensic acquisition. The “memory 
buffer to be executed will most likely be populated directly by a network 
transfer” (Harbour, 2007, p. 35). Source code contained in a variable can 
be executed by something similar to exec() or eval(). 
 
Harbour (2007, p. 42) discusses a technique known as the Nebbett Shuttle 
to launch Win32 executables from a memory buffer and provides an 
example that is reproduced of what an implementation could look like. 
Essentially the technique launches a process in a suspended state and then 
overwrites the allocated memory space with a new executable.  
 
CreateProcess(..., “cmd”, ..., CREATE_SUSPEND, ...); 
ZwUnmapViewOfSection(...); 
VirtualAllocEx(..., ImageBase, SizeOfImage, ...) 
WriteProcessMemory(..., headers, ...); 
for (i=0; i< NumberOfSections; i++) { 
 WriteProcessMemory(..., section, ...); 
} 
Resumethread(); 
Figure 2-15 Code snippet using Nebbet shuttle to launch Win32 
executable code. 
 
A specified process cmd is loaded into memory, but is suspended at the 
entry point. All memory that is allocated to the process is released. Area is 
allocated to put the new executable image in the memory space of the 
original process. The PE headers are written to the start of the memory 
region. Each section of the new executable is written to its new virtual 
address. The new, malicious process is still named as cmd in the task list, 
and since the process inherits privileges from the original code, if the 
original code was allowed to communicate through a host based firewall, the 
replacement code will be allowed to as well. 
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2.11. CHECKSUM CHECKS 
Malware can use checksums to try to determine if the code has been 
changed. This could have been done by the malware analyst to change the 
flow of the malware, or to have patched out anti forensic implementations 
in the code (W. Yan, Zhang, & Ansari, 2008).  
2.12. PROCESS CAMOUFLAGE 
“A cleverly named process is often enough to fly beneath the radar and 
avoid immediate detection” (Harbour, 2007, p. 32). There can often be 
several copies of svchost.exe and spoolsv.exe running in memory, and 
additional processes with the same name may go unnoticed. Other name 
variations could include svcshost.exe, spoolsvc.exe, spoolsvr.exe, 
scardsv.exe and lsasss.exe. 
2.13. STRUCTURED EXCEPTION HANDLING 
Structured Exception Handlers (SEH) can be used to detect the presence of 
a debugger. All Win32 applications have an Operating System (OS) supplied 
SEH, and the exception handling mechanism is thread based. The exception 
handling mechanism in Linux is process based, and the exception handler is 
set up with a signal() system call. The global handler in ntdll.dll 
catches the exception and determines where control is given to. The SEH is 
a function pointer, and it is possible to overwrite the pointer to a SEH chain 
(exception-handler list), where if one handler chooses not to handle the 
exception, then the next handler can do it. The final handler is a default 
handler for the process which must handle it (Koziol et al., 2004, p. 116). 
 
The exception handler list is stored in the Thread Information Block (TIB) 
data structure, which can be found at FS:[0]. A single process can have 
multiple threads, and each thread has a TIB, but all threads see the same 
memory, and all share the same address space (Eilam, 2005, p. 106).  
 
Packers such as AsProtect use this mechanism to gain control, and to see 
if it is running inside a debugger. AsProtect creates multiple exceptions 
and a trick to unpacking AsProtect is to count the number of exceptions. 
OllyDbg can be configured to either pass exceptions to the process to 
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handle, or to handle within the debugger. If the debugger is set to handle 
the exceptions, it will give the user the choice to handle the exception, or to 
pass back to the process. Using this iterative process, the number of 
exceptions can be counted until the process freely runs. This gives the 
analyst the opportunity to break on the OEP. If the count of exceptions is n, 
then the next time it is run, only pass n-1 exceptions to the process. At this 
point, the memory map can be viewed, and the code section can be seen 
where the OEP is in. A break point can be set on the code section (set 
memory break point on access). Then, when the jump to the OEP is 
conducted, the breakpoint on the entire section will be triggered on the OEP 
and the process can dumped (Anthracene, 2006). 
 
2.14. IMPORT ADDRESS TABLE 
Much of the functionality in a program is derived from calls to functions 
arranged in libraries called Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL), and the 
information necessary to call DLL functions is stored in the Import Address 
Table (IAT) of a binary. Programs typically use the DLL’s supplied by 
Microsoft to interact with the OS to perform common tasks. Because these 
tasks are so common, multiple programs can share the same DLL’s that are 
loaded, and reduce unnecessary duplication. The PE header of a program is 
read when it is loaded by the dynamic linker, and the addresses of the DLL 
functions (function pointers) the program requires are filled in, in the IAT 
(Eilam, 2005, p. 487).   
 
Typically however, the Import Address Table (IAT) will be obfuscated by the 
packer or protector. Craig (2006) explains that at compile time, the IAT 
contains NULL memory pointers for each function, but when the executable 
is loaded at run time, Windows overwrites the NULLs with the correct 
memory location for each function. This is because the address of the DLL in 
memory will be different on any particular machine.  
 
“The IAT is resolved with a LoadLibrary loop, just before a jump to the 
original entry point” (Falliere, 2006, p. 1). The import name table is 
typically messed up, but can be rebuilt using tools such as ImpRec (MackT, 
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2008). Most packers used by malware do their best to mess up the IAT so 
that the analyst cannot easily determine the DLL functions called. Typically, 
only three DLL functions will be visible for programs that have been packed 
at load time. The malware packer may have generally messed up the IAT by 
encrypting it, altered its size, or mangled it some other way. It is important 
to understand how the IAT should look, because the analyst may have to 
repair it. 
 
2.15. ROOTKITS 
Windows uses four privilege levels, known as rings, to determine the access 
level for access control. Access control determines how hardware can be 
accessed, what instructions a process may use, what files may be modified 
and which areas of memory can be accessed or changed. Ring 0 is the most 
privileged level and Ring 3 has the least amount of privilege. Most 
applications users run, are run in Ring 3 and these applications cannot 
access hardware directly and have limited access to memory. Ring 3 is 
often referred to as “user land”. Ring 0 applications run with full system 
privileges and can perform IO and memory management, run device drivers, 
execute privileged instructions, access all memory space, access all 
hardware and access all components of the kernel. This is often referred to 
as “kernel land”. 
 
A special mechanism exists so that a user land program can access kernel 
land in a controlled fashion so that device drivers (*.sys file) can be 
installed. Root kits exploit this mechanism so that they can install their own 
device driver into kernel land, giving their program full privileges at Ring 0 
and hence control the environment in which other software runs. In this 
way, it can avoid detection (Hoglund & Butler, 2005). 
2.15.1. System Service Dispatch Table 
System calls are used by user land programs to initiate a function in kernel 
land which works by interrupting the execution of the user land program 
and transfers control of execution to the kernel which is then responsible for 
processed the request. System calls are identified by a system call number, 
which is placed into the EAX register and are processed by a kernel routine 
Analysis Avoidance Techniques of Malicious Software 
 
 64 
called KiSystemService. After processing the request, the user land 
program resumes execution. KiSystemService looks up the system call 
number that is in EAX in a table known as the System Service Dispatch 
Table (SSDT). The SSDT contains the memory addresses of all of the 
system calls and is an ideal target for malicious code to get control of to 
control the execution of the kernel by rerouting calls to legitimate functions 
to functions the rootkit wants to call instead. This technique is referred to as 
Hooking and is used by legitimate software as well.  
2.15.2. IAT Hooking 
The Import Address Table (IAT) is a structure that contains library function 
(DLL) names and addresses in memory that a loaded program requires to 
execute. Rootkits can alter the IAT of a program so that its own function will 
be called instead of the legitimate function by overwriting the address of the 
IAT function with the address of its own function loaded into memory space, 
as illustrated in Figure 2-16. The sold line shows the normal sequence of 
calls. The dashed line from the IAT to the Rootkit code shows the hooking 
from the IAT to the Rootkit code. 
Figure 2-16 Altering the IAT of a program so that rootkit code is 
called instead (hooking). 
2.15.3. Inline Function Hooking 
Instead of over writing the address of the DLL in the IAT, the function code 
can be directly modified in memory and this is known as an inline function 
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hook. This is achieved by over writing the first few instructions of the 
hooked function with instructions that will jump to the rootkit code. After 
the rootkit code has completed, it may return the flow of execution to the 
code that was originally intended to be called. 
2.15.4. SSDT Hooking 
Hooking the flow of execution can also occur in the kernel by using the 
SSDT in a fashion similar to IAT hooking. The original functions address can 
be replaced by the rootkit function. Functions that return results of open 
ports or list running processes, can be subverted and allow the presence of 
the rootkit to remain undetected.  
2.15.5. Direct Kernel Object Manipulation 
Tools exist for detecting the hooks installed by rootkits, such as Root Kit 
Revealer  (Microsoft, 2008c) and a more advanced method to hide 
processes is to alter the kernel memory data structures that are used for 
keeping track of the state of the operating system itself. This is known as 
Direct Kernel Object Manipulation (DKOM) and is hard to detect because 
“directly modifying the raw main memory contents with a Ring 0 rootkit 
cannot be controlled by any built-in security mechanism in Windows” 
(Schwittay, 2006, p. 80). These undocumented data structures contain lists 
of running processes, threads scheduled for execution and other data. A 
disadvantage of using DKOM is that it may make the system unstable or 
even crash. It is especially easy to crash because the actual structure is 
undocumented and minor operating system changes could change the way 
the operating system defines and uses the structures. Processes can be 
hidden by manipulating the in memory data structures that use forward and 
backward pointers to keep track of processes by reorganizing the pointers 
of these doubly linked lists. “Because the scheduling of processes does not 
depend on a process being present in that list, this technique hides the 
process successfully (e.g. From the Task Manager), but the process is still 
executed unnoticed” (Schwittay, 2006, p. 80). Figure 2-17, adapted from 
Schwittay, shows the normal linking between data structures in the top half 
of the diagram. The lower half of the diagram shows how the middle 
process is hidden by manipulating the pointers. 
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Figure 2-17 Using DKOM pointer manipulation to hide a process 
(Schwittay, 2006, p. 80) 
 
2.16. PACKERS AND PROTECTORS 
Packers make static analysis of the binary difficult because the actual code 
instructions and data is not able to be read until the code has been 
unpacked. It is very similar to compression. Unpackers exist for many 
packers in the form of scripts, plugins, programs and in the form of advice 
on how to unpack manually with the use of a debugger. The unpacked code 
can then be analyzed with a debugger such as IDA Pro, or Ollydbg. If 
malware to be analyzed has been packed by an unknown packer, it can 
often be loaded into memory, and then process dumped and examined 
using tools such as the Ollydbg plugin, LordPE (yoda, 2005a), or any 
other memory dumping tool. It should be noted that the code may use 
techniques to determine if a debugger is being used and respond by 
protecting itself using some combination of the anti forensic techniques that 
have been discussed earlier in this literature review. The analyst needs to 
be in a position to statically analyse the executable as soon as it has 
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unpacked itself, by starting analysis at the Original Entry Point (OEP), 
otherwise code can be written over and evidence overlooked. A multitude of 
packers are available and there are methods for unpacking them. The 
general steps outlined by Craig (2006) for unpacking are: 
1. Locate the OEP. 
2. Dump the executable image. 
3. Change the Entry Point of the dumped image. 
4. Calculate the Entry Point Relative Virtual Address (RVA). 
Where RVA EP = OEP – Base Image 
5. Fix the Import Address Table (IAT). 
6. Reinsert the fixed IAT into the dumped executable. 
7. Execute the binary (break at EP), and the binary will populate the IAT 
with the correct values. 
 
Packer signatures can be detected by tools such as Stud_PE (CG SoftLabs, 
2008). Figure 2-18 displays the signature view of a malware specimen, and 
shows that the packer used is PE Pack 1.0 (ANAKiN, 2005). Note that 
Stud_PE in this case is using the PEiD packer signature database. The PEiD 
database contains over four hundred signatures, but is starting to become 
dated. 
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Figure 2-18 Screen shot of Stud_PE showing detection of PE Pack 
signature  
 
Figure 2-19 displays a view of the sections contained in a malware sample 
using Stud_PE. “Sections contain executable code, data, debugging 
information, resources and additional metadata used by the program” 
(Harbour, 2007, p. 13). 
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Figure 2-19 Screen shot of Stud_PE showing useful information on 
sections 
 
Another way of recognizing a packed file is that the first section could have 
a physical size of 0 bytes. This section will be filled with data that will be 
unpacked from another section (Falliere, 2006, p. 1). Once unpacked, the 
classic entry point can be recognized as follows in Figure 2-20. 
 
PUSH EBP 
MOV EBP, ESP 
Figure 2-20 Classic entry point signature for recognition purposes. 
 
Harbour (2007, p. 72) points out that a custom packer will likely defeat low 
level reversers, and that a binary packed by a custom packer is unlikely to 
be identified at all. The Executable Toolkit, exetk (Anonymous, n.d.-c) is a 
custom packer that is available with source code. Harbour (2007, p. 72) 
says that tools such as PeiD are easily fooled and recommends using 
Mandiant Red Curtain (MRC) (Mandiant, 2007) for detecting packed 
binaries. MRC examines and scores executable files based on a set of 
criteria including entropy (randomness), detection of packers, compiler and 
packer signatures to develop a threat score on how suspicious the file is. 
This score can then be used to determine if a file should be further 
examined. A screen shot of MRC is shown in Figure 2-21. Useful columns 
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include the threat score, the Entry Point Signature (Packer Signature), the 
entropy of the entire program, the entropy of the code and a count of the 
anomalies found. 
 
 
Figure 2-21 Mandiant Red Curtain screen shot showing useful 
information including entropy and anomaly count 
 
Lyda and Hamrock (2007) explain that entropy is a method for measuring 
uncertainty in a series of bytes, and although a file compressed with a 
software compressor may have a high entropy level, the data is structured 
and is not random. In contrast, measuring the entropy of packed malware 
measures the lack of structure in the packed malware. The packer typically 
modifies the original programs standard sections (.text, .data, .rsrc) and 
compresses these sections into one or two new sections.  Lyda et al. 
performed a series of controlled experiments to compute the entropy of 
21,567 Windows based malware samples collected between January 2000 
and December 2005 and found that entropy measurement was very 
effective at identifying packed malware. This approach is supported as 
effective at detecting packed malware by other researchers such as 
Ebringer and Sun (2008). 
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2.16.1. ASProtect 
ASProtect is a popular, commercial packer and protector that is used to 
obfuscate demo programs and shareware. Protectors differ from packers by 
incorporating encryption features. It is also used by malware authors to 
deter and hinder AV software and malware analysts from analyzing their 
code. It inserts anti debugging code into the binaries it is packing/protecting 
and can insert registration schemes and time limits. Run time tracing can be 
made complicated by exploiting Microsoft Windows Structured Exception 
Handling (SEH) scheme. It can also use techniques to hinder the dumping 
of memory. Dumping of memory can be useful for the malware analyst by 
letting obfuscated programs unpack themselves as they run, catching and 
halting the program at the moment the unpacking stops, and then dumping 
the unpacked program in memory. This allows the code to then be analyzed. 
ASProtect can make this dumping process less useful by deleting a section 
of code as soon as it has finished executing. This technique is known as 
“stolen bytes”. These bytes must be restored if the dumped program is to 
be run again. The extensive range of features that ASProtect can 
incorporate is listed in the screen shot of Figure 2-22. Figure 2-23 displays 
the dialog that allows the selection of features that can be incorporated into 
the code and shows this this is as simple as selecting check boxes. Figure 
2-24 shows a screen shot of the dialog box displayed at the end of the 
packing and protection implementation routine. It shows that the original, 
6k byte file has grown to 305k bytes with the addition of CRC check 
protection, anti debugging and IAT protection.  
 
The view of the OEP in OllyDbg is shown in the screen shot of Figure 2-25 
before ASProtect is applied to the program. The code and function calls can 
be easily read and followed. The original IAT is shown in the screen shot of 
Figure 2-26 and the imports can be easily read as well, before the 
application of ASProtect. In contrast, Figure 2-27 shows the screen shot of 
OllyDbg after the application of ASProtect and that the file has grown from 
6 KB to 305 KB with the addition of protection such as CRC code checking 
and anti debugging.  The obfuscation introduced by the protector is clearly 
evident and demonstrates that the code has to be unpacked and 
unprotected before analysis can begin. 
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Figure 2-22 List of ASProtect Features 
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Figure 2-23 Dialog showing range of available options in ASProtect 
to protect code and hinder analysis. 
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Figure 2-24 ASProtect completion showing the file size has grown 
markedly with added protection. 
 
Figure 2-25 Original Entry Point clearly evident in OllyDbg before 
protection. 
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Figure 2-26 Imports before protection clearly showing imported 
functions. 
 
 
Figure 2-27 Packed View of Entry Point in OllyDbg showing 
obfuscation. 
2.16.1.1. Unpacking ASProtect 
Anthracene (2006) provides an overview on how to deal with some of the 
features of ASProtect and is only a single demonstration of a plethora of 
informal papers and demonstrations that are available on reverse 
engineering sites that cater mostly for software crackers. Software crackers 
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use reverse engineering techniques to defeat protection mechanisms of 
legitimate software to avoid licensing, or to extract information on how 
software works beneath the hood. Anthracene’s treatise is quite extensive 
and very typical of the step by step advice that is often required to unpack 
packed software to arrive at the OEP and to repair the IAT so that detailed 
analysis can be conducted. Essentially, the technique discussed by 
Anthracene is summarized in the following sequence: 
 
1. Confirm the signature of the packer used, using PEiD. 
2. Open the file in OllyDbg. 
3. Set the options in OllyDbg to pass all exceptions to the program 
being debugged. This is because it uses exception handling tricks to 
try to determine if it is being debugged. 
4. Set OllyDbg to remove analysis from module. This is because code 
and data are intertwined. 
5. The entry point is characterized by a PUSH and a RETN. This is 
equivalent to a JMP. Jump to the address. 
6. Set a hardware breakpoint on access to the DWORD pointed to by the 
ESP register. Then hit run. 
7. The break could be on a JMP EAX instruction. This could be the jump 
to the OEP. Step over this instruction, and this could be the OEP. This 
will be characterized by a typical stack frame setup. 
8. Dump the file using the OllyDump plugin. 
9. Start ImpRec, attach to the process being debugged and fill in the 
OEP. 
10.Click on IAT autosearch, click Ok and then click on Get Imports. 
11.Repair the Imports (which is a detailed activity in itself). 
 
Although presented above as a simple list of summarized instructions, the 
details in Anthracene’s discussion covers more than 23 pages. This 
exemplifies the work required to manually unpack, but only hints at what 
could be considered a much more difficult exercise if more anti-analysis 
features are added to the protector.  
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2.16.2. The Problem with Packers 
Packing is becoming a dominant problem for AV software because of the 
number and sophistication of the packers that are now available (Sun et al., 
2008, p. 2). Even though scripts and plugins are available for unpacking, 
they only work when simple packers are used, and fail when sophisticated 
packers have been used. Such tools often use heuristics to search for the 
OEP whilst the unpacker is allowed to run. Sun et al. propose a method of 
unpacking by creating an execution trace of the instruction pointer EIP, and 
creating a histogram of the addresses of the executed instructions and 
ordering them by the last time an address is executed. This is based on 
their observation that: 
a. OEP bytes are invariably only executed once, even in a packed 
program. 
b. Generally, the packer will unpack the original program to a region of 
memory which has not been executed previously. 
 
The results documented in the paper by Sun et al. appear to be very good 
but only fairly simple packers were examined, including UPX (Oberhumer, 
Molnár, & Reiser, 2008), Morphine (Anonymous, n.d.-j), MEW and FSG 
(Bart & Xtreeme, 2005) as well as a multi packer example which packed 
the file with UPX 2.03 and then Morphine 2.7. Future work identified in 
the paper includes optimizing the tracer to resist anti-analysis techniques. 
 
Figure 2-28 is a screenshot of the protection options dialog that users of 
Themida® can use to protect their code. An extensive list of options are 
available that provide coverage of some of the most significant anti-analysis 
techniques discussed in this literature review.  
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Figure 2-28 Themida® dialog showing extensive range of protection 
options. 
2.17. PLUGINS 
Plugins exist for most of the popular tools used for reverse engineering and 
are typically DLL’s that are simply installed to a known directory pre 
determined by the debugger, which then makes the plugin available via a 
menu. A variety of plugins are available from the internet, particularly 
reverse engineering and cracking sites. It is highly conceivable that these 
plugins contain malicious software themselves and it is advisable to treat 
them with caution and to analyse the source code for the plugin if it is 
possible, especially if forensic evidence has been collected using the plugin. 
The functionality of plugins can be replicated using scripting languages that 
accompany the most popular disassemblers and debuggers such as IDA Pro. 
 
IDA Stealth (Newger, 2008) is a free plugin for IDA Pro (Hex-Rays, 2008), 
a commercial disassembler and debugger. The dialog box for IDA Stealth 
is displayed in Figure 2-29. It lists a limited subset of the techniques 
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discussed by (Ferrie, 2008), who in turn says the 52 techniques discussed 
in his paper are only the most widely used techniques. The plugin functions 
are divided into the following sections: 
• Stealth Techniques 
• Disable Flags 
• Protect Debugger 
• Global Enable 
The particular technique to be used is simply enabled by selecting the 
appropriate checkbox. 
 
 
Figure 2-29 IDA Stealth Plugin showing available options to hide the 
debugger from only a selection of techniques discussed in the 
literature review. 
 
OllyAdvanced (TH-DJM, 2006) is a plugin for OllyDbg (Yuschuk, 2008) a 
free disassembler and debugger. Olly Advanced is similar to the IDA 
Stealth plugin as depicted in Figure 2-30.  
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Figure 2-30 Olly Advanced Plugin showing available options to hide 
the debugger from only a selection of techniques discussed in the 
literature review. 
 
Plugins are useful for manual analysis but typically do not tell the operator 
that the technique that has been selected has been located or mitigated, 
their main function is to hide the debugger. It is also evident too, that the 
extensive list of anti-forensic techniques discussed in the sections above, 
are not fully reflected in the number of options in the plugins. This leaves a 
gap between what is available and what could be required by the analyst. 
This gap can be addressed by the use of scripting languages. 
 
2.18. SCRIPTING LANGUAGES 
Disassemblers and Debuggers such as IDA Pro and OllyDbg are supported 
by scripting languages as well as Application Programming Interfaces (API) 
for the development of plugins.  “Potential uses for scripts are infinite and 
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can range from simple one-liners to full-blown programs that automate 
common tasks or perform complex analysis functions” (Eagle, 2008a, p. 
249).  IDA Pro’s native scripting language is called IDC and appears very C 
like in appearance and is used to query the database that IDA Pro stores 
the file being analyzed in. IDA Python (Erdélyi, 2008) is a Python plugin for 
IDA Pro that allows the analyst to access the functions of IDC and the full 
power of Python. Similar plugins for other popular scripting languages such 
as Perl and Ruby are also available for IDA Pro.  
 
Scripting languages for OllyDbg (also in the form of plugins) include 
OllyScript (SHaG, 2006) which is very similar in appearance to assembly 
language. Other plugins include OllyPerl (Stewart, 2006) and OllyPython 
(Vilhonen, 2007) that leverage from Perl and Python respectively. The 
Immunity Debugger (Immunity, 2008) is an extension of OllyDbg that is 
integrated with Python. 
 
Existing scripts for OllyDbg are plentiful on the web for performing a myriad 
of analysis and reverse engineering tasks and far exceed those available 
freely for IDA Pro. It is this researcher’s conjecture that this is because 
OllyDbg and more recently, the Immunity Debugger, have been the 
favorite tool of software crackers who have a spirit of sharing more 
prevalent than the commercial users of IDA Pro. IDA Pro was initially only 
a disassembler used for performing static analysis and a debugging 
capability was added in the past few years. The existing scripts for OllyDbg 
include a very wide variety of unpackers which are not only useful in their 
own right, but also serve as a source of information on how to unpack 
particular packers. These can also be used as an algorithmic template to 
implement the routine in other scripting languages such as IDA Python.  
 
Scripts written in IDC or IDAPython can then be run against the IDA Pro 
database, which is stored in an IDB (IDA Pro Database) file, or against the 
original executable itself on the command line, or through the Graphical 
User Interface (GUI). The IDB file saves previous analysis work that has 
been conducted on the file which can include identification of functions, 
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structures, enumerations and unions as well as any mitigation work against 
anti forensic techniques and obfuscation. This assists in automating analysis 
on malicious files. For example, to run an IDAPython script with IDA Pro on 
the command line named walkTheSegments.py against an IDB file named 
CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent.idb, the following would be entered on the 
command line or in a script as shown in Figure 2-31. This feature greatly 
assists automation. 
 
idag -A -OIDAPython:walkTheSegments.py 
CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent.idb 
Figure 2-31 Calling IDA Pro on the command line to run a 
IDAPython script assists automation of code analysis. 
2.19. TRACING 
Scripts and plugins that are used to unpack malware typically allow the 
malware to unpack itself at run time, and halt execution when the OEP is 
recognized. Ideally, the analyst can then use a memory dumping tool to 
capture the unpacked malware in memory and analyse it (Aquilina et al., 
2008; Skoudis & Zeltser, 2004; Zeltser, 2007). However, this approach can 
miss anti-analysis techniques incorporated into the unpacking code. Lau and 
Svajcer (2008) point out that executable packers such as Themida® 
(Oreans Technologies, 2008) will not unpack underlying code if it detects 
that it is running inside VMWare and that tracing is very useful to uncover 
the use of anti-analysis techniques. “Tracing offers a means of logging 
specific events that occur while a process is executing” (Eagle, 2008a, p. 
508). Events can include every instruction that is executed, function calls, 
register activities or any other parameter of interest that changes as the 
malware is executed.  
 
Sun et al. (2008) also employ tracing to locate the OEP of packed software 
by creating a histogram of the addresses of executed instructions and 
ordering the histogram by the last time an instruction is executed. 
“Decryption, decompression and copying appear as large spikes at the start 
of the histogram, followed by a flat section, of height one, which is usually 
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the OEP” (Sun et al., 2008). The researchers show good results for 
analyzing non malicious software packed by various packers.  
 
2.20. NEW PARADIGMS FOR MALWARE DETECTION 
AV software, that relies on signature matching and heuristics is recognized 
by AV researchers to be far less than optimal (Mila Dalla et al., 2008; 
Szewczyk & Brand, 2008; W. Yan et al., 2008; Z. Yan & Inge, 2008; Zhou & 
Meador Inge, 2008). This has led to a variety of research to be conducted 
on alternate techniques for malware detection as discussed in the following 
subsections. 
2.20.1. Statistical Structures 
Bilar (2005) shows how malware can be classified by analyzing statistical 
structures. Three perspectives examined by Bilar, includes assembly 
instructions, Win 32 API Calls and system dependence graphs.  Examination 
of assembly instructions is primarily a static analysis technique where the 
frequency distribution of operation codes (opcodes) is developed from the 
disassembly of the binary. Bilar shows that this technique can be useful to 
provide a quick identification. Just looking at the most frequent opcodes is a 
weak predictor. Looking at fourteen of the most infrequently used opcodes 
such as an interrupt (int) and no operation (nop), it may be possible to 
classify malware. Bilar suggests that root kits make heavy use of software 
interrupts whilst viruses make use of the nop instruction for padding sleds. 
Additional work being carried out in this area includes investigating 
equivalent opcode substitution effects between compilers and types of 
opcodes.  
2.20.2. Win 32 API Calls 
Looking at Win 32 API Calls is an active analysis technique that observes 
the API calls that a program under investigation makes. These calls are 
recorded and a count vector is saved into a database. These vectors are 
then compared to known malware vectors in the database if it is determined 
that the vectors are related. Bilar (2005, p. 25) claims that this vector 
classification is successful in classification of malware into a family. The Win 
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32 API call fingerprint is shown by Bilar (2005, p. 27) to be robust, even 
though various packers were used. 
2.20.3. System Dependence Graphs 
System Dependence Graphs is a newly developing static analysis technique 
described by Bilar (2005, p. 31) that represents control, call and data 
dependencies of a program through graph modeling. Then graph structures 
can be used as fingerprints, which assist in the process of identification, 
classification and prediction of behaviour. 
2.20.4. Run Time Behaviour Monitoring 
Malware detection and analysis by an investigator can be a labor intensive 
process using static and active techniques.  Due to time constraints and the 
abilities of the investigator, there is a possibility that critical forensic 
evidence could be overlooked. To this end, automated malware detection 
and classification tools are being developed. Lee and Mody (2006, p. 3) 
“propose an automated classification method based on runtime behavioral 
data and machine learning”. Essentially the run time behaviour of a file is 
represented by a sequence of events, which is stored in a canonical format 
in a database. Machine learning is used to recognize patterns and 
similarities, which are then used to classify new objects. Such an automated 
system is important because human analysis can be inefficient and time 
consuming (Lee & Mody, 2006). However, development of algorithms, 
validation training data for the classification system requires the input from 
manual analysis.  
2.20.5. Obfuscation Detection 
Obfuscation is used by legitimate software to protect the Intellectual 
Property (IP) as well as by authors of malware whose intention is to hide 
the malware from AV software. Wysopal (2009) suggests that the very 
presence of obfuscated code could indicate the presence of malware. 
Wysopal says that if the behaviour of software cannot be verified, then the 
software could have a malicious nature and could violate the privacy of the 
user. 
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2.21. IMPLICATIONS OF THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
The search of the literature, directly related to the implementation, 
detection and mitigation of anti-analysis techniques malware employs, 
reveals a number of lines of enquiry not fully covered in the literature. 
 
Various methodologies exist for analyzing malware. The more effective 
methodologies take the presence of analysis avoidance techniques into 
account and encourage the use of mitigation strategies for them. Zeltser 
(2007) uses a sequential static and dynamic, phased approach, where he 
discovers something from each phase that assists with progressing to the 
next phase to discover more about how the malware works. An effective 
technique to support the detection and mitigation of analysis avoidance 
techniques could be to use such an incremental static and dynamic spiral 
approach, where anti forensic techniques are discovered and mitigated as 
the analyses of the malware progresses from a high level of perspective 
down to the most detailed perspective.  
 
An extensive range of anti forensic techniques can be implemented in 
malware. A non-exhaustive list of techniques can include anti-dumping, 
anti-debugging, anti-disassembling, anti-virtual machine, anti-online 
analysis, use of root kits, IAT destruction, anti-tool specific and process 
injection. Techniques are dispersed amongst the literature and generally 
only exist as code snippets. This leaves the prospect to fully implement the 
techniques and validate their use against analysis tools. This also includes 
an opportunity to determine how effective the tools are against such a large 
number of techniques. It also provides a chance to determine how the use 
of the techniques can be detected and mitigated. A variance of anti-analysis 
taxonomies was revealed in the literature and this provides an opportunity 
to combine the taxonomies into an overall one. 
 
Before detailed analysis of the code of malware can be examined, the 
malware has to be unpacked and the OEP reached. Packers are used to 
compress multiple malware files into one file and are unpacked when 
installed or at run time by run time unpacking routines. Various tools and 
methods are available to unpack packed malware but are very dependent 
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on knowing which packer was used. This information may come from a 
packer signature detector, but tools such as PEiD are becoming dated, 
unless the signature database they rely on are updated with signatures of 
the latest packers. The use of a packer can be determined by measuring the 
entropy of the malware, which tends to have very high levels of entropy 
when packed. Malware collected from the internet could be used to 
determine the prevalence of the use of packers and protectors. 
 
Plugins exist for popular debuggers that assist in hiding the debugger from 
some of the anti-forensic techniques discussed above, but their coverage of 
the number of techniques is limited. A variety of scripting languages that 
are available for use with the debuggers are available and these can be 
used to detect, log and mitigate the use of these techniques. This opens the 
door to examine the existing plugins and to discover how effective scripting 
languages are at extending the tools to detect and mitigate anti-analysis 
techniques. 
 
The literature search revealed that researchers claim that traditional AV 
software is far less than ideal at detecting malware and that alternate 
methods exist. This provides an opportunity to examine their claims.  
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CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODS 
The research questions examined in this thesis were stated in the 
Introduction chapter of this thesis as: 
1. What techniques can malware use to avoid being analyzed? 
2. How can the use of these techniques be detected? 
3. How can the use of these techniques be mitigated? 
 
These questions, refined whilst searching the literature, clearly initiated this 
line of research. Hernon (1991, p. 4) describes research as an inquiry 
process and lists the aims of research to include the “Discovery or creation 
of knowledge, or theory building”.  In addition, Hernon says that another 
aim of research could be the “Testing, confirmation, revision, refutation of 
knowledge and theory”.  Alternatively, Hernon says that the aim of the 
research could be the “Investigation of a problem for local decision making”.  
Without a doubt, all three research questions for this thesis could have any, 
some or all of these aims. However, for research to be considered to have 
been conducted with appropriate rigor, and to be accepted as truth, the 
process and methods used to arrive at the result must be shown to be 
justifiable, the line of enquiry to be clearly defined, with traceability all the 
way from the research questions to the resultant conclusions and claims of 
contribution to knowledge. The research process itself could be considered 
as the linking activities that the researcher conducts to connect the research 
questions to the aims and results of the research via a number of 
intermediatory phases (Bouma & Ling, 2004, p. 5).  
 
3.1. A MODEL OF THE RESEARCH PROCESS 
A possible model of the research process that is discussed and represented 
in diagrammatic form by Oates (2007, p. 23)  is reproduced as Figure 3-1.  
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Figure 3-1 Model of the research process showing the variety of 
paths that can be undertaken (Oates, 2007, p. 23). 
 
The process diagram assists in charting a course to navigate from 
formulating research questions to discovering answers for the research 
questions. The particular model presented by Oates shows that experiences, 
motivation and a literature review are inputs into developing appropriate 
and meaningful research questions. An objective of this initiating phase of 
the process is to show why this line of research is important, why it has not 
been fully addressed in published literature and how the research will be 
used.  The research question is the underlying thread throughout the entire 
process. After it has been formulated, it is then used to select an 
appropriate research strategy, data generation method and data analysis 
method. Research questions clearly have traceability throughout the 
research process and arriving at answers to an enquiry is dependent upon 
the selection of an appropriate research strategy, data generation method 
and data analysis method most appropriate for the questions being asked.  
 
Significant consideration is required to be allocated to the choice of research 
paradigm before the selection process of research method commences. 
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Various research paradigms exist to guide the enquiry (Guba & Lincoln, 
1994, p. 105; Marshall, 1997, p. 16; Oates, 2007, p. 283). Lincoln and 
Guba (1994, p. 105) say that “Questions of method are secondary to 
questions of paradigm, which we define as the basic belief system or 
worldview that guides the investigator, not only in choices of method but in 
ontologically and epistemologically fundamental ways .” This is a significant 
statement, because it emphasizes that in order to conduct research, the 
researcher must adopt an appropriate and over arching, philosophical 
viewpoint, referred to as a research paradigm. 
 
3.2. RESEARCH PARADIGMS 
Oates (2007, p. 282) describes a paradigm as “a set of shared assumptions 
or ways of thinking about some aspect of the world”. Various philosophical 
paradigms exist and have different views about the nature of the world, 
referred to as ontology, and the way that the knowledge is acquired, 
referred to as epistemology. 
 
Paradigms can be subdivided further by asking ontological, epistemological 
and methodological questions (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 108). Epistemology 
essentially focuses on the theory of knowledge and its acquisition (Carroll & 
Swatman, 2000). Ontology is concerned with examining the nature of 
reality from an existence point of view. This philosophical viewpoint asks 
questions such as “what is?” Epistemology on the other hand, focuses on 
asking how this knowledge is acquired in the format of questions such as 
“how do we know what we know?” The methodological question is “how can 
we come to know it?” (Pickard, 2007, p. 6).  
 
Some common research paradigms include positivism, interpretivism and 
critical research (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 105; Oates, 2007, p. 283). 
3.2.1. Positivism    
Oates (2007, p. 283) says positivism is the foundation of the experimental 
method, which in turn, has two fundamental assumptions: 
• The world has order, is regular and is non-random. 
• The world can be investigated objectively. 
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These assumptions are significant because it facilitates the discovery of 
regularities, patterns and laws through the conduct of experimentation to 
discover evidence of cause and effect.  The discovery process is initiated by 
the formulation of a hypothesis which is followed by experiments designed 
to refute or confirm the hypothesis. Confidence in a theory may be gained 
each time it fails to be refuted. Positivist researchers typically use controlled 
experiments but they are not limited to the use of controlled experiments as 
their research strategy. Other strategies such as surveys are also frequently 
used by this paradigm. Positivists are considered to be reductionist. That is, 
they study phenomena by breaking them down into simpler components 
(Easterbrook, Singer, Storey, & Damian, 2008, p. 291).  
 
Guba et al. (1994, p. 109) describe the ontology of positivism as a realism 
and that “an apprehend able reality is assumed to exist, driven by 
immutable laws and mechanisms”. Guba et al. describe the epistemology of 
positivism as dualist and objectivist. This is because the investigator and 
the phenomena under investigation are assumed to be independent entities 
and the investigator studies the object without influencing it, or is 
influenced by it. Validity is threatened if an influence exists. Guba et al. (p. 
110) describe the methodology of positivism to be experimental and 
manipulative. “Questions and/or hypotheses are stated in propositional form 
and subjected to empirical test to verify them; possible confounding 
conditions must be carefully controlled (manipulated) to prevent outcomes 
from being properly influenced”  (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 110). 
3.2.2. Interpretivism 
In contrast to positivism, interpretivism does not seek to prove or disprove 
a hypothesis. The interpretivist approach tries to understand phenomena 
through the meanings and values people assign to them. In this way, 
multiple, subject realities are detailed. Hence, there is no single truth. 
Different researchers can view the world differently and their values and 
actions mold the research process. This results in multiple interpretations. 
Data collected via this paradigm is generally qualitative (Easterbrook et al., 
2008, p. 291; Oates, 2007, pp. 292-293).  
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Guba et al. (1994, p. 110) describe the ontology of interpretivism as 
relativist. This is because realities are interpreted from social experience 
and intangible mental constructions from individuals or groups that hold the 
constructions. Constructions from such individuals or groups may be more 
or less informed than those formed by other individuals or groups. Guba et 
al. (p. 111) describe the epistemology of interpretivism as transactional and 
subjectivist. That is, the investigator and the object of investigation are 
assumed to be interactively linked. Guba et al. (p. 111) describe the 
methodology of interpretivism as hermeneutical and dialectical and say that 
“… constructions can be elicited and refined only through interaction 
between and among investigator and respondents” .  
 
Williamson (2002) explains that what differentiates interpretivism from 
positivism is that knowledge can be acquired differently because the natural 
world is viewed as separate to the social world. The researcher becomes 
part of the study and loss of the benefit of objectivity obtained from 
empirical observation may result. 
3.2.3. Critical Research 
Critical research is similar to interpretivism from the perspective that there 
are multiple views of reality, but differs by saying that social reality 
possesses objective properties that interpretivists discount.  “Critical 
researchers seek to identify and challenge the conditions of domination, and 
the restrictions and unfairness of the status quo and taken-for-granted 
assumptions” (Oates, 2007, p. 297). 
 
Guba et al. (1994) describe the ontology of critical research as historical 
realism and describe the epistemology of critical research as transactional 
and subjectivist. 
   
Similar to the description of the epistemology of interpretivism by Guba et 
al., the investigator and the object under investigation are assumed to be 
interactively linked and the values of the investigator influence the inquiry. 
The same researchers describe the methodology of critical research as 
dialogic and dialectical. A dialog is required between the investigator and 
the subjects of the inquiry and Guba et al. (p. 110) say “… dialogue must be 
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dialectical in nature to transform ignorance and misapprehensions 
(accepting historically mediated structures as immutable) into more 
informed consciousness …” . 
 
3.2.4. Research Paradigm Selected for this Research 
This research does not consider the social meaning of the phenomena under 
investigation. This discounts the use of the other identified research 
paradigms other than the positivist paradigm. The approach selected to 
address the research questions of this thesis is therefore positivist.  
 
An empirical approach is appropriate because the result should be the same, 
no matter how it is measured. The use of various tools to perform 
measurements should produce the same results. This research is 
reductionist. It is studying the plethora of anti-forensic techniques malware 
can incorporate by measuring the effectiveness of these techniques on an 
individual basis together with the effectiveness of being able to detect the 
use of the techniques and how effectively the use of the techniques can be 
mitigated.  The number and type of techniques employed within any 
particular collected malware specimen under investigation must be finite.   
3.3. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
“Empirical research seeks to explore, describe, predict, and explain natural, 
social, or cognitive phenomena by using evidence based on observation or 
experience” (Sjoberg, Dyba, & Jorgensen, 2007, p. 361). Empirical research 
involves the collection and interpretation of evidence through methods such 
as surveys, interviews, experimentation and observation.  
 
Easterbrook et al. (2008, p. 290) say that once the research questions have 
been developed, thought has to be given to the determination of what will 
be accepted as the empirical truth. If ontology is considered as the nature 
of the world with respect to knowledge, epistemology is understood as the 
process in which that knowledge is obtained. This thesis undertakes an 
empirical approach to obtain knowledge relevant to answering the research 
questions. 
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The steps listed by Perry et al. (2000, p. 348) to conduct an empirical study 
are : 
• Formulation of an hypothesis or question to test 
• observing a situation, 
• abstracting observations into data, 
• analyzing the data, and 
• drawing of conclusions with respect to the tested hypothesis. 
 
There are various types of empirical research in which data can be produced. 
Easterbrook, Singer, Storey, & Damian (2008, p. 286) explicitly list the five 
classes of empirical research methods that they believe are most relevant to 
software engineering as: 
• Controlled Experiments (including Quasi-Experiments) 
• Case Studies (both exploratory and confirmatory) 
• Survey Research 
• Ethnographies 
• Action Research 
 
A controlled experiment manipulates one or more independent variables to 
measure the effect on one or more dependent variables to assist the 
researcher to determine how the variables are related and to identify 
causality. A hypothesis is used to guide the steps of the experimental 
design including which variables to include in the study and how they will be 
measured. This is essentially reductionist and positivist in nature. 
Complexity is reduced by allowing only a few variables of interest to vary in 
a controlled manner, whilst holding all other variables constant (Easterbrook 
et al., 2008, pp. 294-296).  
 
A case study investigates a phenomenon within a context and can reveal 
causality. Case studies are used where the reductionism of a controlled 
experiment is inappropriate. This could include when effects may take a 
long time to appear or where the context plays a role in the phenomena 
under investigation (Easterbrook et al., 2008, pp. 296-298).  To address the 
research questions of this thesis, a case study could include observing 
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malware analysts in the field and noting how the analysts detect and 
mitigate anti-forensic techniques over a period of time. 
 
Survey research can be conducted via questionnaires, structured interviews 
or data logging to identify characteristics of a representative sample from a 
well defined population. A clear research question is a precondition, the 
sampling technique must be sound and the survey questions must be 
designed to yield useful and valid data (Easterbrook et al., 2008, pp. 298-
299). To address the research questions of this thesis, a survey could create 
a questionnaire tailored for malware analysts to determine if they believe 
the use of anti-forensic techniques are being increasingly used by the 
malware they are analyzing.  
 
“Ethnography is a form of research focusing on the sociology of meaning 
through field observation” (Easterbrook et al., 2008, p. 300). To address 
the research questions of this thesis, ethnography could be used to observe 
malware analysts create practices and use strategies to detect and mitigate 
the use of anti-forensic techniques over a period of time. 
 
Action research focuses on solving real world problems. “While most 
empirical research methods attempt to observe the world as it currently 
exists, action researchers aim to intervene in the studied situations for the 
explicit purpose of improving the situation” (Easterbrook et al., 2008, p. 
301). The research questions of this research could be addressed by 
working in a malware research laboratory and interacting with malware 
analysts. 
 
Selection of the most appropriate research method requires consideration of 
ontology, epistemology, methodology, resources and the abilities of the 
researcher with respect to the phenomena under investigation.  Empirically 
based questions can be asked to facilitate comprehension of the ontology of 
the phenomenon. One of the first steps Easterbrook et al. (p. 287) 
recommends in selecting the research strategy is to clarify the research 
question. This begins by asking exploratory questions to aid in 
understanding the phenomena. Such questions assist in the determination 
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of measurable and valid evidence. Table 3-1 re-represents the exploratory 
questions and the form of the question discussed by Easterbrook et al. 
(p.288) in the form of a table. 
 
Table 3-1 Examples of exploratory research questions 
Question Form of Question 
Existence questions “Does X exist?” 
 
Description and 
classification 
questions 
 
“What is X like?” 
“What are its properties?” 
“How can it be categorized?” 
“How can we measure it?” 
“What is its purpose?” 
“What are its components?” 
“How do the components relate to each other?” 
“What are all the types of X?” 
 
Descriptive-
Comparative 
questions 
 
“How does X differ from Y?” 
 
The research questions in this thesis are fundamentally exploratory in 
nature and can be answered in a literature review and through empirical 
methods. Answering these questions assists in progressing to the next 
stage of questioning where Easterbrook et al. (p. 288) says “ … base-rate 
questions about the normal patterns of occurrence of the phenomena” need 
to be asked.  Base-rate questions help to determine if a particular situation 
is normal or abnormal. Table 3-2 re-represents the base-rate questions and 
the form of the question discussed by Easterbrook et al. (p. 288) in the 
form of a table. These questions are appropriate for formulating the 
research questions, particularly from the perspective of gaining knowledge 
about how the anti-analysis techniques work and how effective they are. 
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Table 3-2 Examples of base-rate research questions 
Question Form of Question 
Frequency and 
distribution questions 
“How often does X occur?” 
“What is the average amount of X?” 
 
Descriptive-Process 
questions 
 
“How does X normally work?” 
“What is the process by which X happens?” 
“In what sequence do the events of X occur?” 
“What are the steps X goes through as it evolves?” 
“How does X achieve its purpose?” 
 
Relationship questions seek to find out how phenomena are related to each 
other. Table 3-3 re-represents relationship questions in the form of table 
discussed by Easterbrook et al. (p. 288). Although relevant to future 
research, relationship questions are considered to be out of the scope for 
the line of investigation nominated in this thesis. 
 
Table 3-3 Examples of relationship research questions 
Question Form of Question 
Relationship 
questions 
“Are X and Y related?” 
“Do occurrences of X correlate with occurrences of 
Y?” 
 
Causality questions attempt to identify the relationship between cause and 
effect. Answering such questions is assisted by having answered the 
relationship questions presented in Table 3-3.  Easterbrook et al. (2008, p. 
289) points out that it is very important to be able to differentiate 
correlation and causality. This is because it is harder to demonstrate 
causality than it is to show correlation. If high values of variable X correlate 
with high values of variable Y, it could be because X causes Y, or because Y 
causes X. However, it could also be that some other, common variable is 
the cause and that neither is the cause of the other. It could also be the 
case that they co-evolve in complex ways and that no clear cause and effect 
can be identified (Easterbrook et al., 2008, p. 289). 
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Table 3-4 re-represents the causality questions discussed by Easterbrook et 
al. (p. 289). Causality questions are considered to be out of scope for this 
thesis, but remain relevant for future research that extends the line of 
enquiry developed in this thesis. 
 
Table 3-4 Examples of causality research questions 
Question Form of Question 
Causality questions “Does X cause Y?” 
“Does X prevent Y?” 
“What causes Y?” 
“What are all the factors that cause Y?” 
“What effect does X have on Y?” 
 
Causality-
Comparative 
questions 
 
“Does X cause more Y than does Z?” 
“Is X better at preventing Y than is Z?” 
 
 
Causality-
Comparative 
interaction questions 
 
“Does X or Z cause more Y under one condition but 
not others?” 
 
3.3.1. Selected Empirical Research Method 
All of the empirical research methods listed in the discussion above would 
be suitable for addressing the research questions of this thesis. However, 
action research, ethnography, survey and case study would require access 
to malware researchers desirably working in AV software laboratories for an 
extended period of time, and preferably, in situ. Such access is not possible 
for the author at this time. The research questions of this thesis are 
essentially exploratory in nature. The empirical research method selected 
for this research is via controlled experiment. 
3.4. EXPERIMENTAL STRATEGIES 
Various experimental strategies are available.  “In academic research, an 
experiment is a strategy that investigates cause and effect relationships, 
seeking to prove or disprove a causal link between a factor and an observed 
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outcome” (Oates, 2007, p. 127). The strategy starts with a hypothesis 
which can then be tested empirically with an experiment designed to prove 
or disprove the hypothesis. The design of the experiment takes care to 
remove all factors from the study that could affect the result, apart from the 
one factor that is considered to cause the outcome of interest. Easterbrook 
et al. (p. 133) says  true experiment concentrates on the “… manipulation of 
the independent variable, pre- and post-test measurement of the dependent 
variable(s), and control or removal of all other variables”. 
 
3.4.1. True Experiment 
The experiment needs to consider the variables that can be controlled and 
those that can be measured.  The variables can be classified as either 
dependent or independent. The dependent variable (effect) changes as a 
result of a change in the independent variable (cause). Experiments 
typically manipulate the independent variable and observe the effect on the 
dependent variable. The idea is to determine the independent variable that 
causes the change in the dependent variable. The experimental method is 
essentially positivist and reductionist. “They reduce complexity by allowing 
only a few variables of interest to vary in a controlled manner, while 
controlling all other variables” (Easterbrook et al., 2008, p. 295). The aim is 
to show that only one factor causes the observable change. Ways of 
controlling variables to assist the determination of the factor are listed by 
Oates (2007, p. 130) to include: 
• Eliminate the factor from the experiment. 
• Hold the factor constant if it is not possible to eliminate the factor. 
• Use random selection of subjects 
• Use control groups 
• Make the researchers and subjects blind 
 
Oates (p. 131) says an experiment has good internal validity if the 
measurements obtained are the result of the experimenter’s handling of the 
independent variable and not due to other factors. Threats listed by Oates 
(pp. 131-132) to internal validity include: 
• Differences between the experimental and control group 
• History 
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• Maturation 
• Instrumentation 
• Experimental mortality 
• Reactivity and experimenter effects 
 
Oates (p. 132) says an experiment has good external validity if the “results 
are not unique to a particular set of circumstances but are generalizable. 
That is, the same results can be predicted for subsequent occasions and in 
other situations”. Threats listed by Oates (p. 133) to external validity 
include: 
• Over reliance on special types of participants 
• Too few participants 
• Non-representative participants 
• Non-representative test cases 
3.4.2. Quasi Experiment 
Quasi-experiments try to remain within the spirit of the true experiment, 
“but concentrate on observing events in real-life settings where there is a 
‘naturally occurring’ experiment” (Oates, 2007, p. 134). This is because the 
true experiment endeavors to have nearly complete control over the 
independent and dependent variable and can exhibit good internal and 
external validity. Pickard (2007, p. 108) points out that “internal validity is 
always seen as the greatest threat to quasi-experimental research design; 
lack of control over intervening variables means it is almost impossible to 
eliminate rival explanations of any relationship between variables”. 
 
In the field, control over variables is harder, and the manipulation of an 
independent variable is more difficult as well. Therefore, determining cause 
and effect is not as conclusive as that obtainable from conducting a true 
experiment (Oates, 2007, p. 134). The quasi-experiment “has some of the 
components of experimental research, but not all” (Pickard, 2007, p. 107).  
 
Oates (p. 108) explains that there are two types of quasi-experimental 
research design. The non-equivalent group design and the time series 
design. The non-equivalent group design is similar to the true experiment, 
except that the selection of participants is non-random and the study is 
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conducted in the field and not in the laboratory. The time series design is 
similar to the design of the non-equivalent group, except the observations 
are made in time intervals. This gives more observational data that can 
provide detail on progressive change.  
 
3.5. CHOICE OF RESEARCH METHOD  
The selected research method to address the research questions is positivist, 
empirical and quasi-experimental. The independent variable is the individual 
anti forensic technique under investigation and the dependent variable is 
the binary result of either detection or non-detection.  
 
3.6. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
3.6.1. Validation of Techniques 
This section discusses the general processes used to address the three 
research questions of this thesis. The first part of the research design is 
designed to validate the techniques as described and uncovered in the 
Literature Review chapter of this thesis. This includes determination of the 
ability to detect and mitigate these techniques via small quasi experiments. 
The results from this process are presented in the Validation of Techniques 
chapter of this thesis. 
 
3.6.2. Collection of Network Based Malware 
The Nepenthes (Nepenthes, 2006) project is a malware collection tool that 
works by emulating known vulnerabilities and which then downloads the 
payload of the malware that attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities. Dr 
Craig Valli of Edith Cowan University (ECU) has been participating in the 
Nepenthes project and has been collecting malware using a network of 
distributed sensors deployed within the geographical locale of Perth, 
Western Australia. Figure 3-2 is a process diagram depicting how malware 
is collected and processed by Nepenthes and has been adapted from the 
paper by Valli and Wooten (2007) which outlines how the honeynet was 
deployed and used to collect malware for analysis purposes.  
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The process diagram shows that multiple avenues of processing are 
conducted on the collected malware before results are stored in a SQL 
database and made available via a web interface. The highlighted process 
box designates the source of data for the research that was conducted for 
this thesis using malware collected by the ECU Nepenthes malware 
collection system. By the very nature of the way this malware has been 
collected via a network interface, the malware is classified as network based. 
This networked based malware was used a source of data to examine 
particular types of techniques malware uses to hinder analysis, namely, 
packers and protectors which is one of the first techniques malware analysts 
encounter. 
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Figure 3-2 Model of the nepenthes malware collection system 
depicting the source (highlighted) of malware collected for this 
research. 
 
3.6.3. Analysis of Collected Malware Packers 
The second part of the research design is designed to analyze the use of 
Packers and Protectors in Microsoft Windows platform, network based 
malware, collected by the ECU Nepenthes sensors. This is also used to 
support the examination of the research questions, primarily with respect to 
the ability to detect the use of packers and protectors which is used by 
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malware to hinder analysis. The results of this process are presented in the 
Analysis of Collected Malware chapter of this thesis. 
 
3.6.4. Risk Mitigation 
All steps of the process were conducted on a Linux machine which will not 
natively run the malware. Downloading the malware from Nepenthes and 
uploading the malware to the online analysis engines necessitated a 
connection to the internet. All other analysis work was conducted on a 
standalone Linux machine without an internet connection to ensure that the 
malware did not inadvertently interact with the internet. VMWare Virtual 
Machines were used to run the malware for analysis purposes under 
Microsoft Windows XP. The advantage of using Virtual Machines was that 
the state of the Virtual Machine could be restored quickly and easily at any 
point. Data was transferred between the Virtual Machines and the Linux 
host using a USB memory device.  
 
3.7. RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.7.1. Validate Individual Techniques 
This process addresses the exploratory questions outlined in Table 3-1 
above. The objective of this process is to validate the requirement that each 
individual technique prevents code from being analyzed. It also investigates 
the effectiveness of detection and mitigation methods that can be used 
against the techniques under investigation.  
 
Inputs – Literature review, research questions, individual techniques. 
Outputs – Success or failure result for Technique, Detection and Mitigation. 
 
The steps used were: 
1. Write standalone executable programs which employ the individual 
analysis avoidance technique as identified in the Literature Review 
section of this thesis.   
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2. Validate that the technique works by testing the general requirement 
for each technique, that is, “The use of the technique detects that the 
program is running in a debugger”. 
3.  Write a script that will detect the use of each technique. 
4. Validate that the detection script correctly identifies each technique. 
5. Write a script that will mitigate each technique. 
6. Validate that the mitigation script defeats the technique. 
7. Analyse results. 
3.7.2. Analysis of Collected Malware  
The objective of this process is to collect empirical data from the malware 
collected from the ECU Nepenthes honeypot from a variety of analysis tools. 
This process seeks to assess the effectiveness of Packer Detection tools and 
methods. 
 
Inputs – Malware specimens from ECU Nepenthes sensors. 
Outputs – Results from various Packer detection tools and methods. 
 
The steps used to analyze the malware from an empirical perspective were: 
1. Download the malware from the ECU Nepenthes sensor. 
2. Create a directory with the same name as the hash of the collected 
malware specimen on the analysis machine.  
3. Enter the hash into the “MD5 Sum” column of the “Malware Analysis” 
spreadsheet for each sheet that was used to record the result of each 
specific type of analysis method that was used. 
4. Record the date the malware was collected by Nepenthes into the 
“Nepenthes” sheet.  
5. Submit the specimen to Virus Total for analysis. Store the html 
page result in the directory. Virus Total is a site where malware can 
be submitted and the malware is tested by in excess of 30 AV 
Engines. Extract information from result and store in “Malware 
Analysis” spreadsheet in the “Virus Total” sheet. Extract data and 
store in the appropriate column in the sheet. Count the number of 
successful detections and store in “Detections” column. Count the 
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number of engines and store in the “Number of Engines” column. 
Calculate the detection result and store in column “Detection Result”. 
6. Submit the specimen to Anubis which is an online dynamic analysis 
engine. Store the resultant web page into a text file (Anubis) in the 
directory. Record results into the sheet named “Anubis” in the 
appropriate columns. 
7. Validate the collected malware as malicious or not. 
8. Load the unpacked version of the malware into Mandiant’s Red 
Curtain analysis tool. Record entropy and PEiD results directly into 
the “Red Curtain” sheet in “Entropy” and “PEiD” column of the sheet 
respectively.  
9. Determine effectiveness of Packer detection on validated malware. 
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CHAPTER 4 VALIDATION OF ANTI-ANALYSIS 
TECHNIQUES RESULTS 
4.1. OVERVIEW 
The literature review discussed two fundamental types of analyses 
appropriate to analyse malware as static and dynamic analysis. Malware 
tends to be heavily obfuscated to avoid signature based AV software also to 
defeat static analysis. Analysts generally run the malware under 
investigation inside a debugger so that instructions are potentially de-
obfuscated and revealed at run time. After this, further analysis can 
commence, however, malware may contain hundreds of thousands of 
instructions and stepping through every instruction manually can 
understandably become untenable. This is because the time the analyst can 
allocated to the analysis is a limited resource. Debuggers have associated 
scripting languages to perform fundamental analysis tasks in an automated 
manner to avoid stepping manually through the code.  
 
The literature review revealed that malware can use run time packers that 
are a stub program embedded in the malware that unpack the original code 
at run time into memory. Once the malware has been unpacked, the 
original instructions are executed. The point at which the original code is 
reached, after the unpacking process is completed, is referred to as the 
Original Entry Point (OEP). Generally, it is at this point where the program 
can be dumped from memory and analyzed to determine its functionality, 
including access to the registry, files, network communications, vectors of 
attack to other systems and other very useful information to the analyst.  
 
In order to hinder dynamic analysis at such a level, the search of the 
literature exposed a plethora of techniques malware incorporates into its 
code to hide functionality. Malware can determine if it is running inside a 
debugger and then take control of the flow of execution so that it can use 
deception to hide its true intent and not reveal which files it was going to 
modify, how it was going to communicate over the network and other 
malicious activities that could identify it as malicious. This information is 
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also required for disinfection purposes. If a known specimen of malware is 
detected, the intent of the quarantine process is to remove the files that are 
known to be associated with the specimen. 
 
The literature associated with anti-analysis techniques very sparsely covers 
routines to detect the use of these techniques. Detection of the use of anti-
analysis techniques was identified in the literature as potentially a very 
good indicator that the software under investigation is possibly of a 
malicious nature. Equally, the literature review revealed that mitigation 
techniques available in popular plugins for dealing with anti forensic 
techniques such as OllyAdvanced and IDA Stealth for OllyDbg and 
IDA Pro respectively, do not come close to providing coverage for the 
number of anti-analysis techniques. This provides an opportunity to 
investigate the methods that can be employed to detect and mitigate the 
use of anti-analysis techniques. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is three fold. The first part validates a selection 
of the anti-analysis techniques presented in the literature review. Once the 
technique has been validated as successful, the implementation of the 
technique can be used for the next two parts. The second part is used to 
determine if the use of the same technique can be detected. The third part 
determines if the use of the same technique can be mitigated. The intention 
is to produce Objective Quality Evidence (OQE) to directly support answers 
to the three research questions of this thesis. The OQE is produced by a 
series of small quasi experiments where strict control over the flow of 
execution of the programs is maintained and external influences are 
minimized. 
4.2. METHODOLOGY 
The fundamental methodology for performing the quasi experiments is as 
follows: 
For each anti-analysis technique under investigation: 
1. Implement the technique in as simple a program as possible. 
2. Observe if the anti-analysis technique is successful or not. 
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3. Implement a detection script or employ a detection technique 
to try to detect the presence of the technique. 
4. Observe if the detection technique is successful or not. 
5. Implement a mitigation script or technique to try and mitigate 
the use of the anti-analysis technique. 
6. Observe if the mitigation technique is successful or not. 
 
Steps one and two are used to produce OQE to address research question 
one. That is, “What techniques can malware use to avoid being analyzed?”. 
Steps three and four are used to produce OQE to address research question 
two. That is, “How can the use of these techniques be detected?”. Steps five 
and six are used to produce OQE to address research question three. That is, 
“How can the use of these techniques be mitigated?” The function of each of 
these steps is outlined in the following sub sections. 
4.2.1. Implement the technique in as simple a program as possible 
The literature review presented a wide variety of techniques malware can 
incorporate to hinder analysis. Code to implement the anti-analysis 
techniques discussed in the referenced papers exists only as code snippets. 
That is, as non-functioning and non-complete programs. To progress the 
examination of the anti-analysis technique and to determine its 
effectiveness, the code had to be implemented in small standalone 
programs. The selection of the language to develop the programs in was 
assembly language. This is because this is the lowest level a programmer 
can write code in and this is the same language that an analyst would work 
with when analyzing a malicious program. It has the added benefit of 
ensuring that the most strict control was obtained over the functioning of 
the code. That is, it allows control of external variables that could influence 
the behaviour of the program. 
4.2.2. Observe if the anti-analysis technique is successful or not 
Once the anti-analysis technique has been implemented, the program is run 
to determine if it effectively detects the presence of a debugger and alters 
its path of execution. This can be observed at the debugger level, by 
stepping through the program and observing each and every instruction as 
it is executed at the assembly language level. It is intended that the result 
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of each of these tests will either show cause and effect, or not.  Figure 4-1 
depicts the execution logic of the program and shows the only two possible 
observable results in a simple flow chart. Either the technique detects the 
presence of a debugger or it does not. 
 
Detect
Tool?
Record  Result 
as Tool 
Detected
Record Result 
as Tool not 
Detected
Finish
Start
Yes No
 
Figure 4-1 Simple flowchart to record if technique was successful or 
not in detecting the presence of a tool. 
 
4.2.3. Implement a detection script or employ a detection technique 
to try to detect the presence of the technique. 
The purpose of this step is to implement a debugging script or to use an 
analysis technique to detect the use of the anti-analysis technique in the 
developed program. A small variety of scripting languages was used to 
achieve this, using the two most popular debuggers used in Malware Digital 
Forensics, IDA Pro (Commercial) and OllyDbg (Non Commercial) 
(Zeltser, 2007). Scripts are written such that they will either detect the 
technique or not and no unnecessary programming overhead is included. 
Where scripting languages were not used, features of the debuggers were 
used instead to detect the use of the technique. Selection of techniques to 
implement was essentially determined by the techniques implemented in 
popular anti forensic plugins such as the IDA Stealth plugin for validation 
purposes. This gave an addition validating mechanism to determine if the 
technique was successful or not. 
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4.2.4. Observe if the detection technique is successful or not. 
Figure 4-2 depicts the logic of the observable result from conducting the 
test. It is intended that the result of each of these tests will show cause and 
effect.  The results of each test are recorded as observations, the detection 
technique either worked or it did not. 
 
Technique
Detected
?
Record 
Technique as 
Detected
Record 
Technique as
Not Detected 
Finish
Start
Yes No
 
Figure 4-2 Simple flow chart depicting logic of recording the result 
of script or technique to detect implementation of anti-analysis 
technique. 
 
4.2.5. Implement a mitigation script or technique to try and mitigate 
the use of the anti-analysis technique. 
Scripts were written or techniques were employed to mitigate the use of the 
anti-analysis technique. Scripts are written such that they will either 
mitigate the technique or not and no unnecessary programming overhead is 
included. Where scripting languages were not used, features of the 
debuggers were used instead to mitigate the use of the technique. 
4.2.6. Observe if the mitigation technique is successful or not. 
Figure 4-3 depicts the logic of the test of the mitigation script or technique. 
Either the mitigation technique was successful or not. 
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Technique
Mitigated
?
Record 
Technique as  
Mitigated
Record 
Technique as
Not Mitigated 
Finish
Start
Yes No
 
Figure 4-3 Simple flow chart depicting the logic of recording the 
result of the mitigation script or technique. 
 
4.3. KERNEL32 ISDEBUGGERPRESENT() QUASI EXPERIMENT 
4.3.1. Implementation of anti-analysis technique 
Figure 4-4 demonstrates a call to the kernel32 DLL function 
IsDebuggerPresent(). IsDebugger present will return 1 if the process is 
being debugged, 0 if not being debugged, and an appropriate message will 
be displayed. The ADDR keyword specifies that pointers to the strings are 
being passed to the MessageBox function.  
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.686 
.MODEL flat, stdcall 
OPTION CASEMAP:NONE   ;Case sensitive 
 
include windows.inc 
include kernel32.inc 
includeLib c:\masm32\lib\kernel32.lib 
include user32.inc 
includeLib c:\masm32\lib\user32.lib 
 
.DATA 
 text1 db 'Debugger Not Detected', 0 
 caption db 'IsDebuggerPresent',0 
 text2 db 'Debugger Detected', 0 
.CODE 
Start: 
 INVOKE IsDebuggerPresent 
 TEST EAX,EAX 
 JNZ DebuggerDetected 
 INVOKE MessageBox, 0, ADDR text1, ADDR caption, MB_OK 
 JMP Finish 
DebuggerDetected: 
 INVOKE MessageBox, 0, ADDR text2, ADDR caption, MB_OK 
Finish: 
 INVOKE ExitProcess, 0 
End Start 
Figure 4-4 Listing of implementation of kernel32 IsDebuggerPresent 
technique. 
4.3.2. Effectiveness of anti-analysis technique observation 
The debugger was detected when the program was run in OllyDbg and IDA 
Pro. 
4.3.3. Implementation of detection of analysis avoidance technique 
The use of functions can be easily detected from a static analysis point of 
view in IDA Pro. The IDA Python script in Figure 4-5 shows how the 
name of a function can be detected. It should be noted that this is a very 
simple example and that malware can obfuscate function names so that 
detection is not so easy. The function prints to the screen, but could just as 
easily write to a file or a port. It should be noted that this script works with 
the static disassembly. A script can also be written that will work inside the 
debugger as it runs. This approach facilitates dynamic analysis and even 
allows decisions to be made about the control flow of the program as it runs. 
The reality is that a function found from a disassembly may never be 
actually called. This can be determined by checking to see what other 
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functions (cross references) call the function of interest. The compromise is 
that with a static analysis, the analyst is not actually running malicious code. 
However, with a dynamic analysis (running in the debugger), the malicious 
code is actually interacting with the system. 
 
# detectFunction(functionToFind) 
# detect the presence of a particular function 
# input  : functionToFind = function to find as string 
# output : True if function found, False otherwise 
def detectFunction(functionToFind): 
    found = False 
    # get the segments starting address 
    ea = ScreenEA() 
    # loop through all the functions in the segment 
    for function_ea in Functions(SegStart(ea), SegEnd(ea)): 
        if GetFunctionName(function_ea) == functionToFind: 
            found = True 
            print hex(function_ea), GetFunctionName(function_ea) 
    return found 
 
def main(): 
 detectFunction("IsDebuggerPresent") 
 
if __name__ == "__main__": 
    main() 
Figure 4-5 IDA Python function detection script used for static 
analysis. 
 
4.3.4. Effectiveness of  detection of technique observation 
The detection script effectively detected the use of the technique. 
4.3.5. Implementation of mitigation technique 
The mitigation technique employed was the use of the selection of the 
OllyAdvanced option to detect IsDebuggerPresent in OllyDbg and to use 
the IsDebuggerPresent flag in IDA Stealth.  
4.3.6. Effectiveness of mitigation technique observation 
The OllyAdvanced option and the IDA Stealth option were effective in 
mitigating the technique in the implemented program in Figure 4-4. 
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4.4. PEB ISDEBUGGED() QUASI EXPERIMENT 
4.4.1. Implementation of anti-analysis technique 
In such a simple example as shown in the listing in Figure 4-4, the 
IsDebuggerPresent() function call shows up in the import table and can be 
detected. Since the API function call itself is simply reading the second byte 
of the Process Environment Block (PEB) at offset 2, a stealthy version can 
attempt to do this itself directly instead of calling the IsDebuggerPresent 
API function as shown in the listing of Figure 4-6. Offset +30 from the 
Thread Environment Block (TEB) data structure points to the PEB of the 
current process. Because a BYTE is being transferred to EAX, it must be 
extended with zeros (MOVZX) to fill the register.  
 
.686 
.MODEL flat, stdcall 
OPTION CASEMAP:NONE   ;Case sensitive 
 
include windows.inc 
include kernel32.inc 
includeLib c:\masm32\lib\kernel32.lib 
include user32.inc 
includeLib c:\masm32\lib\user32.lib 
 
.DATA 
 text1 db 'Debugger Not Detected', 0 
 caption db 'IsDebugged',0 
 text2 db 'Debugger Detected', 0 
.CODE 
Start: 
 ASSUME FS:NOTHING 
 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR FS:[30h] 
 MOVZX EAX, BYTE PTR [EAX+2]  ;mov with zero extend 
 TEST EAX,EAX 
 JNZ DebuggerDetected 
 INVOKE MessageBox, 0, addr text1, addr caption, MB_OK 
 JMP Finish 
DebuggerDetected: 
 INVOKE MessageBox, 0, addr text2, addr caption, MB_OK 
Finish: 
 INVOKE ExitProcess, 0 
End Start 
Figure 4-6 Listing of implementation of PEB!IsDebugged technique 
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4.4.2. Effectiveness of anti-analysis technique observation 
The use of the technique effectively detected the presence of OllyDbg and 
IDA Pro. 
4.4.3. Implementation of detection of analysis avoidance technique 
The IsDebuggerPresent flag is an option in IDA Stealth that can be 
used to detect the use of this technique. An alternative to using IDA 
Stealth is to patch the IsDebugged field of the Process Environment Block 
(PEB) using the IDC script in Figure 4-7, partially extracted from an 
example from Eagle (2008b). Although Eagle’s technique is effective at 
mitigation, some additional modification is required to check if the malware 
is using this detection method.   
 
#include <idc.idc> 
 
static main() { 
   auto globalFlags, func, end; 
   // run to the entry point 
   RunTo(BeginEA()); 
   // launch the debugger, but suspend 
   GetDebuggerEvent(WFNE_SUSP, -1); 
   //ebx points to peb on entry.  This is only true at BeginEA, 
not main 
   PatchByte(EBX + 2, 0);           //PEB!IsDebugged = 0; 
   // resume the debugger 
  GetDebuggerEvent(WFNE_CONT , -1); 
} 
Figure 4-7 IDC script PatchIsDebuggerPresent.idc to patch 
IsDebuggerPresent flag in PEB. 
 
Another way to detect that this technique is being used, is to check when 
the PEB is being accessed. One way to do this is to check the second 
operand for each instruction to see if it is accessing the PEB at FS:[30h] as 
shown in the listing in Figure 4-8. 
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// simple example to find a pattern dynamically 
#include <idc.idc> 
 
static main() { 
  auto code; 
  EnableTracing(TRACE_STEP, 1); 
  findPattern(GetEventEa(), "fs:30h");   
  for (code = GetDebuggerEvent(WFNE_ANY | WFNE_CONT, -1); code > 
0;  
            code = GetDebuggerEvent(WFNE_ANY | WFNE_CONT, -1)) 
{  
    findPattern(GetEventEa(), "fs:30h");   
  } 
  EnableTracing(TRACE_STEP, 0); 
} 
 
// if pattern found in second operand, print a short message 
static findPattern(addr, pattern) 
{ 
  auto oper1, oper2, mnem; 
  mnem = GetMnem(addr); 
  oper1 = GetOpnd(addr, 0); 
  oper2 = GetOpnd(addr, 1); 
  if (strstr(oper2, pattern) >= 0) { 
      Message("Found %s\n", pattern); 
  Message("%x %s %s, %s\n", addr, mnem, oper1, oper2); 
  } 
  return 0; 
} 
Figure 4-8 IDC script to find a pattern at run time. 
 
4.4.4. Effectiveness of  detection of technique observation 
Both the manual detection technique discussed above and the detection 
scripts were very effective at detecting the use of the anti-analysis 
technique. If the OllyAdvanced option to detect IsDebuggerPresent is 
selected when the code in Figure 4-6 is run, OllyDbg will be detected 
because the call to the function IsDebuggerPresent is never called. This 
emphasizes the importance of understanding the limitations of the 
functionality of tools and the likelihood of workarounds to have been 
discovered and implemented to mitigate detection methods used by 
analysts.  
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4.4.5. Implementation of mitigation technique 
The PEB can be viewed in OllyDbg by pressing Ctrl+G (Goto Expression) in 
the data window and entering FS:[30]. Highlight the offset at 0x02 
(remembering to start at 0), press the space bar to pull up the editor, and 
change the 0x01 to 0x00.  This emphasizes a significant difference between 
IDA Pro and OllyDbg. It is much easier to patch code with OllyDbg than 
with IDA Pro and save the modified binary. OllyDbg is working with the 
actual, original binary, whereas IDA Pro is working with an analyzed 
version of the original binary that is stored in a database, but can still be 
patched and run. 
4.4.6. Effectiveness of mitigation technique observation 
The use of the mitigation technique was effective. 
 
4.5. PEB NTGLOBALFLAGS() QUASI EXPERIMENT 
4.5.1. Implementation of anti-analysis technique 
The DWORD located at offset 0x68 in the PEB contains flags that define how 
various APIs will be used by the loaded program, and certain flags are set if 
the process is being run in a debugger. These flags are listed in Figure 4-9. 
 
FLG_HEAP_ENABLE_TAIL_CHECK  (0x10) 
FLG_HEAP_ENABLE_FREE_CHECK  (0x20) 
FLG_HEAP_VALIDATE_PARAMETERS (0x40) 
Figure 4-9 NTGlobal Flags used to detect if program is running 
inside a debugger 
 
The NtGlobalFlag will be set to 0x00 in a program that is not being 
debugged. If the program is being debugged, the NtGlobalFlag will be set 
to 0x70 which shows that the above flags are set. These flags can be set by 
the call to the ntdll function LdrpInitializeExecutionOptions(). The 
listing in Figure 4-10 demonstrates this technique. 
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.686 
.MODEL flat, stdcall 
OPTION CASEMAP:NONE   ;Case sensitive 
 
include windows.inc 
include kernel32.inc 
includeLib c:\masm32\lib\kernel32.lib 
include user32.inc 
includeLib c:\masm32\lib\user32.lib 
 
.DATA 
 text1 db 'Debugger Not Detected', 0 
 caption db 'NtGlobalFlags',0 
 text2 db 'Debugger Detected', 0 
.CODE 
Start: 
 ASSUME FS:NOTHING 
 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR FS:[30h] 
 MOVZX EAX, BYTE PTR [EAX+68h] 
 CMP EAX, 70h 
 TEST EAX,EAX 
 JNZ DebuggerDetected 
 INVOKE MessageBox, 0, addr text1, addr caption, MB_OK 
 JMP Finish 
DebuggerDetected: 
 INVOKE MessageBox, 0, addr text2, addr caption, MB_OK 
Finish: 
 INVOKE ExitProcess, 0 
End Start 
Figure 4-10 Listing of implementation of PEB!NTGlobalFlags 
technique to detect presence of debugger. 
 
4.5.2. Effectiveness of anti-analysis technique observation 
The use of the technique effectively detected the presence of OllyDbg and 
IDA Pro. OllyDbg was detected, unless the OllyAdvanced NtGlobal 
flag option was enabled. Equally, IDA Pro was detected until the 
NtGlobalFlag (Patch global heap flag) option was selected. 
4.5.3. Implementation of detection of analysis avoidance technique 
To detect the use of this technique, the pattern searching script in Figure 
4-8 can be used to notify the analyst about code access to the PEB. The 
pattern searching script could be modified to cater for the various 
permutations that are possible. 
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4.5.4. Effectiveness of  detection of technique observation 
The pattern matching technique in Figure 4-8 effectively detected the use of 
the technique using IDA Pro. 
4.5.5. Implementation of mitigation technique 
The listing in Figure 4-11 is partially extracted from an example by (Eagle, 
2008b) and shows how the NtGlobalFlag can be successfully patched at 
run time using the IDC scripting language in IDA Pro.  
 
#include <idc.idc> 
 
static main() { 
   auto globalFlags, func, end; 
   RunTo(BeginEA()); 
   GetDebuggerEvent(WFNE_SUSP, -1); 
   globalFlags = Dword(EBX + 0x68) & ~0x70; 
   PatchDword(EBX + 0x68, globalFlags); 
} 
Figure 4-11 IDC Script to patch NtGlobalFlags at run time to avoid 
detection of debugger. 
4.5.6. Effectiveness of mitigation technique observation 
Use of the script in Figure 4-11effectively mitigated the use of the technique. 
 
4.6. HEAP FLAGS QUASI EXPERIMENT 
4.6.1. Implementation of anti-analysis technique 
When the first heap of a program is created, its Flags will be set to 0x02 to 
designate that the heap can grow and the ForceFlags field will be set to 
0x00. However, when a process is being debugged, “these flags are usually 
set to 0x50000062 (depending on the NTGlobalFlag) and 0x40000060 
(which is Flags AND 0x6001007D)” (Yason, 2007, p.5). The following heap 
flags in Figure 4-12 are also set when a heap is created on a debugged 
process. 
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HEAP_TAIL_CHECKING_ENABLED (0X20) 
HEAP_FREE_CHECKING_ENABLED (0X40) 
Figure 4-12 Heap flags that are set when a process is being 
debugged. These can be used to detect the presence of a debugger. 
 
Falliere (2007, p.3) says that checking the ForceFlags field in a heap 
header at offset 0x10 can be used to detect the presence of a debugger. 
This technique is implemented in the listing in Figure 4-13. 
 
.686 
.MODEL flat, stdcall 
OPTION CASEMAP:NONE   ;Case sensitive 
 
include windows.inc 
include kernel32.inc 
includeLib c:\masm32\lib\kernel32.lib 
include user32.inc 
includeLib c:\masm32\lib\user32.lib 
 
.DATA 
 text1 db 'Debugger Not Detected', 0 
 caption db 'Heap Flags',0 
 text2 db 'Debugger Detected', 0 
.CODE 
Start: 
 ASSUME FS:NOTHING 
 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR FS:[30h] 
 MOV EAX,  [EAX+18h]  ;process heap 
 MOV EAX, [EAX+10h] ; heap flags 
 TEST EAX,EAX 
 JNZ DebuggerDetected 
 INVOKE MessageBox, 0, addr text1, addr caption, MB_OK 
 JMP Finish 
DebuggerDetected: 
 INVOKE MessageBox, 0, addr text2, addr caption, MB_OK 
Finish: 
 INVOKE ExitProcess, 0 
End Start 
Figure 4-13 Listing of implementation of HeapFlags detection 
technique. 
4.6.2. Effectiveness of anti-analysis technique observation 
The use of the technique effectively detected the presence of OllyDbg and 
IDA Pro. 
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4.6.3. Implementation of detection of analysis avoidance technique 
To detect the use of this technique, the pattern searching script from Figure 
4-8 can be used to detect when the PEB is being accessed. However, it 
should be noted that it would be very easy to further obfuscate the operand 
to access the PEB. 
 
4.6.4. Effectiveness of detection of technique observation 
The use of the detection technique proved to be effective. 
4.6.5. Implementation of mitigation technique 
Falliere (2007, p.3) suggests two ways to mitigate the use of this technique 
as follows: 
1. Create a non-debugged process, and attach the debugger once the 
process has been created. An easy solution is to create the process 
suspended, run until the entry-point is reached, patch it to an infinite loop, 
resume the process, attach the debugger, and restore the original entry-
point. 
2. Edit the registry key: 
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File 
Execution Options 
“Create a subkey (not value) names as your process name, and under this 
subkey, a String value GlobalFlags set to nothing” (Falliere, 2007, p.3). 
 
Yason (2007, p.5) says that a solution is to patch the PEB.NTGlobalFlag 
and PEB.HeapProcess flag to the values as if the process is not being 
debugged. Yason provides an OllyScript to patch the flags that is 
reproduced as follows in the listing in Figure 4-14. The assembly language 
feel is very evident in OllyScript syntax and serves as a very interesting 
contrast to IDAPython and IDC script. A variety of OllyScripts can be 
found on most reverse engineering web sites and can be used to see how 
particular analysis techniques work and if desired, transform the algorithm 
into another scripting language such as IDAPython to work with IDA Pro.  
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var peb 
var patch_addr 
var process_heap 
 
// retrieve PEB via a hardcoded TEB address (first thread:  
// 0x7ffde000) 
mov peb, [7ffde000+30] 
 
//patch PEB.NtGlobalFlag 
lea patch_addr, [peb+68] 
mov [patch_addr], 0 
 
//patch PEB.ProcessHeap.Flags/ForceFlags 
mov process_heap, [peb+18] 
lea patch_addr, [process_heap+0c] 
mov [patch_addr], 2 
lea patch_addr, [process_heap+10] 
mov [patch_addr], 0 
Figure 4-14 OllyScript to patch Heap Flags 
4.6.6. Effectiveness of mitigation technique observation 
The technique was mitigated when the Heap Flag option of IDA Stealth 
was checked.  The script in Figure 4-14 effectively mitigated the technique 
in IDA Pro. Setting the Heap Flags option in OllyAdvanced (v1.26) did 
not help in mitigating this case, the debugger was still detected.  
 
4.7. NTQUERYINFORMATIONPROCESS() QUASI EXPERIMENT 
4.7.1. Implementation of anti-analysis technique 
The NtQueryInformationProcess call is used to retrieve information about 
the running process. Its prototype is shown in Figure 4-15. 
 
NTSTATUS WINAPI NtQueryInformationProcess( 
  __in       HANDLE ProcessHandle, 
  __in       PROCESSINFOCLASS ProcessInformationClass, 
  __out      PVOID ProcessInformation, 
  __in       ULONG ProcessInformationLength, 
  __out_opt  PULONG ReturnLength 
); 
Figure 4-15 NtQueryInformationProcess call used to retrieve 
information about the running process 
 
The PROCESSINFOCLASS enumeration can be set with a value of 7 to retrieve 
the port number of the debugger for the process. The process is being 
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debugged if the return value is non zero. An example implementation of this 
technique by ap0x (2006) is shown in the listing in Figure 4-16. 
 
.386 
.model flat, stdcall 
option casemap :none   ; case sensitive 
       
include \masm32\include\windows.inc 
include \masm32\include\user32.inc 
include \masm32\include\kernel32.inc 
includelib \masm32\lib\user32.lib 
includelib \masm32\lib\kernel32.lib 
 
.data 
       DbgNotFoundTitle db "Debugger status:",0h 
       DbgFoundTitle db "Debugger status:",0h 
       DbgNotFoundText db "Debugger not found!",0h 
       DbgFoundText db "Debugger found!",0h 
       ntdll db "ntdll.dll",0h 
       zwqip db "NtQueryInformationProcess",0h 
.data? 
       NtAddr dd ? 
       MinusOne dd ? 
.code 
 
start: 
 
; MASM32 antiOlly example 
; coded by ap0x 
; Reversing Labs: http://ap0x.headcoders.net 
; This example can detect Olly by using 
NtQueryInformationProcess API. 
MOV [MinusOne],0FFFFFFFFh 
PUSH offset ntdll ;ntdll.dll 
CALL LoadLibrary 
PUSH offset zwqip ;NtQueryInformationProcess 
PUSH EAX 
CALL GetProcAddress 
MOV [NtAddr],EAX 
MOV EAX,offset MinusOne 
PUSH EAX 
MOV EBX,ESP 
PUSH 0 
PUSH 4 
PUSH EBX 
PUSH 7 
PUSH DWORD PTR[EAX] 
CALL [NtAddr] 
POP EAX 
TEST EAX,EAX 
JNE @DebuggerDetected 
PUSH 40h 
PUSH offset DbgNotFoundTitle 
PUSH offset DbgNotFoundText 
PUSH 0 
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CALL MessageBox 
JMP @exit 
  @DebuggerDetected: 
PUSH 30h 
PUSH offset DbgFoundTitle 
PUSH offset DbgFoundText 
PUSH 0 
CALL MessageBox 
  @exit: 
PUSH 0 
CALL ExitProcess 
end start 
Figure 4-16 Implementation of NtQueryInformationProcess 
technique to detect the presence of a debugger (ap0x, 2006) 
4.7.2. Effectiveness of anti-analysis technique observation 
The use of the technique effectively detected the presence of OllyDbg and 
IDA Pro. 
4.7.3. Implementation of detection of analysis avoidance technique 
The use of particular functions (where the use of the function is not 
obfuscated) can be easily detected in IDC by the use of the function call 
LocByName() which takes the name of the function to search for as a 
parameter and returns the address of the function which serves to detect 
the use of the function.   
4.7.4. Effectiveness of  detection of technique observation 
The use of the technique was effectively detected using the function call 
LocByName() in IDC. 
4.7.5. Implementation of mitigation technique 
The NtQueryInformationProcess is a wrapper around the 
ZwQueryInformationProcess system call. The debugger will be found until 
the OllyAdvanced option ZwQueryInformationProcess is enabled. The 
NtQueryInformationProcess signature is as follows in Figure 4-17. 
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NTSTATUS NTAPI NtQueryInformationProcess ( 
 HANDLE            ProcessHandle, 
 PROCESSINFOCLASS  ProcessInformationClass, 
 PVOID             ProcessInformation, 
 ULONG                  ProcessInformationLength, 
 PULONG        ReturnLength 
} 
Figure 4-17 Signature of NtQueryInformationProcess 
 
IDA Stealth has an option to mitigate this technique using the 
NTQueryInformationProcess option.  
 
Once the address of the function has been found, the function can be 
mitigated by setting a breakpoint on the return from 
NtQueryInformationProcess. An algorithm presented by Eagle (2008a, p. 
534) using IDA Pro is as follows: 
 
• Locate the address of NtQueryInformationProcess. 
• Create a function at the address. 
• Find the end address of the function. 
• Find the beginning of the return instruction by subtracting three from 
the end address and set a breakpoint at this address. 
• Add a condition function on the breakpoint and set the breakpoint’s 
attributes so that execution is prevented from stopping on the 
breakpoint. 
 
The listing in Figure 4-18 is extracted from an example by (Eagle, 2008b) 
that implements the algorithm described above.  
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#include <idc.idc> 
 
//handle a return from NtQueryInformationProcess 
#define ProcessDebugPort 7 
static bpt_NtQueryInformationProcess() { 
   auto p_ret; 
   if (Dword(ESP + 8) == ProcessDebugPort) { 
      //test ProcessInformationClass 
      p_ret = Dword(ESP + 12); 
      if (p_ret) { 
         PatchDword(p_ret, 0);  //fake no debugger present 
      } 
   } 
} 
 
static main() { 
   auto globalFlags, func, end; 
   RunTo(BeginEA()); 
   GetDebuggerEvent(WFNE_SUSP, -1); 
   
//   func = LocByName("ntdll_NtQueryInformationProcess"); 
   func = LocByName("ntdll_ZwQueryInformationProcess"); 
   MakeFunction(func, BADADDR); 
   end = GetFunctionAttr(func, FUNCATTR_END) - 3; 
   AddBpt(end); 
   SetBptAttr(end, BPT_BRK, 0);  //don't stop 
   SetBptCnd(end, "bpt_NtQueryInformationProcess()"); 
 
} 
Figure 4-18 Listing of NtQueryInformationProcess avoidance 
technique (Eagle, 2008b) 
 
A code snippet from Yason (2007, p.7) that uses 
NtQueryInformationProcess is reproduced in Figure 4-19: 
 
; using ntdll!NtQueryInformationProcess (ProcessDebugPort) 
lea eax,[.dwReturnLen] 
push  eax  ; ReturnLength 
push  4  ; ProcessInformationLength 
lea eax, [.dwDebugPort] 
push  eax  ; ProcessInformation 
push  ProcessDebugPort ; ProcessInformationClass (7) 
push  0xffffffff ; ProcessHandle 
call [NtQueryInformationProcess] 
cmp dword [.dwDebugPort], 0 
jne .debugger_found 
Figure 4-19 Code snippet using NtQueryInformationProcess (Yason, 
2007, p.7) 
 
Analysis Avoidance Techniques of Malicious Software 
 
 127 
An example OllyScript presented by Yason (2007, p.7) is reproduced in 
Figure 4-20. It shows how a breakpoint can be set where 
NtQueryInformationProcess() returns and then patches 
ProcessInformation to 0 when the breakpoint is hit. 
 
var   bp_NtQueryInformationProcess 
 
// set a breakpoint handler 
eob  bp_handler_NtQueryInformationProcess 
 
// set a breakpoint where NtQueryInformationProcess returns 
gpa  “NtQueryInformationProcess”, “ntdll.dll” 
find   $RESULT, #c21400#  //retn 14 
mov   bp_NTQueryInformationProcess, $RESULT 
bphws  bp_NTQueryInformationProcess, “x” 
run 
 
bp_handler_NtQueryInformationProcess: 
// ProcessInformationClass == ProcessDebugPort ? 
cmp  [esp+8], 7 
jne   bp_handler_NtQueryInformationProcess_continue 
 
// patch ProcessInformation to 0 
mov   patch_addr, [esp+c] 
mov  [patch_addr], 0 
 
// clear breakpoint 
bphwc  bp_NtQueryInformationProcess 
 
bp_handler_NtQueryInformationProcess_continue: 
run   
Figure 4-20 OllyScript to Patch ProcessInformation (Yason, 2007, 
p.7) 
4.7.6. Effectiveness of mitigation technique observation 
The mitigation techniques were observed to be very effective. 
 
4.8. KERNEL32 CHECKREMOTEDEBUGGERPRESENT() QUASI 
EXPERIMENT 
4.8.1. Implementation of anti-analysis technique 
This call has two parameters, a process handle, and a pointer to a BOOLEAN 
variable that will be set to TRUE if it is found that a debugger is attached to 
the process. The signature of this call is as follows in Figure 4-21. 
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BOOL CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent ( 
 HANDLE  hProcess, 
 PBOOL  pbDebuggerPresent 
) 
Figure 4-21 Signature of CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent 
 
The call chain for this function is via the ntdll function 
NtQueryInformationProcess which queries the DebugPort field of the 
EPROCESS kernel structure. An example listing (ap0x, 2006) is provided in 
Figure 4-22 that uses the CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent function call.  
 
.386 
.model flat, stdcall 
option casemap :none   ; case sensitive 
 
include \masm32\include\windows.inc 
include \masm32\include\user32.inc 
include \masm32\include\kernel32.inc 
includelib \masm32\lib\user32.lib 
includelib \masm32\lib\kernel32.lib 
 
.data 
DbgNotFoundTitle db "Debugger status:",0h 
DbgFoundTitle db "Debugger status:",0h 
DbgNotFoundText db "Debugger not found!",0h 
DbgFoundText db "Debugger found!",0h 
krnl db "kernel32.dll",0h 
chkrdbg db "CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent",0h 
.data? 
IsItPresent dd ? 
.code 
 
start: 
 
; MASM32 antiRing3Debugger example  
; coded by ap0x 
; Reversing Labs: http://ap0x.headcoders.net 
; CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent is function similar to  
; IsDebuggerPresent. 
; This function is available only in Windows NT and it  
; outputs TRUE or FALSE value if debugger is present  
; in selected process. 
 
; Load the function via GetProcAddress 
 
PUSH offset krnl ;kernel32.dll 
CALL LoadLibrary 
PUSH offset chkrdbg ;CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent 
PUSH EAX 
CALL GetProcAddress 
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; IsItPresent variable will store the result 
PUSH offset IsItPresent 
PUSH -1 
CALL EAX 
MOV EAX,DWORD PTR[IsItPresent] 
TEST EAX,EAX 
JNE @DebuggerDetected 
PUSH 40h 
PUSH offset DbgNotFoundTitle 
PUSH offset DbgNotFoundText 
PUSH 0 
CALL MessageBox 
JMP @exit 
  @DebuggerDetected: 
PUSH 30h 
PUSH offset DbgFoundTitle 
PUSH offset DbgFoundText 
PUSH 0 
CALL MessageBox 
  @exit: 
PUSH 0 
CALL ExitProcess 
end start 
Figure 4-22 Listing of CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent technique to 
find presence of remote debugger (ap0x, 2006) 
4.8.2. Effectiveness of anti-analysis technique observation 
The use of the technique effectively detected the presence of OllyDbg and 
IDA Pro. 
4.8.3. Implementation of detection of analysis avoidance technique 
The use of this technique can be detected by locating calls to the 
CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent function call as exemplified by the routine 
presented in Figure 4-23. 
4.8.4. Effectiveness of detection of technique observation 
Detection of the use of the technique proved to be effective. 
4.8.5. Implementation of mitigation technique 
A technique to detect and patch the use of this technique with the 
Immunity Debugger is provided by BoB (2007) in the procedure listed in 
Figure 4-23.  
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#---------------------------------------------------------------
---------- 
# CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent .. 
# Note: This Api calls ZwQueryInformationProcess Api,  
# so usually no need to patch both .. 
 
def Patch_CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent(imm): 
    deb = imm.getAddress( "kernel32.CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent" 
) 
    # Just incase on Win2k .. ;) 
    if (deb <= 0): 
        imm.Log( "No CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent to patch .." ) 
        return 
 
    imm.Log( "Patching CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent ..", address = 
deb ) 
    imm.writeMemory( deb, imm.Assemble( " \ 
        Mov   EDI, EDI                                    \n \ 
        Push  EBP                                         \n \ 
        Mov   EBP, ESP                                    \n \ 
        Mov   EAX, [EBP + C]                              \n \ 
        Push  0                                           \n \ 
        Pop   [EAX]                                       \n \ 
        Xor   EAX, EAX                                    \n \ 
        Pop   EBP                                         \n \ 
        Ret   8                                           \ 
    " ) ) 
 
Figure 4-23 Implementation of CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent 
detection technique (BoB, 2007) 
 
After detection, the procedure patches the program by assembling new 
instructions to replace the original instructions.  The assembly language 
commands and assembled instructions appear as follows in Figure 4-24. 
 
MOV   EDI, EDI   8B FF                  
PUSH  EBP             55                                
MOV EBP, ESP     8B EC 
MOV EAX, [EBP + 0Ch]   8B 45 0C 
PUSH 0                6A 00  
POP [EAX]               8F 00                
XOR EAX, EAX          33 C0 
POP EBP                   5D 
RET   8                  C2 08 00 
Figure 4-24 Resultant patched program after running 
CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent detection script. 
Once the start address of the CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent function is 
found in the Kernel32 DLL, memory can be over written with the new 
instructions. This can be done manually through a debugger, or through a 
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script. Figure 4-25 provides an equivalent example written in IDC script. 
A variety of other anti anti debugging techniques in BoB’s script include: 
• IsDebuggerPresent  
• ZwQueryInformationProcess 
• CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent 
• PEB.IsDebugged 
• PEB.ProcessHeap.Flag 
• PEB.NtGlobalFlag 
• PEB.Ldr 
• GetTickCount 
• ZwQuerySystemInformation     
• FindWindowA 
• FindWindowW 
• FindWindowExA 
• FindWindowExW 
• EnumWindows 
 
 
#include <idc.idc> 
 
# detect and patch CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent 
 
static main() { 
   auto addr; 
   RunTo(BeginEA()); 
   GetDebuggerEvent(WFNE_SUSP, -1); 
   addr = LocByName("kernel32_CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent"); 
     if (addr != BADADDR){ 
       Message("CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent at address %x\n", addr); 
  patchCheckRemoteDebuggerPresent(addr); 
   } 
} 
 
static patchCheckRemoteDebuggerPresent(addr) { 
   PatchDword(addr, 0x8B55FF8B); 
   PatchDword(addr + 4, 0x0C458BEC); 
   PatchDword(addr + 8, 0x008F006A); 
   PatchDword(addr + 12, 0xC25DC033); 
   PatchWord(addr + 16, 0x0008);   
}  
Figure 4-25 CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent detection and mitigation 
IDC Script (Dynamic) 
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4.8.6. Effectiveness of mitigation technique observation 
The implemented mitigation techniques proved to be very effective. The 
debugger was detected when run inside OllyDbg, but was mitigated when 
the OllyAdvanced ZwQuerySystemInformation option was enabled.  IDA 
Pro was detected when the program was executed. The 
NTQueryInformation process (which includes 
CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent) checkbox must be selected in IDA 
Stealth to prevent its discovery by the anti-analysis technique. 
 
4.9. UNHANDLED EXCEPTION FILTER QUASI EXPERIMENT 
4.9.1. Implementation of anti-analysis technique 
Windows has a chained Structured Exception Handler (SEH) mechanism to 
pass exceptions to handlers instead of crashing the program if possible. 
Malware can take advantage of SEH to gain control of the malware to detect 
it is being debugged. The malware throws an exception deliberately, and if 
its own SEH does not handle the exception, it can deduce that it is being 
debugged. OllyDbg does have a setting to not handle exceptions and to 
pass exceptions to the process being debugged. Exceptions are handled in 
the following way for Windows XP SP2, Windows 2003 and Windows Vista 
(Falliere, 2007, p.5):  
 
• Pass control to the per process Vectored Exception Handler if any. 
• Otherwise, pass control to the per thread SEH which is pointed to by 
FS:[0] in the thread that generated the exception. 
• If not processed by the previous two steps, the final SEH in the chain 
will call the kernel32 function UnhandledExceptionFilter which is 
set by the system. This function will determine what to do next 
dependent upon whether the program is being debugged or not. If 
not being debugged, a user defined filter function will be called, that 
is set by the kernel32 function SetUnhandledExceptionFilter. If it 
is being debugged, the program is terminated.  
 
Two types of exception handlers are (Gordon, n.d.) : 
Analysis Avoidance Techniques of Malicious Software 
 
 133 
• Final exception handler. 
• Per thread exception handler. 
 
The final exception handler is set up in the main thread by a call to the API 
function SetUnhandledExceptionFilter which replaces the top level 
exception handler that Win32 places at the top of each thread and process. 
If an exception occurs after this call “in a process that is not being 
debugged, and the exception makes it to the Win32 unhandled exception 
filter, that filter will call the exception filter function specified by the 
lpTopLevelExceptionFilter parameter”(+Pumpqara, n.d.). A modified 
version of an example developed by +Pumqara is shown in Figure 4-26. 
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.686 
.model flat, stdcall 
option casemap:none 
  
include c:\masm32\INCLUDE\Windows.inc 
include c:\masm32\INCLUDE\user32.inc 
include c:\masm32\INCLUDE\kernel32.inc 
includelib c:\masm32\lib\user32.lib 
includelib c:\masm32\lib\kernel32.lib 
 
.data 
caption db "SetUnhandledExceptionFilter",0 
text4 db "Return Point from Handler", 0 
text1 db "In Handler",0 
 
.code 
ExceptionHandler proc 
 INVOKE MessageBox, 0, addr text1, addr caption, MB_OK 
 ; get the EXCEPTION_POINTERS structure from the stack  
 MOV EAX, DWORD PTR [ESP+4] ; 
 ; from the EXCEPTION_POINTERS structure, get the pointer 
 ; to the CONTEXT structure 
 MOV EAX, [EAX+4] ; CONTEXT   
      ASSUME EAX:PTR CONTEXT 
; change the regEip member of the CONTEXT to the safe address 
     MOV [EAX].regEip, OFFSET SafeAddress  ; Change regEip 
     ; Set EXCEPTION_CONTINUE_EXECUTION flag in EAX 
     XOR EAX,EAX 
     DEC EAX    
     RETN 4  ; Normalize stack and return 
ExceptionHandler endp 
 
start:  
      ; register the exception handler 
 INVOKE SetUnhandledExceptionFilter,offset ExceptionHandler 
 ; force a divide by 0 exception 
 XOR EAX,EAX 
 DIV EAX 
  
SafeAddress: 
 INVOKE MessageBox, 0, addr text4, addr caption, MB_OK 
 INVOKE ExitProcess,0 
end start 
Figure 4-26 Listing of implementation of 
SetUnhandledExceptionFilter technique. 
 
4.9.2. Effectiveness of anti-analysis technique observation 
This technique was found to be very effective. If the program is run 
normally, the exception handler will be called after the deliberate divide by 
zero exception, and will return to the location of SafeAddress. If the 
program is run in OllyDbg, the program will not enter the exception 
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handler and will crash, unless the debug options are set to pass the 
exceptions to the program. IDA Pro performs in a very similar manner and 
can also be set to pass exceptions to the application. Many packers use this 
technique to make the analysis process more difficult. This is because if the 
program is being debugged, the top level exception handler is never called. 
Only the per thread or per process handler is called. 
4.9.3. Implementation of detection of analysis avoidance technique 
Detection of this technique was accomplished by searching for a call to 
SetUnhandledExceptionFilter function call. 
4.9.4. Effectiveness of detection of technique observation 
The detection technique proved to be effective. 
4.9.5. Implementation of mitigation technique 
The type of exception that is raised could be examined as well as the 
handler and patched out if it assists the analysis. 
4.9.6. Effectiveness of mitigation technique observation 
The mitigation technique proved to be effective. 
 
4.10. NTSETINFORMATIONTHREAD() QUASI EXPERIMENT 
4.10.1. Implementation of anti-analysis technique 
A thread can be hidden from a debugger by using the ntdll function 
NtSetInformationThread. This is usually used for setting the priority of a 
thread, but can be used to prevent debugging events from being sent to the 
debugger. It’s prototype is as follows in Figure 4-27. 
 
NTSYSAPI NTSTATUS NTAPI NtSetInformationThread( 
IN HANDLE ThreadHandle, 
IN THREAD_INFORMATION_CLASS ThreadInformationClass, 
IN PVOID ThreadInformation, 
IN ULONG ThreadInformationLength 
); 
Figure 4-27 NtSetInformationThread signature 
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The ThreadInformationClass has to be set to 0x11 to hide the thread, 
which essentially detaches the thread. The following listing, an extension of 
an example by (Falliere, 2007, p.7) demonstrates this technique. 
 
.386 
.model flat,stdcall 
option casemap:none 
include c:\masm32\include\windows.inc 
include c:\masm32\include\user32.inc 
include c:\masm32\include\kernel32.inc 
includelib c:\masm32\lib\kernel32.lib 
includelib c:\masm32\lib\user32.lib 
 
.data 
LibName db "ntdll.dll",0 
FunctionName db "NtSetInformationThread",0 
DllNotFound db "Cannot load library",0 
AppName db "Load Library",0 
FunctionNotFound db "Function not found",0 
strAllOk db "Debugger Not Found", 0 
 
.data? 
hLib dd ?           ;  the handle of the library (DLL) 
FunctionAddr dd ?   ; the address of the function 
 
.code 
start: 
  invoke LoadLibrary,addr LibName 
  .if eax==NULL 
    invoke MessageBox,NULL,addr DllNotFound,addr AppName,MB_OK 
     .else 
       mov hLib,eax 
       invoke GetProcAddress,hLib,addr FunctionName 
        .if eax==NULL 
 invoke MessageBox,NULL,addr FunctionNotFound,addr AppName,MB_OK 
         .else 
           mov FunctionAddr,eax 
           push 0 
           push 0 
           push 11h 
           push -2 
           call [FunctionAddr] 
    invoke MessageBox, NULL, addr strAllOk, addr AppName, MB_OK 
         .endif 
          invoke FreeLibrary,hLib 
       .endif 
    invoke ExitProcess,NULL 
end start 
Figure 4-28 Listing of implementation of NtSetInformationThread 
technique. 
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4.10.2. Effectiveness of anti-analysis technique observation 
When run outside a debugger, the MessageBox will display the message that 
the debugger was not found. If stepped in OllyDbg, the thread will be 
detached, and an error will be displayed that access is denied when trying 
to exit from the debugger, effectively detecting the presence of the 
debugger. 
4.10.3. Implementation of detection of analysis avoidance technique 
The use of this technique can be detected by locating calls to 
NtSetInformationThread. 
4.10.4. Effectiveness of detection of technique observation 
The detection technique proved to be effective. 
4.10.5. Implementation of mitigation technique 
The OllyAdvanced option ZwSetInformationThread can be set to mitigate 
this technique or when the IDA Stealth plugin NtSetInformationThread 
option is selected. 
4.10.6. Effectiveness of mitigation technique observation 
IDA Pro was not detected when run without breakpoints, but detached the 
thread when stepped through with the debugger. The debugger was not 
detected when the IDA Stealth plugin NtSetInformationThread option 
was selected. If the first breakpoint is set one instruction (or more) beyond 
the call to the function, the breakpoint is reached ok, effectively mitigating 
the technique. 
 
 
4.11. KERNEL32 CLOSEHANDLE() AND NTCLOSE()QUASI 
EXPERIMENT 
4.11.1. Implementation of anti-analysis technique 
The presence of a debugger can be detected by making use of the ZwClose 
system call. CloseHandle indirectly makes use of this call. Calling ZwClose 
with an invalid handle will generate a STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE exception. 
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Falliere (2007, p.7) says that “the only proper way to bypass the 
CloseHandle anti-debug is to either modify the system call data from ring 0, 
before it is called, or set up a kernel hook.” The listing in Figure 4-29, an 
extension of an example provided by (Falliere, 2007, p.7) demonstrates this 
technique. 
 
.686 
.MODEL flat, stdcall 
OPTION CASEMAP:NONE   ;Case sensitive 
 
include windows.inc 
include kernel32.inc 
includeLib c:\masm32\lib\kernel32.lib 
include user32.inc 
includeLib c:\masm32\lib\user32.lib 
 
.DATA 
 text1 db 'Debugger Not Detected', 0 
 caption db 'Heap Flags',0 
 text2 db 'Debugger Detected', 0 
.CODE 
Start: 
 PUSH OFFSET Finish 
 PUSH 1234h  ; invalid handle 
 CALL CloseHandle 
 INVOKE MessageBox, 0, addr text1, addr caption, MB_OK 
 JMP Finish 
DebuggerDetected: 
 INVOKE MessageBox, 0, addr text2, addr caption, MB_OK 
Finish: 
 INVOKE ExitProcess, 0 
End Start 
Figure 4-29 Listing of Kernel32 CloseHandle technique to detect 
presence of debugger 
4.11.2. Effectiveness of anti-analysis technique observation 
The program runs fine outside a debugger, but inside OllyDbg, the 
STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE exception was raised.  IDA Pro behaved in a very 
similar manner. 
4.11.3. Implementation of detection of analysis avoidance technique 
The call to CloseHandle is easy enough to find for detection purposes.  An 
example script to locate functions and their cross references adapted and 
modified from an example by Eagle (2008a, p.271) is shown in Figure 4-30.  
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#include <idc.idc> 
 
// locate functions and their cross references 
// adapted from an example by Chris Eagle, p.271 
// The IDA Pro Book 
 
static findFunction(func) { 
  auto f, addr, xref, source; 
  f = LocByName(func); 
  if (f == BADADDR) { 
    Message("%s not located\n", func); 
  } 
  else { 
    for (addr = RfirstB(f); addr != BADADDR; addr = RnextB(f, 
addr)) { 
      xref = XrefType(); 
      if (xref == fl_CN || xref == fl_CF) { 
        source = GetFunctionName(addr); 
        Message("%s is called from 0x%x in %s\n", func, addr, 
source); 
      } 
    } 
  } 
} 
 
static main() { 
   // add functions to find 
   findFunction("CloseHandle"); 
} 
Figure 4-30 Listing of findFunction script adapted from Eagle 
(2008a, p.271) 
4.11.4. Effectiveness of detection of technique observation 
The detection technique was found to be effective. 
4.11.5. Implementation of mitigation technique 
IDA Stealth  has an NtClose option that can be used to mitigate this 
technique. 
4.11.6. Effectiveness of mitigation technique observation 
The mitigation technique was found to be effective. 
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4.12. USER-MODE TIMERS QUASI EXPERIMENT 
4.12.1. Implementation of anti-analysis technique 
Packers and debug detection routines take advantage of the fact that code 
running in a debugger is going to take longer to execute than when not 
running in a debugger. The routines measure the time elapsed and compare 
it with a normal run time value. If it took longer to run than expected, then 
it is probably running in a debugger. The RDTSC (Read Time Stamp Counter) 
instruction can be used before and after a routine to determine how much 
time elapsed. 
 
The kernel32 DLL has a function called GetTickCount that returns with the 
number of milliseconds elapsed since the system was started. A 
SharedUserData data structure is always located at address 0x7FFE0000 
and contains the fields TickCountLow and TickCountMultiplier.  
 
The following listing, in Figure 4-31, shows an full implementation of a 
partial example presented by Yason (2007, p. 8). It shows how the RDTSC 
instruction can be used to determine if the program could be being stepped 
in a debugger. 
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; this code uses the RDTSC instruction to get the time stamp  
; before and after a section of timed code to determine if it  
; is being debugged. 
 
.686 
.MODEL flat, stdcall 
OPTION CASEMAP:NONE   ;Case sensitive 
 
Include windows.inc 
Include kernel32.inc 
IncludeLib c:\masm32\lib\kernel32.lib 
Include user32.inc 
IncludeLib c:\masm32\lib\user32.lib 
 
.DATA 
 text1 db 'Debugger Not Detected', 0 
 caption db 'RDTSC',0 
 text2 db 'Debugger Detected', 0 
.CODE 
Start: 
 ; result of RDTSC returned in EDX:EAX 
 RDTSC 
 PUSH EAX 
 PUSH EDX 
 ; just a delay to simulate some function 
 MOV ECX, 10 
L1: NOP 
 LOOP L1 
 ; get time stamp again 
 RDTSC 
 ; work out the delta 
 POP EBX 
 CMP EDX, EBX 
 JA DebuggerDetected 
 POP EBX 
 SUB EAX, EBX 
 CMP EAX, 500h 
 JA DebuggerDetected  
 INVOKE MessageBox, 0, addr text1, addr caption, MB_OK 
 JMP Finish 
DebuggerDetected: 
 INVOKE MessageBox, 0, addr text2, addr caption, MB_OK 
Finish: 
 INVOKE ExitProcess, 0 
End Start 
Figure 4-31 Listing of implementation of RDTSC technique to detect 
presence of a debugger. 
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4.12.2. Effectiveness of anti-analysis technique observation 
This technique proved to be effective at detecting the presence of a 
debugger. 
4.12.3. Implementation of detection of analysis avoidance technique 
This use of this technique can be found by locating the instruction RDTSC.  
4.12.4. Effectiveness of  detection of technique observation 
Locating calls to the instruction RDTSC proved to be effective 
4.12.5. Implementation of mitigation technique 
A simple solution to this technique would be to identify where the timing 
checks are being performed in the code, and then set a breakpoint before 
the first time delta measurement and then perform a run instead of a step 
until the breakpoint is hit (Yason, 2007, p.9). Alternatively the result 
returned from a call to GetTickCount and modify the return value. Yason 
says that OllyAdvanced installs a kernel mode driver that sets the Time 
Stamp Disable bit (TSD) in the CR4 control register which will trigger a 
General Protection (GP) exception if the RDTSC instruction is executed in a 
privilege level other than 0. The Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT) is setup so 
that the GP exception is hooked and the execution of the RDTSC is filtered.  
Yason emphasises that this driver may cause instability to the system.  
4.12.6. Effectiveness of mitigation technique observation 
OllyAdvanced has two anti RDTSC options, but the debugger was still 
detected.  The most effective mitigation strategy was to locate the calls to 
the function and patch out appropriately. 
 
4.13. KERNEL32 OUTPUTDEBUGSTRINGA() QUASI EXPERIMENT 
4.13.1. Implementation of anti-analysis technique 
Falliere (2007, p.7) reports that he encountered this technique whilst 
examining files packed with ReCrypt v0.80. If OutputDebugStringA is 
called with a valid ASCII string under the control of a debugger, the return 
value will the address of the string passed as a parameter. When not run in 
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a debugger, the return value should be 1. This technique is demonstrated in 
the listing in Figure 4-32. Yason (2007, p.26) says that this technique is 
specific to OllyDbg because it is vulnerable to a format string bug. 
 
; this code will detect the presence of OllyDbg v1.1 and  
; v2.0 alpha by exploiting a string format vulnerability 
 
.686 
.MODEL flat, stdcall 
OPTION CASEMAP:NONE   ;Case sensitive 
 
include windows.inc 
include kernel32.inc 
includeLib c:\masm32\lib\kernel32.lib 
include user32.inc 
includeLib c:\masm32\lib\user32.lib 
 
.DATA 
 text1 db 'Debugger Not Detected', 0 
 caption db 'OutputDebugStringA',0 
 text2 db 'Debugger Detected', 0 
 textString db 'My Test String', 0 
.CODE 
Start: 
 XOR EAX,EAX 
 INVOKE OutputDebugString, addr textString 
 CMP EAX, 1 
 JNE DebuggerDetected 
 INVOKE MessageBox, 0, addr text1, addr caption, MB_OK 
 JMP Finish 
DebuggerDetected: 
 INVOKE MessageBox, 0, addr text2, addr caption, MB_OK 
Finish: 
 INVOKE ExitProcess, 0 
End Start 
Figure 4-32 Listing of implementation of OutputDebugStringA to 
detect presence of a debugger. 
 
4.13.2. Effectiveness of anti-analysis technique observation 
The technique worked in OllyDbg v1.10 and OllyDbg v2.00 (alpha2) and 
it was found that the technique also worked in IDA Pro. 
4.13.3. Implementation of detection of analysis avoidance technique 
This technique can be detected by adding the following line to the main 
function in the listing in Figure 4-30: 
 findFunction(“OutputDebugStringA”); 
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A technique that works to detect and then patch the return result from 
OutputDebugStringA is provided in  Figure 4-33 which was extracted and 
modified from an example by (Eagle, 2008b).  
 
#include <idc.idc> 
 
static main() { 
   auto addr, funcName, end; 
   funcName = "kernel32_OutputDebugStringA"; 
   // run to entry point 
   RunTo(BeginEA()); 
   // wait until process is suspended 
   GetDebuggerEvent(WFNE_SUSP, -1); 
   // locate address of function 
   addr = LocByName(funcName); 
   if (addr != BADADDR) { 
 Message("%s found at %x\n", funcName, addr); 
    MakeFunction(addr, BADADDR); 
    end = GetFunctionAttr(addr, FUNCATTR_END) - 3; 
    AddBpt(end); 
    SetBptAttr(end, BPT_BRK, 0);  //don't stop 
    //fix the return value as expected in non-debugged 
processes 
    SetBptCnd(end, "EAX = 1"); 
   } else { 
 Message("%s not found\n", funcName); 
   } 
} 
Figure 4-33 Script to patch result of OutputDebugStringA function 
call to hide presence of debugger.  
4.13.4. Effectiveness of detection of technique observation 
The use of the detection techniques was found to be effective. 
4.13.5. Implementation of mitigation technique 
This technique can be mitigated by enabling the OutputDebugString option 
in IDA Stealth. Alternatively, the listing in Figure 4-33 can be employed. 
4.13.6. Effectiveness of mitigation technique observation 
The mitigation techniques were found to be effective. 
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4.14. ROGUE INT3 QUASI EXPERIMENT 
4.14.1. Implementation of anti-analysis technique 
The idea of this technique is to insert INT3 opcodes into the binary to trick 
the debugger into thinking it is one of the software breakpoints it has 
inserted into the binary being debugged. Control will be given to an 
exception handler when the INT3 is encountered in a program that is not 
being debugged and the program continues executing. Debuggers typically 
handle these debugger interrupts themselves. The exception handler of the 
malware can set flags so that it can determine if it is running in a debugger 
if the exception handler is not entered. Yason (2007, p.7) says that the 
kernel32 DLL function DebugBreak() internally invokes an INT3 and this 
can be used instead. An example presented by ap0x (2006) is presented in 
Figure 4-34. It sets the value of EAX to 0xFFFFFFFF (via the CONTEXT 
record) in the exception handler to flag the fact that the exception handler 
has been entered. The purpose of the context record is to contain the state 
of a thread. The context record that is passed to an exception handler 
contains the current state of the thread that threw the exception (Yason, 
2007, p.8). Yason (2007, p.7) points out that the kernel32 DLL function 
DebugBreak() internally invokes INT3, and some packers use this call 
instead of using INT3 directly. 
 
.386 
.model flat, stdcall 
option casemap :none   ; case sensitive 
 
include \masm32\include\windows.inc 
include \masm32\include\user32.inc 
include \masm32\include\kernel32.inc 
includelib \masm32\lib\user32.lib 
includelib \masm32\lib\kernel32.lib 
 
.data 
msgTitle db "Execution status:",0h 
msgText1 db "No debugger detected!",0h 
msgText2 db "Debugger detected!",0h 
.code 
 
start: 
 
; MASM32 antiRing3Debugger example 
; coded by ap0x 
; Reversing Labs: http://ap0x.headcoders.net 
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; This code takes advantage of debugger not handling INT3 
; instructions correctly. If we set a SEH before INT3 executing 
; INT3 instruction will fire SEH. If debugger is present it 
; will just walk over INT3 and go straight forward. 
; If debugger is not present exception will occur and execution 
; will be handled by SEH. 
 
; Set SEH 
ASSUME FS:NOTHING 
PUSH offset @Check 
PUSH FS:[0] 
MOV FS:[0],ESP 
 
; Exception 
INT 3h 
 
PUSH 30h 
PUSH offset msgTitle 
PUSH offset msgText2 
PUSH 0 
CALL MessageBox 
 
PUSH 0 
CALL ExitProcess 
 
; SEH handling 
@Check: 
POP FS:[0] 
ADD ESP,4 
 
PUSH 40h 
PUSH offset msgTitle 
PUSH offset msgText1 
PUSH 0 
CALL MessageBox 
 
PUSH 0 
CALL ExitProcess 
 
end start 
Figure 4-34 Listing of implementation of INT3 technique to detect 
the presence of a debugger (ap0x, 2006) 
 
4.14.2. Effectiveness of anti-analysis technique observation 
This code successfully detects that it is running in OllyDbg. 
4.14.3. Implementation of detection of analysis avoidance technique 
This technique can be detected by searching the code for the INT3 
instruction. 
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4.14.4. Effectiveness of  detection of technique observation 
Searching for the presence of INT3 instructions was found to be effective. 
4.14.5. Implementation of mitigation technique 
This technique can be mitigated in a couple of different ways. The first 
solution was to allow the interrupts to be automatically passed to the 
exception handler by setting the debugging options to pass INT3 breaks 
and Single-step breaks to the program. Another method was to identify the 
exception handler address (in OllyDbg, View  > SEH Chain) and then set 
a breakpoint on the exception handler. Then the exception can be passed to 
the exception handler by pressing Shift + F9, and the code of the exception 
handler can be traced. Note that you have to step through (or set a 
breakpoint) the code until the SEH is installed before you can see it in the 
SEH window. 
4.14.6. Effectiveness of mitigation technique observation 
The mitigation techniques were found to be effective. A software breakpoint 
exception was raised in IDA Pro when the program was run and an option 
to pass the exception to the program is offered via a dialog box. If the 
exception is not passed to the program, the debugger was detected, 
otherwise the debugger is not detected. Essentially, this technique can be 
mitigated by setting an option to pass breakpoint exceptions to the program. 
 
4.15. “ICE” BREAKPOINT QUASI EXPERIMENT 
4.15.1. Implementation of anti-analysis technique 
The Ice breakpoint is an undocumented Intel instruction that can be used 
to detect programs that are being debugged. Its opcode is 0xF1. This 
instruction generates a SINGLE_STEP exception when executed and the 
debugger will not call the exception handler and execution will not continue 
as expected. An example implementation is shown in the listing in Figure 
4-35, which is a very simple modification to the example developed by ap0x 
which was shown above in the listing of Figure 4-35. 
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.386 
.model flat, stdcall 
option casemap :none   ; case sensitive 
 
include \masm32\include\windows.inc 
include \masm32\include\user32.inc 
include \masm32\include\kernel32.inc 
includelib \masm32\lib\user32.lib 
includelib \masm32\lib\kernel32.lib 
 
    .data 
msgTitle db "Execution status:",0h 
msgText1 db "No debugger detected!",0h 
msgText2 db "Debugger detected!",0h 
    .code 
 
start: 
 
; Set SEH 
ASSUME FS:NOTHING 
PUSH offset @Check 
PUSH FS:[0] 
MOV FS:[0],ESP 
 
; Exception 
db 0F1h 
 
PUSH 30h 
PUSH offset msgTitle 
PUSH offset msgText2 
PUSH 0 
CALL MessageBox 
 
PUSH 0 
CALL ExitProcess 
 
; SEH handling 
@Check: 
POP FS:[0] 
ADD ESP,4 
 
PUSH 40h 
PUSH offset msgTitle 
PUSH offset msgText1 
PUSH 0 
CALL MessageBox 
 
PUSH 0 
CALL ExitProcess 
 
end start 
Figure 4-35 Listing of implementation of Ice Breakpoint technique 
to detect the presence of a debugger. 
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4.15.2. Effectiveness of anti-analysis technique observation 
This technique was successful with OllyDbg and IDA Pro 
4.15.3. Implementation of detection of analysis avoidance technique 
The use of this technique can be found by searching for the opcode F1h. 
4.15.4. Effectiveness of detection of technique observation 
The detection technique was found to be effective. 
4.15.5. Implementation of mitigation technique 
This technique can be overcome by setting the debugging options to pass 
single-step breaks to the program. 
4.15.6. Effectiveness of mitigation technique observation 
The mitigation technique was found to be effective. 
4.16. INTERRUPT 2DH QUASI EXPERIMENT 
4.16.1. Implementation of anti-analysis technique 
Interrupt 2Dh will raise a breakpoint exception if the program is not being 
debugged. Note how this is different to the other examples. If a debugger is 
attached, there will not be an exception. This technique is demonstrated in 
the listing shown in Figure 4-36. 
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.386 
.model flat, stdcall 
option casemap :none   ; case sensitive 
 
include \masm32\include\windows.inc 
include \masm32\include\user32.inc 
include \masm32\include\kernel32.inc 
includelib \masm32\lib\user32.lib 
includelib \masm32\lib\kernel32.lib 
 
.data 
msgTitle db "Execution status:",0h 
msgText1 db "No debugger detected!",0h 
msgText2 db "Debugger detected!",0h 
.code 
 
start: 
; Set SEH 
ASSUME FS:NOTHING 
PUSH offset @Check 
PUSH FS:[0] 
MOV FS:[0],ESP 
 
; Exception 
INT 2DH 
POP FS:[0] ; clear the SEH 
ADD ESP, 4 
 
INVOKE  MessageBox, 0, offset msgText2, offset msgTitle, 30h 
JMP Finish 
 
; SEH handling 
@Check: 
POP FS:[0] 
ADD ESP,4 
INVOKE  MessageBox, 0, offset msgText1, offset msgTitle, 40h 
 
Finish: 
PUSH 0 
CALL ExitProcess 
 
end start 
Figure 4-36 Listing showing use of INT 2DH to raise an exception if 
the program is not being debugged. 
 
4.16.2. Effectiveness of anti-analysis technique observation 
This was effective in both OllyDbg and IDA Pro. 
4.16.3. Implementation of detection of analysis avoidance technique 
This technique can be detected by search for Interrupt 2Dh. 
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4.16.4. Effectiveness of detection of technique observation 
The detection technique proved to be effective. 
4.16.5. Implementation of mitigation technique 
This technique can be overcome by setting the debugger options to pass all 
exceptions to the program being debugged. 
4.16.6. Effectiveness of mitigation technique observation 
The mitigation technique proved to be effective. 
 
4.17. POPF AND THE TRAP FLAG QUASI EXPERIMENT 
4.17.1. Implementation of anti-analysis technique 
The trap flag in the Flags register is used to control the tracing of a program. 
If the trap flag is set, an instruction that is being executed will raise a 
SINGLE_STEP exception. Falliere (2007, p.10) says that this can be used to 
thwart tracers. A working implementation using Falliere’s snippet of code is 
given in the listing of Figure 4-37. This will have no effect on the flags 
register of a program that is being traced. The debugger will process the 
exception that is raised, and the associated exception handler will not be 
executed. 
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.386 
.model flat, stdcall 
option casemap :none   ; case sensitive 
 
include \masm32\include\windows.inc 
include \masm32\include\user32.inc 
include \masm32\include\kernel32.inc 
includelib \masm32\lib\user32.lib 
includelib \masm32\lib\kernel32.lib 
 
.data 
msgTitle db "Execution status:",0h 
msgText1 db "No debugger detected!",0h 
msgText2 db "Debugger detected!",0h 
.code 
start: 
; Set SEH 
ASSUME FS:NOTHING 
PUSH offset @Check 
PUSH FS:[0] 
MOV FS:[0],ESP 
; Exception 
PUSHF 
MOV EAX, 100h 
MOV  [ESP], EAX 
POPF 
INVOKE  MessageBox, 0, offset msgText2, offset msgTitle, 30h 
JMP Finish 
; SEH handling 
@Check: 
POP FS:[0] 
ADD ESP,4 
INVOKE  MessageBox, 0, offset msgText1, offset msgTitle, 40h 
Finish: 
PUSH 0 
CALL ExitProcess 
end start 
Figure 4-37 Listing of implementation POPF and the Trap Flag 
technique to detect the presence of a debugger. 
 
4.17.2. Effectiveness of anti-analysis technique observation 
OllyDbg and IDA Pro were detected if the exception was not passed to 
the program.  
4.17.3. Implementation of detection of analysis avoidance technique 
The use of this technique can be detected by examining exceptions. 
4.17.4. Effectiveness of  detection of technique observation 
This technique proved to be effective. 
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4.17.5. Implementation of mitigation technique 
This was defeated by passing all raised exceptions to the program being 
debugged. 
4.17.6. Effectiveness of mitigation technique observation 
This technique proved to be effective. 
 
 
4.18. SUMMARY OF VALIDATION OF TECHNIQUES RESULTS 
The literature review revealed a large and wide variety of techniques 
malware can incorporate to hinder analysis and avoid detection. A subset of 
these techniques were implemented and validated in small, standalone 
programs. All of the implemented techniques were observed to be effective 
at detecting the presence of a debugger, namely IDA Pro and OllyDbg. 
After ensuring that the anti-analysis technique was effective, small scripts 
were developed or sourced to determine if the use of the technique could be 
detected. All of the implemented detection techniques were observed to be 
effective. Mitigation scripts were then developed or sourced to determine if 
the use of the technique could be mitigated. All of the implemented 
mitigation techniques or scripts were observed to be effective. A summary 
of the results is provided in Table 4-1. 
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Table 4-1 Validation of Techniques Results 
Technique Implemented 
in Code 
Debugger Detection Technique 
Detectable 
Technique 
Mitigatable IDA 
Pro 
OllyDbg 
IsDebuggerPresent      
IsDebugged      
NtGlobalFlags      
Heap Flags      
NtQueryInformationProcess      
CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent      
UnhandledExceptionFilter      
NtSetInformationThread      
CloseHandle      
User Mode Timers      
OutputDebugString      
INT 3      
ICE Breakpoint      
INT 2DH      
POPF      
 
These results provide a significant measure of validation for the anti-
analysis techniques discussed in the literature review (Falliere, 2007; Ferrie, 
2008; Yason, 2007).  
 
The ability to detect the use of anti-analysis techniques provides confidence 
in being able to implement an application to detect malware, as suggested 
by Wysopal (2009) who said that the use of such techniques could be a very 
good indicator of the program under investigation to possibly have a 
malicious nature. This is important, because the literature review 
represented claims that existing malware detection paradigms are less than 
effective and that a new approach is required. 
 
The literature review showed that the coverage of anti-analysis techniques 
in popular plugins was limited. These results show that mitigation scripts 
can be very useful to extend the coverage of such plugins to aid in the 
analysis of malicious software and to hide the presence of analysis tools. 
 
Significant programming and operating system knowledge is required to 
detect and mitigate the techniques malware can incorporate to avoid 
analysis, as evidenced in the programs and scripts used to derive the 
results in this chapter. The conduct of this research led to the identification 
of a Malware Analysis Body of Knowledge by Valli and Brand (2008) that 
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attempts to identify an appropriate spectrum of knowledge required to 
analyse malicious software. A key component of the MABOK is the 
treatment of anti-analysis techniques. The MABOK is discussed in greater 
detail in section 6.7.9 of this thesis.  
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CHAPTER 5 ANALYSIS OF COLLECTED MALWARE 
RESULTS 
5.1. OVERVIEW  
The purpose of this chapter is to present the results of examination of 
network based malware collected by the ECU Nepenthes sensors as 
described in the Conceptual Framework, section 3.6 of this thesis. It 
examines claims in the literature review that existing approaches to the 
detection of malware is less than effective and supports research question 
two, that is, “How can the use of these techniques be detected?”. In general, 
the literature review discussed three techniques common to AV software to 
detect malicious software as signature recognition, heuristics and file 
integrity checking. To this end, the effectiveness of existing virus signature 
detection is examined as well as an examination of the effectiveness of 
heuristics. 
 
An additional facet of this chapter is an examination into the use of run time 
packers which are arguably, one of the most fundamentally used analysis 
avoidance techniques. Methods that can be used to detect the use of run 
time packers, include packer signature recognition and by measures of 
entropy (randomness) in the code. 
 
898 malware samples were collected by the ECU Nepenthes sensors 
between June 25 2007 and August 9 2008. All samples were collected by 
the Nepenthes system which emulates known vulnerabilities that network 
based malware takes advantage of, to install malware on the vulnerable 
computer. 
5.2. VIRUS SIGNATURES 
5.2.1. Anubis 
All 898 samples were submitted to Anubis and of these, 738 (82.2%) were 
able to be analyzed and 160 (17.8%) were not able to be analyzed. Of the 
738 specimens of malware that were able to be analyzed, 544 virus 
signatures were able to be determined by the Ikarus virus scanner. This 
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represents a detection rate by the Ikarus virus scanner of 73.7%. This is 
the solitary virus scanner Anubis uses. The results of Ikarus are shown in 
Table 5-1 and it is clearly dominated by the Allaple (Anonymous, n.d.-a) 
worm. Variants exist of most types of malware and these variants were 
grouped together where possible in the results in Table 5-1. 
 
Table 5-1 Ikarus Virus Scanner results showing high incidence of 
Allaple worm in the collected malware specimens. 
Ikarus Signature Count % 
Allaple 422 77.57 
Virut 30 5.51 
PoeBot 17 3.13 
Rbot 16 2.94 
Agent 10 1.84 
Nepoe 8 1.47 
SdBot 7 1.29 
Delf 6 1.10 
WinFixer 4 0.74 
VanBot 4 0.74 
Hupigon 3 0.55 
NSPM 3 0.55 
Lovesan 2 0.37 
ProcessHijack 2 0.37 
IRCBot 2 0.37 
oda 1 0.18 
Lineage 1 0.18 
AHKD 1 0.18 
Adload 1 0.18 
Zlob 1 0.18 
Klone 1 0.18 
Slaper 1 0.18 
Sasser 1 0.18 
 
 
5.2.2. Virus Total 
Virus Total is an online virus scanner site that accepts uploaded files 
which are then processed by up to 36 virus scanner engines. Results for the 
submission of a particular collected specimen to Virus Total are given in 
Table 5-2 as an example. It shows that 33 of the 36 virus engines 
recognized the signature of the malware. This particular specimen was 
collected on October 17 2007 and the analysis was conducted on September 
4 2008. 
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Table 5-2 Virus Total results from a single submission showing 
disparity in signatures by different vendors. 
Anti Virus Scanner Result 
AhnLab-V3 Win32/Allaple.worm.B 
AntiVir WORM/Allaple.Gen 
Authentium W32/RAHack.A.gen!Eldorado 
Avast Win32:Allaple 
AVG Worm/Allaple.B 
BitDefender Win32.Worm.Allaple.Gen 
CAT-QuickHeal I-Worm.Allaple.gen 
ClamAV Worm.Allaple-311 
DrWeb Trojan.Starman 
eSafe Suspicious File 
eTrust-Vet Win32/Mallar 
Ewido - 
F-Prot W32/RAHack.A.gen!Eldorado 
F-Secure Net-Worm.Win32.Allaple.b 
Fortinet W32/ALLAPLE.E!worm 
GData Net-Worm.Win32.Allaple.b 
Ikarus Net-Worm.Win32.Allaple.a 
K7AntiVirus Net-Worm.Win32.Allaple.a 
Kaspersky Net-Worm.Win32.Allaple.b 
McAfee W32/RAHack 
Microsoft Worm:Win32/Allaple.A 
NOD32v2 a variant of Win32/Allaple.Gen 
Norman Allaple.gen 
Panda W32/Rahack.gen 
PCTools Worm.Allaple.Gen 
Prevx1 - 
Rising Worm.Win32.Allaple.a 
Sophos W32/Allaple-F 
Sunbelt Worm.Win32.Allaple.JF 
Symantec W32.Rahack.W 
TheHacker - 
TrendMicro WORM_ALLAPLE.IK 
VBA32 Net-Worm.Win32.Allaple 
ViRobot Worm.Win32.Allaple.Gen 
VirusBuster Worm.Allaple.Gen 
Webwasher-Gateway Worm.Allaple.Gen 
 
The differing naming conventions used by each of the 36 Anti Virus 
scanners is clearly evident.  
 
162 specimens, collected between June 25 2007 and October 21, were 
submitted to Virus Total. This had been a period of over a year for most 
of the specimens since they had been collected. Only 17 of the 162 samples 
(10.4%) were detected by all of the Anti Virus scanners. The results of this 
test are plotted in Figure 5-1. It indicates that 100% detection by all Anti 
Virus scanners is not achieved nearly a year after collection and suggests 
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that the 73.7% virus detection rate by Ikarus may be considered within 
the norm.  
 
Figure 5-1 Virus Total detection rate plot showing less than ideal 
detection results. 
 
 
 
5.3. MALWARE FUNCTIONALITY 
Anubis reports contain a summary of the functionality of the malware it 
analyzes. Functionality reported by Anubis for the submitted samples 
included various combinations of the following reports: 
• Performs Address Scan. 
• Auto Start Capabilities. 
• Creates Files in the Windows System Directory. 
• Changes Security Settings of Internet Explorer. 
• Joins IRC Network. 
 
Address scans are performed by malware to locate other targets on the 
network to attack. Auto start capabilities are generally changes made to the 
registry to ensure that the malware is activated each time the computer is 
restarted. Malware is generally packed when it is initially loaded onto a 
vulnerable machine, and usually consists of multiple files which are then 
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copied to various locations in the Windows System directory with the hidden 
attribute set and given file names that very closely resemble legitimate file 
names to provide additional camouflage. Security settings are changed in 
Internet Explorer so that more malware can be downloaded from sites 
without warnings. IRC networks are used by Bots to accept remote 
commands from a BotNet. Table 5-3 lists the results of the high level 
malicious activities the malware performed. Note that various combinations 
of activities are possible.  
 
Table 5-3 Submitted malware functionality results 
Malware Function Occurrence 
Count 
Performs Address Scan 301 
Auto start capabilities 282 
Creates files in the Windows system directory 276 
Changes security settings of Internet Explorer 135 
Joins IRC network 58 
 
The Allaple (Anonymous, n.d.-a) worm was the most representative 
specimen collected by the sensors. Four variants of this worm were 
detected, including Allaple.A, Allaple.B, Allaple.D  and Allaple.E. 
The number of detections for each variant is presented in Table 5-4. 
 
Table 5-4 Allaple variants detection results 
Allaple Variant Detections 
Allaple.A 340 
Allaple.B 63 
Allaple.D 1 
Allaple.E 18 
Totals 422 
 
Table 5-5 presents the functionality detected by Anubis of the variants. 
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Table 5-5 Functionality of Allaple variants results 
Malware Function Allaple.
A 
Allaple.
B 
Allaple.
D 
Allaple.
E 
Performs Address Scan 164 29 1 13 
Autostart Capabilities 119 22 0 3 
Creates Files in the Windows System 
Directory 
112 21 0 4 
Changes security settings of Internet 
Explorer 
9 0 0 3 
Joins IRC network 0 0 0 0 
 
In contrast, Table 5-6 shows the Allaple specimens where Anubis did not 
record any activity at all, even though these particular specimens’ run time 
was around 150 seconds as depicted in Figure 5-2. 
 
Table 5-6 Allaple variants showing no activity recorded 
Allaple Variant No 
Activity 
Ikarus 
Detections 
% 
Allaple.A 62 340 18.24% 
Allaple.B 13 63 20.63% 
Allaple.D 0 1 0.00% 
Allaple.E 2 18 11.11% 
Totals 77 422 18.25% 
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Figure 5-2 Run time Of Allaple specimens where no activity is 
recorded could indicate deception. 
 
5.4. PACKER ANALYSIS 
Anubis uses SigBuster as its packer signature detector during the time 
this research has been conducted and it is not publicly available. The only 
way to use SigBuster is to upload a malware specimen to Anubis and 
have the file analyzed online. Of the 738 samples that were able to be 
analyzed, the SigBuster packer detector recognized 543 signatures of 
packers, as listed in Table 5-7.  
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Table 5-7 SigBuster detected packer signature results 
SigBuster Signature Count % 
Allaple_Polymorphic_Packer vna SN: 1647 444 60.16 
eXpressor v1.4.5 SN:225 21 2.85 
Signature_Safe v2. SN:49 9 1.22 
PolyCrypt_PE v2005.06.01 SN:391PolyCrypt_PE v2.1.4b/2.1.5 
SN:1150 
8 1.08 
Themida vna SN:732 6 0.81 
eXpressor V1.4 SN: 1654 4 0.54 
UPX All_Versions SN:1634 4 0.54 
UPX All_Versions SN:1634EXE_Cryptor v2.2X SN:193 4 0.54 
Allaple_Polymorphic_Packer vna SN: 1647UPX All_Versions SN:1634 3 0.41 
FSG V1.3x SN:1637 3 0.41 
Unknown_packer vna SN: 1671Allaple_Polymorphic_Packer vna SN: 
1647 
3 0.41 
ASProtect v1.2x-1.3x SN:137 2 0.27 
ASProtect v1.2x-1.3x SN:137ASProtect v2.1/2.2(exe) SN:1424 2 0.27 
DotFix NiceProtect vna SN: 1655 2 0.27 
EXE_Cryptor v2.2X SN:193 2 0.27 
eXpressor V1.4 SN: 1654Unknown_packer vna SN: 1679 2 0.27 
eXpressor V1.4 SN: 1654UPX All_Versions SN:1634 2 0.27 
PKLITE32 v1.1 SN:1153 2 0.27 
Unknown_packer vna SN: 1660 2 0.27 
eXpressor V1.4 SN: 1654UPX All_Versions SN:1634EXE_Cryptor v2.2X 
SN:193 
1 0.14 
Expressor v1.4 SN: 1672 1 0.14 
Expressor v1.4 SN: 1672UPX All_Versions SN:1634 1 0.14 
FSG V1.3x SN:1637EXE_Cryptor v2.2X SN:193 1 0.14 
NsPack All_Versions SN:1635 1 0.14 
PE_Compact v2.0x SN:1610FSG V1.3x SN:1637 1 0.14 
PE_Compact v2.X SN:660FSG V1.3x SN:1637 1 0.14 
PE_Pack v1.0 SN:1399 1 0.14 
PE_Pack v1.0 SN:72 1 0.14 
PE_Pack v1.0 SN:72 1 0.14 
Unknown_metamorphic_packer vna SN: 1658 1 0.14 
Unknown_packer vna SN: 1654 1 0.14 
Unknown_packer vna SN: 1654UPX All_Versions SN:1634EXE_Cryptor 
v2.2X SN:193 
1 0.14 
Unknown_packer vna SN: 1671Unknown_packer vna SN: 1679 1 0.14 
Unknown_packer vna SN: 1676Signature_Safe v2. SN:49 1 0.14 
Unknown_packer vna SN: 1679 1 0.14 
UPX_xor_stub vna SN:1612 1 0.14 
Xtreme_Protector v1.05 SN:78 1 0.14 
Total  73.58 
 
 
 
The SigBuster results are dominated by the 
Allaple_Polymorphic_Packer vna SN: 1647 signature with 444 
occurrences, followed very distantly by variations of Expressor with 32 
occurrences.  In contrast, Mandiant Red Curtain (MRC) uses PEiD as its 
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packer signature detector which is publicly available together with its 
database of signatures. The PEiD database consists of over 400 signatures.  
MRC only detected 43 known signatures, the results of which are displayed 
in Table 5-8. 
 
Table 5-8 PEiD signature results indicating disparity in signature 
matching with those performed by SigBuster. 
PEiD Signature Count % 
PECompact v2.x 11 1.49 
CodeSafe v2.0 9 1.22 
Anticrack Software Protector v1.09 
(ACProtect) 
4 0.54 
Borland Delphi v6.0 - v7.0 3 0.41 
Microsoft Visual Basic v5.0 / v6.0 3 0.41 
UPX v0.89.6 - v1.02 / v1.05 - v1.22 3 0.41 
ASProtect v1.23 RC1 2 0.27 
UPX v1.03 - v1.04 1 0.14 
PKLITE32 v1.1 1 0.14 
PEtite v1.4 1 0.14 
NeoLite vx.x 1 0.14 
Symantec Visual Cafe v3.0 1 0.14 
Microsoft Visual C++ v5.0/v6.0 (MFC) 1 0.14 
Xtreme-Protector v1.05 1 0.14 
UPX-Scrambler RC v1.x 1 0.14 
Total  5.83 
 
 
The significant contrast in results between Table 5-7 and Table 5-8 could be 
attributed to SigBusters ability to detect the AllAple Polymorphic 
Packer which is not in the PEiD database of signatures.  It is also observed 
that not a single signature matched between PEiD and SigBuster. 
 
An alternative method for the detection of the use of a packer is through 
measuring the entropy (randomness) of the program. MRC employs this 
technique as one of the criteria it uses to develop a risk score to identify 
malicious software. Packed code has a higher value of entropy than 
unpacked code. MRC uses a value of 0.9 as a threshold to signal files of 
interest. MRC was used to scan the directory of malware and returned 838 
results. Of these, 829 returned a measurement of entropy of greater than, 
or equal to 0.9. This represents 98.9% of the files. In comparison, when 
MRC was used to scan the C:\Windows\System32 directory of an 
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uncompromised system, 19 files out of 671 executable files returned an 
entropy of greater than, or equal to 0.9. This represents 2.83% of the files. 
The entropy method appears to be very successful for the detection of 
runtime packed files.  
 
Figure 5-3 displays the entropy of the malware that was collected during 
the period June 25 2007 to October 21 2007 and clearly shows the high 
level of entropy of the malware.  
 
Figure 5-3 Graph indicating high measures of entropy of malware 
exceeding accepted threshold  
 
 
 
5.5. SUMMARY OF COLLECTED MALWARE RESULTS 
The results in this chapter support claims that signature based virus 
detection is less than ideal. The Ikarus Virus Scanner used by Anubis only 
detected 73.7% of malware collected by the ECU Nepenthes sensors, even 
though the malware had been in the wild for a period of up to a year. In 
addition, the specimens were clearly malicious because they had arrived on 
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the sensors by deliberately exploiting an emulated vulnerability and 
installed software uninvited. 
 
The functionality of the malware determined by Anubis clearly 
demonstrated malicious intent. This does provide a good indicator of the 
nature of the malware, however, running the software to determine its 
nature gives control of the malware to employ deception techniques and 
does provide an opportunity to the malware to do damage to the system. 
 
Measures of entropy showed to be a very good method to determine if the 
malware is packed. The results also showed that two different packer 
signature determination tools provided very different results. This is 
significant because identification of a packer signature assists in the 
determination of the appropriate unpacking algorithm to employ to unpack 
the malware to arrive at the OEP so that detailed analysis can commence. 
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CHAPTER 6 DISCUSSION 
6.1. DISCUSSON OF VALIDATION OF ANTI-ANALYSIS 
TECHNIQUES RESULTS 
Only a subset of the techniques discussed in the Literature Review of this 
thesis were validated due to the extensive number of techniques uncovered 
through a search of the literature and software reverse engineering sites. 
The validation process included implementing individual techniques in 
simple, standalone programs, running the program in two popular 
debuggers (IDA Pro and OllyDbg) and then observing whether or not, the 
debugger was able to be detected. The simple nature of the validating 
program was designed to ensure that no other factor was present to 
account for the behaviour of the program. This was followed by writing or 
sourcing a detection and mitigation script or method and observing the 
result. A summary of the results of the techniques that were validated is 
presented in Table 6-1. The check symbol () designates that the technique 
was successful, whilst the use of the cross symbol () would have been 
used to designate failure of the technique.  
 
All of the implemented techniques were successful in detecting the presence 
of the two debuggers. The use of these anti-analysis techniques was 
successfully detected and mitigated using scripts or via manual methods. 
The techniques that were not implemented and discussed by other 
researchers (Eagle, 2008b; Falliere, 2007; Ferrie, 2008; Yason, 2007) 
appear to be sound, and this researcher is confident that these techniques 
would also be able to be detected and mitigated successfully. 
 
Documentation for scripting languages to support the validation activity was 
found to be sparse and mostly focused on function definitions. Learning how 
to implement scripts to perform a particular function was attained by 
examination of existing scripts from reverse engineering software web sites 
such as Tuts4You (T. Rogers, 2008) and analyzing how they were 
implemented. Scripting languages provide a rich set of functionality and are 
essential for analysis of malware that employs anti-analysis techniques. The 
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same scripting languages are also extremely useful for detection and 
mitigation of anti-analysis techniques.  
 
Table 6-1 Validation of techniques results showing validity of 
technique and the ability to detect and mitigate the techniques. 
Technique Implemente
d 
in Code 
Debugger Detection Technique 
Detectable 
Technique 
Mitigatable IDA 
Pro 
OllyDbg 
IsDebuggerPresent      
IsDebugged      
NtGlobalFlags      
Heap Flags      
NtQueryInformationProcess      
CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent      
UnhandledExceptionFilter      
NtSetInformationThread      
CloseHandle      
User Mode Timers      
OutputDebugString      
INT 3      
ICE Breakpoint      
INT 2DH      
POPF      
 
6.2. DISCUSSION OF COLLECTED MALWARE ANALYSIS 
RESULTS 
The Nepenthes sensors work by emulating known vulnerabilities and 
allowing network based malware to install itself on the vulnerable computer. 
It could be considered that any software that takes advange of such 
vulnerabilities and installs itself on a computer over the internet, uninvited, 
be categorised as malicious. The malware collected by the ECU Nepenthes 
sensors was validated as malicious software by its behaviour, however the 
detection rate by the Ikarus virus detector employed by Anubis was 
approximately 73.7%. A detection rate of much lower than 100% may not 
be an unusual result when compared with other virus detectors results as 
performed when the malware was submitted to Virus Total, which 
employs up to thirty six AV engines from various vendors . 
 
A continuous subset of the malware collected between June 25 and October 
21 2007 was submitted to VirusTotal on or around September 04 2008. 
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Even though each malware specimen was submitted to 36 virus detectors, 
approximately one year after collection and submission to online virus 
collection agencies, only 93.7% of the virus engines agreed that the 
specimens were malicious. This indicates that AV software may provide less 
than ideal detection ability and supports the claims by other researchers 
(Mila Dalla et al., 2008; Szewczyk & Brand, 2008; W. Yan et al., 2008; Z. 
Yan & Inge, 2008; Zhou & Meador Inge, 2008). 
 
The specimens were dominated by the Allaple worm at approximately 
77.57% of the total number of specimens that could be analyzed. 
Approximately 18% of these specimens recorded no activity when run 
inside the sandbox Anubis provides, even though the average run time was 
148 seconds. Although purely speculation at this point in time, this could 
indicate specimens that have detected the presence of Anubis or other 
analytical tools and used deception to not perform malicious activity to 
avoid being detected and remains to be investigated. These samples should 
be flagged for special consideration for determining if they were using anti 
online analysis techniques that have been documented in this research. 
 
98.9% of the specimens indicated very high levels of entropy which means 
they were packed or protected. Packing and protecting is typically used by 
malware to mitigate detection by Anti Virus software. The two packer 
detectors did not agree on the names of any of the packer signatures they 
detected. SigBuster provided a name for 73.58% of the specimens and 
PEiD gave a name for 5.83% of the specimens. Knowledge of the name of 
the packer greatly assists malware analysis because the appropriate 
unpacking algorithm can be used to unpack the malware to arrive at the 
OEP. Using packers that are not recognised by packer detectors assists the 
malware from not being analyzed in detail and certainly implies that 
automated unpacking based on recognition of a name could produce a lot of 
false positives. Measurement of entropy appears to be a very successful 
method of detecting packed and protected malware as supported by other 
researchers (Ebringer & Sun, 2008; Lyda & Hamrock, 2007) . 
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6.3. RESEARCH QUESTION 1 - WHAT TECHNIQUES CAN 
MALWARE USE TO AVOID BEING ANALYZED? 
This research question is essentially exploratory in nature. It was answered 
by  
• Uncovering techniques from a review of the literature. 
• Implementation of the techniques. 
• Validation of the techniques through quasi experimentation. 
 
The literature review uncovered an extensive range of techniques, mostly 
published by three key researchers (Falliere, 2007; Ferrie, 2008; Yason, 
2007) who each provide their own, differing taxonomies of techniques. Note 
that these papers have only been published within the past year or two of 
this research and this could be indicative of the problems encountered by 
the increased spectrum of techniques malware can now employ to hinder 
analysis. Their work is supplemented by other researchers (Anthracene, 
2006; Gordon, n.d.; Rolles, 2007; Smidgeonsoft, 2005; Smith & Quist, 
2006; xC, 2007) whose online articles focus on more individual techniques 
and provide greater detail with respect to implementation and analysis. The 
work of Rolles in particular, focuses on leading edge techniques such as 
malware that uses its own virtual machines to avoid detailed analysis. Such 
malware is difficult to analyse because the custom virtual machines have 
their own instruction sets and these customised instruction sets have to be 
determined before detailed analysis can commence.  A proposed taxonomy 
by the author of this research combines elements of the taxonomies of 
Falliere, Ferrie and Yason appears in Table 6-2, in an attempt to provide a 
more complete coverage of techniques. Note that each technique listed in 
the taxonomy is the highest level stratum and could be further stratified.  
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Table 6-2 Taxonomy of anti-analysis techniques 
Technique Description 
Anti Emulation A range of techniques exist to detect that the 
malware is running inside popular VM’s such as 
VMWare  or Virtual PC. 
Anti Online 
Analysis 
A variety of techniques exist for malware to 
determine if it is running in a online analysis engine 
such as Anubis or Norman Sandbox. 
Anti Hardware 
 
Techniques that target hardware such as the CPU 
including the debug registers. 
Anti Debugger 
 
Anti Disassemblers 
 
Anti Tools 
 
Anti Memory 
 
 
 
Anti Process 
 
 
Anti-analysis 
Target the way Debuggers work and take advantage 
of these to take control of the flow of execution. 
Target the way Disassemblers work and take 
advantage of this to produce a false disassembly. 
Detect the presence of specific analysis tools and 
enter a deceptive mode. 
Target the way memory is used when a process is 
being debugged and take advantage of this as well 
as the way processes can be dumped from memory 
including stolen bytes. 
Target the way processes are handled when being 
debugged and take advantage of this including 
structured exception handling. 
Target the way analysis is conducted. Use junk 
code, code camouflage, check sum checks, 
destruction of the Import Address Table and other 
deceptive techniques to make analysis harder. 
Packers and 
Protectors 
Use run time packers and protectors to obfuscate 
code and data and make it hard to unpack to find 
the original entry point. This includes packers that 
use their own virtual machines such as 
HyperUnpackme2. 
Rootkits Insert rootkits at Ring 0 to take control of the way 
the operating system manages processes and use 
deception to hide malicious processes. 
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The existing literature only provided snippets of code and these snippets 
had to be implemented in standalone programs for the purpose of validation. 
Each technique that was validated was implemented in isolation to provide 
as much control as possible over the environment and written in assembly 
language. Assembly language was used because collected malware, such as 
that collected by the ECU honeypot (Valli & Wooten, 2007) are binaries and 
are in assembly language in their disassembled state. Validation was 
conducted by employing quasi experiments where the effects on common 
debuggers such as IDA Pro and Ollydbg were observed. All of the 
techniques that were implemented were determined to be valid and 
prevented analysis.  
 
Malware is often packed or protected to hinder analysis by anti-virus 
software or static analysis. One of the first steps the malware analyst 
performs after detection of the virus signature is the detection of the packer 
used to pack the malware. Determination of the name of the packer allows 
the analyst to apply the appropriate algorithm to unpack the malware. 
Hundreds of different packers exist and range from using simple techniques 
through to very complex techniques that use Virtual Machines. Unpacking 
can be conducted by automated scripts or with manual methods to arrive at 
the OEP. Even simple packers can be customized by malware authors to 
disrupt automated scripts and hence hinder analysis. Additionally, the 
unpacking routines can contain the analysis avoidance techniques discussed 
and validated in this thesis. A common technique is to cause a divide by 
zero exception during the unpacking process to give control to the malware 
so that it can determine if it is running inside a debugger. If it detects it is 
running inside a debugger, the malware can take control and exit the 
program.  
 
Malware can use anti-forensic techniques at any time and use deception to 
hide its real purpose. If it does not perform any malicious action while it is 
being analyzed, it may be accepted on the system as being safe. Then once 
free from analysis, it can perform its original, malicious objective. 
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6.4. RESEARCH QUESTION 2 – HOW CAN THE USE OF THESE 
TECHNIQUES BE DETECTED? 
 This research question was also mostly exploratory in nature, particularly 
with respect to how the technique can be detected. A number of the 
techniques that were discussed in the literature review were validated in 
small quasi-experiments where a single technique was implemented and its 
behaviour was observed and empirically recorded from conducting 
controlled experiments. Once the technique was validated, scripts were 
written or sourced particular to the two debuggers that were being used to 
detect the use of the technique. There are a variety of plugins for the 
popular debuggers whose purpose is to hide the debugger from malware 
that uses these techniques, but these plugins only provide a very small 
subset of anti-anti-forensic functionality and generally do not log the 
detection event. This necessitated the development of scripts that not only 
hide the debugger but also log the detection event. It was found that all of 
the techniques that were implemented could be detected using scripts or by 
manual methods. A very good source for discussing the development of 
these detection scripts for IDA Pro are discussed by Eagle (2008b), but the 
number and scope of the scripts is relatively small compared to the number 
of techniques revealed from the literature review. A much higher number of 
scripts are available from software reverse engineering sites such as the 
Tuts4You web site maintained by Rogers (2008). However, the scripts at 
such sites are written for debuggers such as OllyDbg  and either have to be 
rewritten into IDC or IDAPython scripts for IDA Pro, or the analyst must be 
prepared to use multiple debugging tools and multiple scripting languages. 
It is therefore highly advisable for malware analysts to develop or source 
detection scripts and have a library of suitable scripts at their disposal. It is 
also advisable for malware analysts to develop or have access to malware 
analysts with scripting skills particular to popular debuggers.  
 
It was noted that plugins for OllyDbg and IDA Pro such as Olly Advanced 
and IDA Stealth focus mostly on hiding the debuggers. This researcher 
recognizes three limitations of these plugins. The first is that the number of 
techniques that are currently mitigated by the plugins is limited. This is 
exemplified by the discrepancy in the large number of techniques uncovered 
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in the literature review compared to the limited number of techniques 
available in the plugins. The second is that the techniques focus on hiding 
the debugger only. Other methods and approaches are required to cover 
the other techniques that are available as specified in the taxonomy in Table 
6-2 above. This means that extensive knowledge of techniques and tools 
including acknowledgement of their limitations is required to mitigate the 
anti forensic techniques that malware has at its disposal to employ. The 
third limitation uncovered in this research is that the plugins do not provide 
notification through logs that particular techniques were detected. This 
limitation does not assist the collection of forensic evidence.  
 
A review of the literature on malware analysis methodologies (Skoudis & 
Zeltser, 2004; Zeltser, 2007) found that the most effective methodologies 
take the presence of analysis avoidance techniques into account. Zelter’s  
incremental, static and dynamic spiral approach for analyzing malware from 
a high level of detail down to a low level of detail provided an effective 
methodology to discover and mitigate analysis avoidance techniques as the 
analysis progresses.  Zelter’s methodology uses an iterative and recursive 
technique to traverse through the phases of static analysis, molding the 
environment for conitnued dynamic analysis. Zelter’s methodology begins 
by performing a basic static analysis of the malware specimen such as 
performing a virus scan, determining the type of file and the type of packer 
used. This is followed by setting up a suitable environment to examine the 
specimen in, such as Windows XP in a Virtual Machine. This is followed by 
running the malware and observing its behaviour. The methodology 
continues to spiral in from obtaining information from a low level of detail, 
down to a highly detailed level. A graphical representation of Zelter’s 
methodology is depicted in Figure 6-1. An extended model of Zelter’s spiral 
analysis methodology is represented by Figure 6-2. The advantage of 
extending Zelter’s spiral analysis methodology is that when anti forensic 
techniques are encountered, they can be detected and mitigated before 
proceeding with the analysis. This appears to be a far superior approach to 
that discussed by (Skoudis & Zeltser, 2004) who neglects to include a 
strategy for detecting and mitigating anti forensic techniques. 
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Figure 6-1 Graphical representation of Zelter's analysis 
methodology showing spiral nature through phases.  
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Figure 6-2 Extended analysis methodology to cater for anti-forensic 
techniques.  Anti-analysis techniques are mitigated as they are 
detected. 
 
The analysis that was conducted in this research showed that the 
measurement of the entropy of the malcode is very effective at detecting if 
a packer has been used. The analysis of the collected malware via two 
different, packer signature detectors also provided very different signature 
results. Generally, once the packer signature has been determined, the 
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appropriate algorithm can be applied to unpack the malware to arrive at the 
OEP. However, if conflicting packer signatures are determined from two or 
more packer signature detectors, both algorithms may have to be applied to 
arrive at the OEP, and there is no guarantee that either one of them is 
correct. This has implications with respect to wasting the time of the analyst 
and certainly benefits the malware writer whose objective is to prevent or 
hinder analysis of the malcode.  
6.5. RESEARCH QUESTION 3 – HOW CAN THE USE OF THESE 
TECHNIQUES BE MITIGATED? 
This research question was also mostly exploratory in nature and answered 
through empirical results gained from controlled quasi-experiments.  It was 
found through quasi experimentation of the techniques that were selected 
to be validated, that the techniques could be mitigated once they had been 
detected. However, although popular debugging tools such as OllyDbg and 
IDA Pro have plugins to help hide the debugger such as Olly Advanced 
and IDA Stealth respectively, their coverage of techniques is relatively 
limited given the much larger number of techniques that are available in 
contrast to the number of techniques covered by the plugins. Additionally, 
these plugins concentrate mostly in hiding the debugger leaving a 
considerable lack of overall mitigation coverage for the remainder of the 
techniques. This leaves considerable work to be done in providing mitigation 
coverage for the remaining techniques in tools and scripts.  
 
6.6. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
6.6.1. Methodology 
Although the research questions were answered via the literature review, 
validated through quasi-experimentation and detection of the use of 
packers and protectors in collected malware, other research methods would 
be of assistance, particularly to assist in triangulation to gain an improved 
perspective of this phenomena. This could include a case study where 
observations are made of how malware analysts in the field detect and 
mitigate anti-forensic techniques.  It could include survey research 
conducted via questionnaires and structured interviews of malware analysts 
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in the field to find data to address a hypothesis such as “Is Malware 
increasingly using anti forensic techniques”. Conceivably, given the 
complexity of malware, teams of malware analysts have specialties and 
work together. A ethnography could be conducted to find meaning through 
field observation of malware analysts and how they work together and 
detect and mitigate anti-forensic techniques. Additionally, action research 
could be conducted to interact with malware analysts in the field to assist in 
improving the processes and methodologies associated with countering anti-
forensic techniques in malware.  
 
Although detection and mitigation scripts were validated against the 
implemented techniques, they were not used against the collected malware 
because of the restraints of the research questions and limitations of time. 
This remains as an activity to pursue. 
 
6.7. DISCUSSION OF CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 
This research claims to contribute to the body of knowledge associated with 
the anti-analysis techniques malware can incorporate to hinder forensic 
analysis. These claims are discussed in the following subsections. 
 
6.7.1. Confirmation that anti-analysis techniques are very effective 
This research shows that a variety of techniques are available to authors of 
malware to hinder the malware forensic analyst from fully discovering the 
capabilities of the malware. Malware can use these techniques to detect if it 
is being analyzed and can then use deception to hide its true intent (Brand, 
2007; Eagle, 2008a; Falliere, 2007; Grugq, n.d.; Yason, 2007). This 
research shows how these techniques work, how the use of these 
techniques can be detected and how they can be mitigated. This line of 
research that combines these three aspects has not been located in existing 
research. 
6.7.2. Anti-analysis techniques can be detected and mitigated 
This research shows that the use of scripting for debuggers and 
disassemblers extends the functionality of the tools to facilitate the 
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detection and mitigation of analysis avoidance techniques employed by 
malware. This research recommends that the development of debugger and 
disassembly scripting skills is a requisite to being able to detect and counter 
analysis avoidance techniques of malware. This contribution exists at the 
current front line of research in the detection of malware. 
6.7.3. Confirmation that virus signature detection is less than ideal 
An examination of a sample of the malware specimens collected for the 
purposes of this research shows that even though the majority of the 
malware collected had been “in the wild” for up to, or exceeding one year, 
the unanimous detection by a collection of thirty six AV detection engines 
was only 10.4%. The particular AV engine used by the Anubis 
(International Secure Systems Lab et al., 2008) online virus analyzer only 
recorded a 73.7% detection rate. This is a significant and potentially 
alarming result. It indicates that even though it is accepted computer 
security policy to run AV software, detection of all malware could be highly 
unlikely. This is supports the findings of other researchers (Masood, 2004; 
Mohandas, n.d.; Skoudis & Zeltser, 2004; Szewczyk & Brand, 2008). 
6.7.4. Malware extensively uses Packers and Protectors 
Runtime packers are utilized by network based malware to compress 
malware and to act as a counter measure to signature based AV software  
via obfuscation (Sun et al., 2008). The packed malware has to be unpacked 
to be able to perform a detailed static analysis because packed malware 
obfuscates the malware code. Knowledge of the packer used, assists in the 
process of unpacking because the appropriate unpacking methodology can 
be employed. Software tools are available that attempt to determine the 
name of the packer that was used to pack the malware. This research 
shows that two popular packer detectors that were used by this researcher 
did not agree on the names of any of the packers that were used. This is 
significant because it indicates uncertainty could be associated with the 
determined packer signatures and more in depth analysis is required to 
validate the type of packing that was conducted. The line of this research 
was extended to examine entropy (randomness) measurements of the 
packed malware as a method of determining if the collected malware was 
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packed or not. Entropy measurements are shown in this research to be a 
very good indicator that malware has been packed. 
6.7.5. Support for a new paradigm for malware detection 
AV software typically uses signature matching and recognition of heuristics 
to detect malware. This approach generally requires the malware to have 
been collected “from the wild”, analyzed and signatures downloaded to 
client computers to approach any level of effectiveness.  Significant damage 
to computers could occur between the time of collection and signature 
updates have been performed. In addition, it is very unlikely that AV 
software will detect custom malware that has not been set loose on the 
internet, but targeted against an individual or a corporation because it will 
not have been analyzed and a signature will not have been obtained by an 
AV company.  AV software that uses this approach is seen to be fighting a 
losing battle in the literature and from this research (Mila Dalla et al., 2008; 
Zhou & Meador Inge, 2008). This research supports a proposal for a new 
paradigm for malware detection. In particular, this research proposes that 
detection of deception and anti-analysis techniques in software should flag 
the software as potentially malicious and delegate for further in depth 
analysis or removal. 
6.7.6. Identification of analysis tool deficiencies 
A number of software tools are utilized by malware forensic analysts. Static 
analysis and dynamic analysis are two methodologies that can be used to 
analyse the malware (Aquilina et al., 2008). Software disassemblers and 
debuggers such as IDA Pro (Hex-Rays, 2008) and OllyDBg (Yuschuk, 
2008) can be used to perform a detailed analysis of the malware code and 
provide an internal view of the malwares functionality (Valli & Brand, 2008). 
This is referred to as static analysis. In contrast, dynamic analysis runs the 
malware and observes the interaction of the running malware with the 
computer from an external point of view. A number of plug-ins that extend 
the functionality of IDA Pro and OllyDBg include IDA Stealth (Newger, 
2008) and Olly Advanced (MaRKuS, 2006) respectively to work with 
malicious code that employ anti-analysis techniques. The intention of such 
plug-ins is to provide functionality to hide their associated tools from the 
malware they are analyzing. The research in this thesis shows that the 
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number of anti forensic techniques covered by such plug-ins is much less 
than the number of techniques that are available to be implemented by 
malware. In addition, this research shows that although the plug-ins 
successfully hides the debugger or disassembler, the tools do not provide 
any information to the analyst about having detected the use of analysis 
avoidance techniques. This is significant because detection of the use of 
anti-analysis techniques in software may be of assistance to a digital 
forensic investigator to show that deception was used to hide malicious 
intent. 
6.7.7. Determination of suitable malware analysis methodology 
Essentially, types of malware analysis fall under two main categories, 
dynamic analysis and static analysis.  Dynamic analysis means the code is 
run and its behaviour and interaction with the computer it is running on, 
and the interaction with inter connected computers is observed. Static 
analysis means that the code is not run, but the code itself is analyzed to 
determine the functionality and capability of the code. Generally, dynamic 
analysis is easier to perform than static analysis but malware can more 
easily employ deception to hide its true intent without the analyst being 
aware of it. In reality, both types of analysis can be subverted. This 
research recommends that given the deceptive nature of malware, a 
combination of dynamic and static analysis is best performed in a sequential 
manner to mitigate analysis avoidance techniques. Fundamentally, this 
means that an initial high level static analysis of the malware is first 
performed. Using this information, a high level dynamic analysis is 
conducted using the information from the first static analysis to setup a 
suitable working environment.  Information gathered from this phase is 
used as an input to conduct a more detailed static analysis, mitigating 
analysis avoidance counter measures in the malware. This process of 
dynamic analysis following static analysis is then followed, spiraling in from 
a high level of perspective until a low level of perspective of the malware is 
attained. This is very much along the lines recommended by Zeltser (2007), 
but explicitly adds the search for anti forensic techniques and subsequent 
mitigation as the analysis proceeds. 
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6.7.8. Development of a taxonomy of analysis avoidance techniques 
This research amalgamates existing anti-analysis technique taxonomies into 
a single taxonomy as shown in Table 6-2 (Falliere, 2007; Ferrie, 2008; 
Yason, 2007). This is envisaged as being potentially very useful for 
classification purposes. 
 
6.7.9. Malware Analysis Body of Knowledge 
This research has shown that malware does make extensive use of packers 
and protectors to hinder analysis. This research has also shown that the 
recursive and iterative approach outlined by Zeltser (2007) to analyse 
malware is the most effective methodology to detect and mitigate anti-
analysis techniques as they are uncovered to continue analysis. 
Combination of these two findings led to a proposed analysis process that 
incorporates a learning taxonomy and is reproduced from the paper by Valli 
and Brand (2008, p. 3) as Figure 6-3. Research remains to be done on 
developing the learning taxonomy that incorporates anti-analysis techniques 
into the malware analysis process. This research could possibly be 
continued with surveys, case studies and ethnographies with AV software 
company malware analysts and malware academic researchers. Nothing on 
this particular research front has been able to be ascertained from known, 
existing research. This line of research would also benefit from a study of 
learning taxonomies such as Bloom’s learning taxonomy which divides 
educational objectives into three domains, affective, cognitive and 
psychomotor (Anderson et al., 2001). 
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Figure 6-3 Malware analysis process incorporating a learning 
taxonomy that assists in the development of the MABOK. 
 
 
The paper by Valli and Brand (2008) identified a Malware Analysis Body of 
Knowledge (MABOK) that could “be used as a framework for competency 
development and assessment for the field of malware analysis” (Valli & 
Brand, 2008, p. 2). Essentially this is because malware analysis is 
recognised to be difficult and a very broad knowledge domain is required to 
undertake detailed, in-depth analysis of malware. A knowledge domain 
identified by Valli and Brand (2008, p. 4) essentially from the research 
conducted for this thesis, is reproduced as Figure 6-4. Essentially, the 
diagram shows eight, high level categories of knowledge that are required 
to undertake malware analysis. The next lower stratum identifies numerous 
sub-domains of knowledge that could also be broken down into even more 
sub-domains.  
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Figure 6-4 Model of the learning domain of the Malware Analysis Body of Knowledge (MABOK)
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6.8. FUTURE RESEARCH 
The lines of enquiry examined in this research could be extended in a 
number of avenues, as outlined in the following sub sections. 
6.8.1. Hypothesis 
Future research could include addressing a hypothesis such as: 
• Network based malware is increasingly using anti forensic techniques. 
 
This could be conducted by examining the network based malware collected 
by the ECU Nepenthes honeypot using the analysis avoidance detection 
and mitigation scripts presented in this thesis using a positivist, empirical, 
quasi experimental research methodology as outlined in this thesis.  
6.8.2. Plugin Development 
This research noted that plugins such as IDAStealth and OllyAdvanced 
provide coverage for only a subset of analysis avoidance techniques 
Additional research could be conducted on extending the coverage of 
techniques of such plugins. A limitation of the existing plugins is that their 
focus is on hiding the debugger and do not have the ability to detect and log 
the use of anti-analysis techniques. The detection and logging of techniques 
as they are discovered during forensic analysis of malware could assist in 
the collection of evidence suitable for a court of law. 
6.8.3. Collation of Techniques 
This research revealed an extensive range of analysis avoidance techniques 
that is distributed amongst research papers, hacking and reverse 
engineering sites. Detection and mitigation techniques are not represented 
any where near the same extent in academic literature or on hacking and 
reverse engineering sites. A very useful contribution to the field of malware 
analysis research could be to collate analysis avoidance techniques together 
with their corresponding detection and mitigation techniques into a central 
library and to develop an encompassing taxonomy. 
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6.8.4. Improved Packer Signature Detection 
Packer signature detection has been revealed in this research to be an area 
that requires further and most likely, continual research. This also extends 
to the area of unpacking packed malware as well. This is because malware 
can use multiple packers not only from a sequential sense, for example, 
pack the entire malware specimen with packer A and then pack the result 
with packer B, but firstly pack sections of code with packer A and then pack 
the result with packer B. This last scenario is another deception trick that is 
generally only uncovered once manual analysis is conducted. It is possible 
that an automated analysis process may miss the second (or third, or more) 
level of packing. This remains an area of research that lacks published work. 
 
6.8.5. A New Paradigm for Malware Detection 
This research has shown that AV software to be less than fully effective at 
detecting malware. Research could continue into investigating a new 
paradigm for malware detection, particularly by detecting the use of anti-
analysis techniques in scanned software and flagging it for more detailed 
attention.  
 
6.8.6. A Model for Automating the Spiral Analysis Methodology 
The spiral analysis methodology depicted in Figure 6-2 was proposed as a 
suitable process to follow to detect and mitigate anti-forensic techniques 
employed by malware in a very manual, labor intensive manner. This same 
methodology is presented in Figure 6-5 in the form of a process diagram 
that could be implemented in software to more automate the malware 
analysis process where anti-forensic techniques need to be detected and 
mitigated. It shows malware under investigation as the input to the process 
that employs the spiral analysis methodology. A central control supervisor 
processor is responsible for managing each step and phase of the analysis, 
where recording, processing and reporting is managed or delegated to a sub 
process. The supervisor function interacts with each phase by providing 
control over the constituent steps in each phase. It also acts as the 
recipient of data which is produced by each phase which is required to make 
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decisions on how to tailor the subsequent phases.  In addition to assisting 
the forensic analyst, such a process could be a supplementary tool, or a 
replacement, for traditional signature and heuristic based anti-virus 
software. This is because detection of the use of deception techniques could 
be a very good indicator of malicious intent as argued by this research. 
Continuation of this line of research into automating the analysis process is 
left to be researched. 
 
 
Figure 6-5 Proposed process model to automate the spiral analysis 
methodology which recursively and iteratively detects and mitigates 
static and dynamic anti-analysis techniques 
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION 
7.1. ANALYSIS AVOIDANCE TECHNIQUES OF MALWARE 
AV software generally employs heuristics and signature matching to detect 
the presence of malware. Determination of the signatures and heuristics of 
malware is performed by analysts and sent out in updates to the signature 
files anti-virus software depends on to detect its presence. It is not 
uncommon for these updates to be conducted multiple times per day 
because of the large number of new malicious threats that appear each day 
on the internet. AV software has been shown in this research to be less than 
fully effective and this supports the claims of other AV researchers. Malware 
can employ a variety of techniques to avoid detection by anti-virus software 
and hinder the analysis conducted by analysts. This is because malware is 
becoming increasingly profit driven and more likely to incorporate stealth 
and deception techniques to avoid detection. 
 
Malware has an extensive range of anti-forensic techniques that it can 
incorporate into its overall functionality to hinder analysis. This can include, 
but is not limited to the following taxonomy of techniques: 
• Anti emulation 
• Anti online analysis 
• Anti hardware 
• Anti debugger 
• Anti disassembler 
• Anti tools 
• Anti memory 
• Anti process 
• Anti-analysis 
• Packers and Protectors 
• Rootkits 
 
The overall aim of malware that incorporates these techniques is to defeat 
the signature and heuristic based nature of anti-virus software and to 
hinder the forensic analyst by making detailed analysis time consuming and 
difficult. This research has validated a number of these techniques and all 
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proved to be effective. This research has also shown that these techniques 
can be detected and their use mitigated so that detailed forensic analysis 
can be conducted. However, it remains a time consuming activity, based on 
methodology and analysis that requires a very broad range of knowledge 
and a significant skill set. Competence with scripting languages associated 
with the popular debuggers is a requisite to being able to detect and 
mitigate these techniques, particularly when new techniques arise. This is 
because the coverage of the techniques in existing plugins and scripts is 
limited. Plugins tend to concentrate on hiding the debugger, or mitigate 
only a small number of the anti-analysis techniques that are available. This 
is identified as a limitation analysts must be aware of. Existing analysis 
scripts for some tools are more prevalent than for other tools. In either case, 
the forensic analyst will need the ability to create or modify existing scripts 
to conform to the requirements of the tools that the forensic analyst has 
validated as forensically sound to employ. 
7.2. CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 
This research contributes to the body of knowledge directly related to the 
anti-analysis techniques malware incorporates into its code, from a variety 
of perspectives, as outlined in the following sub sections. 
7.2.1. Confirmation that anti-analysis techniques are very effective 
This research shows that a variety of techniques are available to authors of 
malware to hinder the malware forensic analyst from fully discovering the 
capabilities of the malware.  
7.2.2. Anti-analysis techniques can be detected and mitigated 
This research shows that the use of scripting for debuggers and 
disassemblers extends the functionality of the tools to facilitate the 
detection and mitigation of analysis avoidance techniques employed by 
malware.  
7.2.3. Confirmation that virus signature detection is less than ideal 
An examination of a sample of the malware specimens collected for the 
purposes of this research shows that even though the majority of the 
malware collected had been “in the wild” for up to, or exceeding one year, 
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the unanimous detection by a collection of thirty six AV detection engines 
was only 10.4%.  
7.2.4. Malware extensively uses Packers and Protectors 
Runtime packers are utilized by network based malware to compress 
malware and to act as a counter measure to signature based AV software  
via obfuscation (Sun et al., 2008). Entropy measurements are shown in this 
research to be a very good indicator that malware has been packed. 
7.2.5. Support for a new paradigm for malware detection 
This research supports a proposal for a new paradigm for malware detection. 
In particular, this research proposes that detection of deception and anti-
analysis techniques in software should flag the software as potentially 
malicious and delegate for further in depth analysis or removal. 
7.2.6. Identification of a Malware Body of Knowledge 
The knowledge required to analyse malware is extensive. A Malware 
Analysis Body of Knowledge (MABOK) has been identified from the conduct 
of this research, to include anti-forensics as a very significant component.  
7.2.7. Identification of analysis tool deficiencies 
The research in this thesis shows that the number of anti forensic 
techniques covered by such plug-ins is much less than the number of 
techniques that are available to be implemented by malware. In addition, 
this research shows that although the plug-ins successfully hides the 
debugger or disassembler, the tools do not provide any information to the 
analyst about having detected the use of analysis avoidance techniques. 
This is significant because detection of the use of anti-analysis techniques in 
software may be of assistance to a digital forensic investigator to show that 
deception was used to hide malicious intent. 
7.2.8. Determination of a suitable malware analysis methodology 
This research outlines a suitable methodology for analyzing malware that 
incorporates anti-analysis techniques. 
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7.2.9. Development of a taxonomy of analysis avoidance techniques 
This research amalgamates existing anti-analysis technique taxonomies into 
a single taxonomy. 
 
7.3. LINKING OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE 
Malware can use anti-forensic techniques and use deception to hide its real 
purpose whilst being analyzed. If it does not perform any malicious action 
while it is being analyzed, it may be accepted on the system as being safe, 
or excluded from the evidence collection process. Then once free from 
analysis, the malware can perform its original, malicious objective. Some 
considerations must be made in order to closely analyze malware. Firstly, 
totally relying on AV software to classify the malware could be a mistake 
because signature based detection is far less than ideal. It is unlikely to 
recognize customized malware that has not been analyzed before. This 
leads to necessity of the digital forensic analyst to analyze the malware 
manually. It must be noted that a significant number of anti-analysis 
techniques exist covering the entire spectrum of the computational 
mechanics of computers. These techniques are very effective at hindering 
analysis. This can be compounded by additional factors. This includes 
deficiencies in analysis tools that do not cover the number of anti-analysis 
techniques that are available. It is made more difficult by the number of 
packers and protectors that malware can use. This makes it hard because a 
typical technique to unpack the malware is to use known algorithms to let 
the malware unpack itself to reach the OEP. In doing so, control is given to 
the malware and an opportunity exists for the malware to detect that is 
being analyzed and to employ deception. An additional consideration is that 
a very extensive knowledge of programming, debugging and operating 
system internals is required that arguably exceeds the level attained even 
by competent software engineers. On the positive side, the use of anti-
analysis techniques can be detected and mitigated, given significant 
analysis skills have been attained. This can be assisted by using an 
appropriate methodology where static and dynamic methods are combined 
in such a way that the view of the malware transitions from a high level of 
detail down to a low level of detail, mitigating the anti-analysis techniques 
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as analysis progresses in a spiral analysis methodology. Although legitimate 
software uses anti-analysis techniques to protect itself from reverse 
engineers, malware is almost certain to use anti-analysis techniques. So 
much so, the detection of the use of anti-analysis techniques may be a very 
good indicator of the presence of malware. 
7.4. LESSONS LEARNED FROM RESEARCH APPROACH AND 
CONDUCT 
The selected research method to address the research questions was 
positivist, empirical and quasi experimental. The research questions were 
essentially exploratory in nature. Validation of the techniques, followed by 
their detection and mitigation, was conducted in a series of controlled quasi-
experiments. This effectively answered the research questions. Other 
empirical methods such as action research, ethnography, survey and case 
study could have been used, but would have required access to malware 
researchers desirably working in AV software laboratories for an extended 
period of time, and preferably, in situ. Such access is not possible for this 
researcher at this time. A combination of these methods would not have 
necessarily enhanced the validity of the results but would have undoubtedly 
contributed to answering the research questions. Triangulation would have 
been assisted by using additional tools to validate the results as would have 
using multiple analysts to perform the quasi experiments.  
7.5. RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS 
A number of significant implications have arisen from this research. A large 
number of anti-analysis techniques were uncovered and found to be very 
effective when implemented in small stand alone programs. These same 
techniques could be detected and mitigated by the development of scripts 
and plugins. Existing analysis tools serve primarily to hide the tools from 
being counter detected by the malware and cover a small minority of the 
available techniques malware can use to hinder analysis. These tools do not 
provide functionality to log or record detection of analysis avoidance 
techniques. Logging or recording of these techniques may be of great use to 
the digital forensic investigator when analyzing malware whilst investigating 
a case. Functionality can be added to existing tools by custom development 
of scripts and plugins. Knowledge of analysis avoidance techniques and 
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being able to script and develop plugins adds to a body of knowledge, the 
MABOK, identified by this research. The MABOK covers the knowledge 
domain required to analyse malware and will be useful for assessment and 
skill development for analysts working with malware. In addition, this 
research shows an appropriate methodology should be employed by the 
forensic analyst to detect and mitigate these anti-analysis techniques as 
analysis continues. 
 
This research supports claims that AV software performs at a less than ideal 
level and that a new paradigm is warranted. This research recommends that 
any software that employs anti-analysis techniques be treated as suspicious. 
This is because a characteristic employed by nearly all malware examined in 
this research employed anti forensic techniques, primarily packers and 
protectors.  
 
Deficiencies in existing tools and plugins were found in the tools used for 
this research with respect to handling anti forensic techniques. This 
exemplifies the need for analysts to be able to conduct manual analysis and 
to not rely on automated tools. In addition, this emphasizes the importance 
of possessing the ability to be able to extend the functionality of the tools 
on an as required basis. 
 
This research can be continued on a number of fronts. Firstly, it could 
continue the search for anti forensic techniques employed by the malware 
that was collected for the purposes of this research. Such a line of enquiry 
could use the existing detection and mitigation scripts as a foundation and 
continue in the development and use against the collected malware. This 
work could use a hypothesis such as “malware is increasingly using anti 
forensic techniques” and show the use of the techniques over time for 
collected malware. 
 
Another line of enquiry would be to use the detection of anti forensic 
techniques as a new paradigm for AV software. This would very much suit 
the application of the true experiment research methodology. 
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